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CHAPTER I
THE ISSUES AND THEIR BACKGROUND
The central problem of this dissertation is stated in
its title: Does the understanding of wholes require both
analysis and synopsis? This question implies that there is
a difference between the analytic and synoptic methods. To
find this difference the dissertation examines views of men
who say they use analysis or synopsis in order to understand
wholes of various kinds. This dissertation asks whether the
distinction between analysis and synopsis is more than verbal.
It asks what a synoptic method over and against analysis
might do for understanding wholes better. But before these
questions are asked, the meanings of "whole," "sum," "part,”
and the like must be clear. And finally, it is asked hew
recent developments in natural science show, as some men have
claimed, a "synoptic" or "holistic" method. At the end of
this chapter the specific content of later chapters will be
outlined.
A. The Contemporary "Organismic" Point of View.
In recent times "organismic," "holistic," or "ganzheit -
lich " philosophies have become prominent and popular. They
use, in various ways, the conclusions of natural scientists
and try to show that all entities in the world have a struc-
ture something like that of a living thing. They say that
"wholeness" is the most important characteristic of every
entity. Such developments in present physics as field theories,
the quantum of action, and the "uncertainty principle" are
1
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2taken, though sometimes indirectly, as supports for this
"holistic” or 'organismic’
1
perspective. Biology furnishes even
more evidence and encouragement: the complexly patterned
activities of the organism and the emergent products of evo-
lution seem patently to defy a "dissecting" method. Inter-
preters of the “organismic" and "holistic " perspective have de-
rived considerable impetus from Gestalt psychology 1 which
emphasizes the dynamic patterns of experience as opposed to an
elementaristic or machine theory of sensations.
All these philosophies, it will be seen, involve the
distinction between a true, genuine, or organic whole and a
mechanical aggregate or collection. In most cases they main-
tain that the most fundamental and pervasive wholes are those
of the former type, whereas a now-antiquated analytic or
abstracting method mistakenly tends to reduce all wholes to
mere aggregates. For Burkamp the basis of contrast is the
new versus the old intellectual method:
War ffl.r den Jungen Descartes und seine Zeit, ja
fUr die ganze Zeit des strengen Rationalismus bis
Leibniz der konstruktive Aufbau der Erkenntnis aus
elementaren Beziehungen und Eigenschaften von Ele-
menten der Schlflssel zur Lftsung aller Fragen, so ist
es heute im Gegensatz dazu jugendlich himmelsttir-
mende Geister die Synopsis und Synergetik eines
Ganzen im Schauen, im Denken, in der biologischen
Wirksamkeit. Sogar der Physik und der Mathematik
wird diese bessere Denkweise dringend zur Annahme
empfohlen.2
1. Consult bibliography for explanation of standard abbrevia'
tion system used in footnotes. See von Mises, KLP, 317ff on
relation of Gestalt psychology to contemporary organismic
perspective. See below. Chapter V.
2. SG, vii. Burkamo insists that all wholes with self-per-
oetuating structure (the earth, a proton, organisms, or the
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5The classical period of synoptic and ''holistic' thought , Bur-
kamp notes, was that of Hamann, Herder, and Goethe in con-
trast to the epoch of "partial-re lationism" in which Galileo
and Descartes lived.
Similarly, the basis for Smuts* philosophy, called
"holism^
1
is the difference between the hard, limited, and
rigid intellectual tools of the last century and the more
plastic and fluid ones of the present. Smuts offers as the
basic thesis of his philosophy:
Every organism, every plant or animal, is a whole,
with a certain internal organization and a measure
of self-direction, and an individual specific char-
acter of its own....Not only are plants and animals
wholes, but in a certain limited sense the natural
collocations of matter in the universe are wholes;
atoms, molecules, and chemical compounds are limited
wholes.
-
Such a thesis implies that a rigidly mechanistic and analytic
method of investigation is inadequate since in a whole the
"togetherness is not mechanical" and since the whole "is
more than the sum of its parts. Smuts does not go very
far toward developing a specifically "holistic" methodology.
Along this line he makes the suggestive observation that in
the nineteenth century there was a dominance of "partial and
misleading abstractions" as the rigid categories of physics
state) and all causal wholes (a locomotive or an organism)
show conformity to purpose as one of their primary character'
istics. See SG, 88, 59, 102-105.
3. Ibid., 349.
4. HE, 98.
5. Ibid., 101.
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4were applied to life and mind to miss the structured, inter-
mingling-field character of all events. rflaroughout Holism and
Evolution Smuts interprets developments of modern science,
especially physics and biology, as indicating that everything
in the world — a collection of matter, an organism, conscious-
ness, and personality — is a whole exemplifying the basic
0
category of individuality.
Whitehead’ s philosophy is probably the most sophisticated
and circumspect statement of the "organ! smic" point of view. The
"philosophy of organism" is an attempt to show how every
actual entity is a "cell-complex" or "system of all things"
which mirrors the universe. Actual entities express the ulti-
mate metaphysical truth of atomism but they are complex. An
actual entity is a "unity of feeling," a process, ens orehend-
7
ens . Germinal to Whitehead’ s view is a contrast between the
abstract and concrete way of looking at things:
The whole concept of materialism only applies to very
abstract entities, the products of logical discernment.
The concrete enduring entities are organisms, so that
the plan of the whole influences the very characters of
the various subordinate organisms which enter into it.®
Whitehead everywhere exposes the serious error of mistaking an
abstract object for a concrete and genuinely whole one. This
is the fallacy of "misplaced concreteness." Even physical sci-
ence, in reconsidering its foundations so as to get out of
6. See 16-18, 140, 98, 107.
7. Whitehead, PR, 53, 65, 334.
8. SMW, 115.
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5difficult theoretical ruts, "must recur to a more concrete
view of the character of real things, and must conceive its
fundamental notions as abstractions derived from this direct
intuition."^ Since abstract thinkers fail to take account
of ’’the whole evidence," they must miss essential features of
every event, for example, the element of attainment or reali-
zation. 10 Taking his cue from Whitehead 1 s "reconstruction,"
0. L. Reiser applies the notion of organism and Gestalt to
space, time, atoms, and the cosmos itself .
H
Again, 'Whitehead’s
views have noticeably influenced the thinking of Charles
Hartshorne. They have helped to shape his "societal psychism"
which entails an "organismic" interpretation of physical
phenomena and a persistent search throughout the realm of
existence for "individuals" marked by various degrees of inte-
gration. 12
In a book entitled The World As An Organic 'Whole N. 0.
Lossky opposes the organic view to materialistic atomism.
"Organicism" means the priority of the whole or system to the
parts. Lossky states his basic thesis:
It Is the whole that exists primarily and the elements
can exist and come into being only within the system
of the whole.... In other words, the whole is prior to
the parts; the absolute must be sought In the domain
of wholeness or, rather, beyond it, and certainly not
among the elements; the elements are In any case
9. 'Whitehead, SMW, 196.
10. See ibid., 268, 156, 152.
11. See Art. (1954), 198-200.
12. See BH, 287-289, 190. Cf. Art. (1935), 290-295.
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derivative and relative; i.e. they only exist
in relation to the system of which they are mem-
bers. I3
6
A real or organic whole stands in contrast to a mere summation
of elements. It is what Kdhler means by Gestalt . Los sky is
aware that such views entail distinctive methodology. The
notion of organic whole lies at the root of every judgment
about any object because every object must be discriminated
out of a given whole. Lossky's defense of "organismic 1 philos-
ophy plainly suggests the mare’s nest of epistemological prob-
14lems that hover in the background.
Marvin Black's book entitled The Pendulum Swings Back
is a popularized defense of views like those of Lossky, Smuts,
and others. It is guided by the methodological thesis that
Science today is not content with the purely
mechanical explanation of reality but has a much
broader vision and is "seeing things together" as
parts of a unified whole. Contrary to the dogmatic
assumptions of certain schools of thought. Science
today is not opposed to the synoptic attitude but
rather encourages it.
By synoptic attitude Black means a method of investigation
which takes into account what poets and artists have "intui-
tively felt, rather than intellectual perceived, the vision
of things as totalities, .. .in their wholeness." Contemporary
scientific methods and findings. Black offers, require a non-
mechanistic philosophy behind physical science and a recognition
13. WOW, 2.
14. See ibid., 11-12, 2
15. Black, PSB, 8.
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7of a "more ‘beyond" in physico-chemical behavior. For the
most part, however. Black's book is more of a statement of
scientific results supporting an "organic view" than it is
a self-conscious and radical inquiry into methodological
problems.
Many other thinkers are inclined toward the "organismic"
thesis.'1'7 But often they are not so circumspect as to its
grounds and so precise in their contrasts. T. H. Howells' book,
ineptly entitled Hunger for Wholiness , applies to the study of
human nature in life, play, art, and religion a thesis much
like that of R. H. Wheeler who holds that "The logical pattern
underlying twentieth century science is. .
.
organismic in that
the major interest in science lies in the part-whole relation.
Like the years around 1250, 1650, and 1820 the present era is,
according to Wheeler, another cyclical swing toward the "organ-
ismic position." The superficial sweep of Wheeler's generali-
zations is matched by Howells' too gratuitous and uncritical
16. Black, PSB, 36-57, 20-21, 55-56.
17. With basic motives quite unlike those of Marvin Black or
N. 0. Lossky the Marxian dialectical materialists also aim to
show that contemporary scientific results require a nonmechan-
istic perspective. "The mechanistic world picture," writes A.
Emery, "is out-dated and discarded." The characteristic traits
of modern natural science, Marxists hold, seem to support and
require a dialectical philosophy: "Matter, movement, space and
time are one continuum, a dialectical unity of content and
form. ...From the whole of the world process special events ori-
ginate without losing their unity with the whole. Each indi-
vidual phenomenon, everything we perceive is such a special pro-
cess. The perceptible matter which mechanics calls material
point is merely a point of juncture of the non-immediately per-
ceived continuum." (Emery, Art. (1935), 18-20. Cf. Somerville,
Art. (1938), 233; Haldane, Art. (1934), 79.) In the philosophy
of dialectical materialism togetherness, organization, or whole-
ness and process are the central categories.
18. Art. (1936), 26. See 61, 26-27. Cf. Howells, HFW, 86.
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8thesis that the relativity theory in physical science implies
that the thought -pattern of the present era is " organ! smic ." 10
In a later chapter there will he occasion to notice how the
relativity theory is a continuation of the work of Galileo and
Newton, using the same methods in wider fields. Nevertheless
there are certain phases of recent physical science which do
lend credibility to the synoptic and ’brganismic" point of view. 20
As Whitehead, Burkamp, and other contemporary thinkers
have noticed, the "organismic" view is closely related to the
romantic emphasis in literature and philosophy. Writing of the
mental habits that shape the history of ideas, A. 0. Love joy sug-
gests that in a romantic period
you find the simple becoming an object of suspicion
and even detestation, and what Friedrich Schlegel
called eine romantische Verwirrung the quality most
valued in temperaments, in poems, and in universes. 1
With a romantic emphasis the "organismic motive" predominates.
Wordsworth’s protest that "We murder to dissect" reflected his
appreciation of nature as a living whole not amenable to the ways
of the scientist and analyst. Goethe, who is often referred to
as romanticist par excellence , would not tolerate mythology and
legend in science to the disadvantage of observation and
19. See Howells, HFW, 18. Wheeler writes that the 1255... 1935
thought-pattern has 28 characteristics including: part-whole
relation, system, rationalism, teleology, socialism, over-
summative wholes, etc. This in contrast to the characteristics
of 1400, 1775, 1860: aggregates, planless world, laissez-faire,
hedonism, domination of feeling, etc. (Art. [1936], 27-29.) Com-
pare these remarks with Howells': "The whole is modexst; the
part is exhibitionist ... .The whole impresses the introvert; the
part impresses the extrovert." (HFW, 30.)
20. See below, 132-140.
21. GCB, 10.
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9experiment
:
Weder Mythologie noch Legenden sind in der Wissen-
schaft zu dulden. Lasse man diese den Poeten, die
berufen sind, sie zu Nutz und Freude der Welt zu
behandeln. Der wissenschaftliche Mann beschr&nke
sich auf die nfichste klarste Gegenwart. 22
Nevertheless Goethe's lines in Faust seem to ask for the pri-
macy ndes schauenden Bewusstseins" or what Marvin Black
called synopsis. Mephistopheles taunts the scientists:
7/er will was Lebendigs erkennen und beschreiben,
Sucht erst den Geist heraus zu treiben,
Dann hat er die Teile in siener Hand,
Fehlt leiderl nur das geistige Band.
Many other scientists and philosophers might be men-
r>'z
tioned as endorsing the organismic perspective. Subsequently
it will be shown how some central figures in the history of
philosophy since the Greek cosmologists have been interested,
directly and indirectly, in the nature of wholes and the
methods appropriate to investigating them. Citations of some
22. Goethe, SW, XXXIX ( Schriften zur Naturwissenschaften . 1),
69-70. See ibid., 26-28 ( nSrfahrung und Wissenschaft " ) for a
lucid description of scientific method as it is actually prac-
ticed. Von Mises well protests an uncritical use of Goethe's
name as a rallying-cry for anthroposophy and the "schaunden
Bewusstsein. " In the subsequent historical chapter there will
be further reference to Goethe's methodological contributions.
23. Othmar Spann, the German sociologist, is an ardent exponent
of the organismic perspective. In Tote und lebendige Wis sen-
sehaft (4-5) he writes: "Dies aHein ist das Grundlegende
,
ist
die Ur-Aufgabe aller gesellschaftlichen Wissenschaft : zu
begreifen, was Ganzheit sei, und welcher vollkommene Gegensatz
bestehe zwischen henem Verfahren, das aus einselnen Stticken
ein ( scheinbares ) Ganzes zusammenstellen will, und henem andern,
dem Ganzheit ein Erstes, das Erstwesentliche, Unableitbare
(Primfire), all© Einzelheit dagegen nur abgeleiteter, glied-
licher Teil ist." (Quoted by von Mises in KLP, 322) Again,
Aloys Wenzl, professor of philosophy at Munich, writes: "Es
gibt in der neuen Atomphysik Gesetzm&ssigkeiten, die sich nur
aussprechen lassen mit Bezug auf ein zusammenh&ngendes Ganzes,
nicht mit Bezug auf die Element selbst, Ganzheiten also, in
denen jeder Teil sozusagen auf anderen Riicksicht nimmt." (From
Frank
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contemporary theories show the urgency and vitality of
these issues.
In all the views mentioned thus far there was implied
a difference between a "concrete” and "abstract" way of
looking at complex things. The concrete way brings a
reference to different forms of togetherness that distinguish
wholes one from another and to the unique and irreduciable
properties a whole may have in contrast to its parts. The
abstract way misses these features. In the end it tends to
see all wholes as being merely parts-in-a-certain-order.
In all the views mentioned thus far there were
methodological questions in the background threatening to
become articulate — the analytic dissecting method versus
a "synoptic" method more adequate to wholes, questions
about abstraction and elimination of data relevant to judg-
ments about wholes, and the place of concrete intuition In
comprehending wholes.
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B. Direct Anticipations of the Dissertation Problem.
The various "holistic" and "organismic" philosophies
discussed earlier only suggest the central problem of this
dissertation. But there is a direct assault on it in the
writings of Lewis W. Beck. Those writings are listed in
the bibliography at the end of this dissertation.
The writings of Lewis W. Beck advance the problem of
24
this dissertation in important ways. He shows, in an
effort to outline the unique features of synoptic method,
how various claims for that method have been either too
little, too much, or all together too indefinite. In
criticism of Merz, Beck argues that it is not enough to re-
gard "acknowledgement of an oversummative property" in a
whole as being the unique contribution of synopsis. Such
acknowledgement requires only an intuition or acquaintance.
And that is not enough to tell us whether we have a whole
and what kind it is. Further, Beck shows that our know-
ledge of wholes and parts requires experience and experiments
tion. In this he agrees with Spaulding that deductive logic
is not sufficient.
But despite these valuable advances Beck f s view of
synopsis is not enough. He believes that it differs from
and corrects Spaulding 1 s analytic method of dealing with
wholes. In Chapter III of this dissertation, however, you
24. See below, 113-119
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12
will see that the main difference between Beck’s "synopsis"
and Spaulding’s "analysis" is one of names.
B. Definitions.
1. Analysis.
Analysis is ordinarily taken to mean the resolution
of any object into elements or parts. Inasmuch as it re-
fers to the process of resolving as ?;ell as the results,
analysis must entail a recognition of the relation of the
elements to the original whole, i.e., it must Include syn-
thesis. If one analyzes a rose, he finds it to consist of
thorns, stem, petals, seeds, leaves, sap, and so on —
all related in such a way as to Insure growth and all with
some unique and some common properties.
It is implied in the above definition of analysis
that the object which undergoes analysis is not simple, in-
divisible, or completely a unit. For an object to be ana-
lyzable it must somehow be complex. In some sense It must
be a whole. In the chapter devoted to analysis that follows
it will be seen that there are different kinds of analysis.
And distinctions as to kind rest on the nature of the ana-
lytical operations themselves or on the objects to which
they are directed.
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2. Synopsis.
Synopsis is usually defined in relation to analysis
"because it is said to embrace certain features of analysis
and at the same time to have something more. If synopsis
is not just another name for analysis, it must have a
specific contribution of its own. If there is any more than
a verbal difference between analysis and synopsis, there
must be a difference of fact, i.e. those words must stand for
determinable differences in the way of investigating wholes.
Etymologically, analysis means the understanding of
anything by resolving it into its elements of parts; synopsis
means understanding by seeing objects together. But in
this simple sense analysis and synopsis imply one another
and cannot be radically separated. In this simple sense
synopsis is no more than synthesis — the counterpart of
analysis determined by direction of investigation. For ex-
ample, the petals, thorns, leaves, and other parts of the
rose are "seen together" in so far as they are known as
parts. Moreover, designation of parts of the flower
establishes its kinship with lilies, daisies, and the entire
realm of flora.
For preliminary and introductory purnoses synopsis may
be defined as the procedure in which analysis-synthesis,
as described above, is dominated by reference to the specific
and unique whole with which investigation started and in
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14
which it should terminate. "Dominated” means that the
adequacy of analysis is tested b?/ reference to the whole
as starting point and that the results of analysis are inter-
preted by a similar reference.
The analyst tends to see a complex object as "nothing
but" an expression or result of simpler terms and relation-
ships. He seeks abstract simplicity. The synoptist, on the
other hand, tends to see parts, elements, and relationships
in subordination to the specific properties of the whole
which give that whole under consideration its sui generis
nature. He seeks explanation that is adequate to all the
appearances and tries to avoid minimizing or explaining any-
thing away in the interest of such generality and simplicity
as may come from concentrating on parts-in-a-certain-rela-
tionship. These differences between synopsis and analysis,
as well as the various implications of these differences,
will be developed more fully in Chapter IV.
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3, Whole and part.
The preceding definitions suggest the urgency of
clarifying the term 'Whole!' Every fundamental definition
of whole is an echo of Plato's thesis that it is a complex
unity: "A whole must necessarily be one made up of many;
and the parts will be parts of the one, for each of the
parts is not a part of many, but of a whole. 11 ®® That is
to say, a whole is not a unit but a unity of elements. It
is a single thing but not simple, or, to use a phrase of
William Stern, a whole is a unitas multiplex . Singularity,
unity, or oneness and diversity, plurality, or manyness are
equally implied in the notion of whole. A whole is an
organization or system of elements. It is a togetherness of
objects (here, any object of attention) seen as one. A
human family is a whole. It is a specific organization of
persons such as father, mother, sister, and brother with
diverse and sometimes intrasitive relations among them.
The term "part” means, first of all, that which the
whole contains, an element which is together with other ele-
ments to form the whole. For reasons which will be elaborated
in the next paragraphs — for reasons connected with the dif-
ference between wholes and aggregates, between the discrimina-
tion of qualities and the discovery of other objects within
25. Parmenides, 157. See ibid., 137, 166. (Jowett, DP, II,
127, 98-99, 139-140.) Cf. Eisler, WpB, I, 452-453; Krikorian,
Art. (1935), 121; Beck, Art. (1939), 340; discussion of Plato
below.
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a complex object — "parts" should be confined to objects
which are the sufficient conditions of a whole’s unique
or specific properties. "Qualities" or "aspects" are ap-
propriate labels for the separate properties that identify
an object. The qualities or aspects of a brick are color,
weight, shape, and smoothness. Its parts are sand, fibrous
binder, and cement. Thus every part is an object, i.e. a
complex or cluster of concrete qualities. (Whether these
concrete qualities are subjective or objective — epistemo-
logical idealism versus realism — is a question which is
outside the scope of this dissertation.) Since every part
is an object, there are no simple parts. Every part Is a
complex of some concrete qualities or aspects. Only ab-
I
stracted qualities are simple, and these can never be "parts"
according to the above definition.
a. Types of whole.
In considering types of whole, it is advisable to re-
view several classifications made by various writers and note
the principle of classification, the implicit definition of
whole, and some consequences of each grouping for the
meaning of whole in general. A thoroughly adequate classi-
fication of wholes is really a metaphysical problem related
to categories and modes of being. It requires a full-blown
metaphysic. Here metaphysical problems are dealt with in so
far as they are directly related to problems of method.
After remarking that "The whole signifies a pattern
of elements and relations persisting through change," Y. H.
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Krikorian, In an article entitled "The Concept of Organiza-
tion," finds five major types of whole with a number of sub-
types. 26 First, there is logical or mathematical organiza-
tion. Here the elements form a "deductive whole" -- proposi-
tions and premises, axioms and theorems — which awaits
existential exemplification. The additive organization, "where
the whole is the sum of its elements," is the simplest sub-
type of this group. A foot as the sum of inches is an addi-
tive organization. 2 *^ Secondly, there is spatio-temporal organi-
sation. In suatial organization the whole is a unity of posi-
tions of the elements —e.g. a square or a triangle. In a
temporal organization the whole is a unity of simultaneity or
succession of elements — e.g. the history of a nation. An
event as "qualified space-time" is a projection from these more
primitive types. 2® The third type, substantial organization,
is a whole which is "a pattern of qualities persisting through
duration of time." A "thing" like a book or chair illustrates
substantial organization. Again, such organizations may dif-
fer in virtue of their persistence — a mountain or a flash of
lightning. 29
26. Art. (1935), 121. Krikorian makes "whole" an aspect of
organization along with elements and relations. Thus, "organi-
zation" is the more inclusive notion. Nevertheless, when he
analyzes the types or modes of organization, it Is "in terms
of different types of whole." The difference between organiza-
tion and whole is apparently that the whole is "the pattern of
elements and relations" and thus "is always one," whereas an
organization is complex and itself includespattern. Throughout
his article Krikorian does not always adhere to this precise
distinction.
27. Ibid., 122.
28. Ibid., 122.
29. See ibid., 123.
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Causal organization is the fourth type. Here a mani-
fold of elements is related in terms of uniformity and correla-
tions ("Fundamentally assertions of mutual implications").
For example, wind moves the branches, heat raises the column
of mercury. Causal organization in turn has the subtypes of
strict and statistical causality — the difference being that
in the latter the uniformity is only for groups. Purposive
organization is the fifth type in which "there is a tendency,
a common result of a type which is usually, though not always,
accomplished. " In view of the inclusion of accomplishment
and tendency, purposive organizations are related to feelings
of pleasure and displeasure, or rather, purposive wholes in-
clude them as functions of accomplishment. This type is ex-
emplified by a work of art, a living animal, a personal mind,
- . , 30
and a society.
In his "Defense of Analysis" in the co-operative volume.
The New Realism
,
Spaulding offers a classification whose form
is substantially retained in his subsequent writings. Since
Chapter III contains a detailed examination of his views, it
is necessary here only to sketch this classification and notice
the principle of its order. "The whole," says Spaulding, " is
the parts and their properties and the relations relating the
30. Krikorian, Art. (1935), 124. The important consequence of
this theory of organization is that since there are different
levels of organization, accurate prediction depends on "a more
thorough empiricism," and prediction will increase "as our ex-
perience increases and as our knowledge of empirical laws- in-
creases." (125) Further, unless organization is additive, its
properties described distributively are not the same as those
described collectively. Thus, a violin, watch, oil painting,
considered distributively is physical, chemical, or mechanical;
considered collectively each shows purpose.
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parts and the possibly specific properties of the whole.
Since a whole is elements (terms, parts, or individuals are
used by Spaulding as synonyms) in relations, wholes may best
be distinguished from one another by the type of relation-
shin that holds among the parts. First, there is the aggregate
or collection in which components are linked only by "and."
"Anything, taken with at least one other 'something, 1 " says
Spaulding, "and these two with another something, and so on,
32form a whole." The universe is a whole in at least this
sense: an aggregative totality. Such a Y/hole, Spaulding re-
marks, has no distinctive properties as a whole.
In the second type of whole the individuals have, in
addition^conjunction, similarity and sometimes ordering-rela-
tions so as to form classes. In The New Realism Spaulding
includes in the notion of class relations generating order--
symmetrical and transitive relations and their opposites. This
grouping is broken down in The New Rationalism where he dis-
tinguishes between classes and series.^ In any case, the
next general type of whole above aggregate is the class in which
either individuals or other classes are united and ordered to
form such wholes as space, time, and carbon or element and
number. The highest type of whole is the organic whole. Here
there is a complex of elements "which, related, do modify or
32. Spaulding, Art. (1912), 163.
31. Ibid., 161.
33. 192-194. Cf. Art
.
( 1912 ) , 167-170.
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influence one another, or which perhaps are constituted by-
virtue of their relation to one another."^ Living things
and physical objects exemplify such wholeness. These, like
the wholes of space and time, have properties not additive ly
derived from the parts. The specific relationships that dis-
tinguish organic wholes are complex causal and purposive relations
among elements.^
The only type of whole which elicits Wilhelm Burkamp'
s
interest in Die Struktur der Ganzheiten is one which at least
fulfills Ehrenfels 1 criterion for Gestalt :
"Gestalten" nennt man nach von Ehrenfels diejenigen
psychischen Zust&nde und Vorgange, deren charakteristische
Eigenschaften und Wirkungen aus artgleichen Eigen-
schaften und Wirkungen ihrer sogennanten Teile nicht
zusammensetzbar sind.36
Following Othmar Spann, Burkamp defines whole in terms of the
emergence of oversummative properties and believes that whole
and sum are opposites: nGanzes Oder Ganzheit ist nicht die
Summe der Teile, sondern mehr als diese Summe, ja etwas griind-
sfi.tzlich Anderes." 57 Burkamp is anxious to stress the "Eigen-
determinierheit der Ganzheiten" and by this he means that a
whole has certain unique and irreducible characteristics. His
views at this point may well be compared with Spaulding's posi-
tion on organic wholes. On the basis of the above distinction
34. Spaulding, Art. (1912), 240. See TNR, 500.
35. See below, Spaulding on "organic wholes," Chapter III.
36. Kfthler, PG, ix. Burkamp, SG, 68.
37. SG, 50 from Spann, Kategorienlehre
, 86.
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Burkamp finds two main types of whole: autotaktisches Ganzes
and menotaktisches Ganzes .
An autotactical whole is a changing whole, a closed
causally determinate process. Its structure determines the
order of changes. Here the emphasis is on self-determination
and closed system hut yet change. The more significant and
fruitful notion is that of menotactical whole. Here the domi-
nant note is repetition. The repeated and perpetual recurrence
of a given structure guarantees the whole’s continued existence! 0
Under normal circumstances the whole’s condition is determined
hy the recurring structure. Burkamp finds that the earth,
planetary system, a flame, a living cell, and an organism
exemplify menotactical wholeness. Under this somewhat vague
and general class are subsumed the notions of Wirkungsganz -
heit and teliaches System . As Burkamp says: "Man kann auch
jege menotaktisches Strukturierung als solche als Telie auf-
fassen. . . .Man kfinnte Menotaxis auch als Menotelie beziechnen,
da das Bleiben als solches Ziel ist." "Telie" itself needs
further explaining: "Unter einter Telie oder einem telischen
System verstehe ich allgemein ein dienliches Ganzes ... .Dieh-
lichkeit der Wirkung ist ein wichtiges Motive, Zusammenh&nge
als Ganzes aufzufassen. " Burkamp, like Kant, stresses "con-
formity to purpose" and goal-seeking -- not necessarily the
conscious entertaining of an intended goal — as an essential
38. See Burkamp, SG, xv-xvi, 88ff.
39. SG, 88, xvi; 102-103. In the last quotation the "purpose"
is close to what Hegel called external or finite purpose.
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mark of wholeness. Especially is "conformity to purpose"
necessary to complete the notion of Wlrkung3ganzheit . In a
biological unity or a machine there is almost always a purpose-
unity, Burkamp believes. "Direction" in productive results
or organization of material is patent evidence of teleologi-
cal unity. Furthermore, the notion of optimum or ideal per-
formance shows the need for purposive categories in organisms,
machines, or even cultural groups.
b. Comments on the definition
and types of whole.
1 ) Wholes and sums in relation to spec i fic or unique
properties . Of the common features in the preceding classi-
ficiation one stands out as noteworthy — the contrast between
whole and sum, or the difference between aggregates and what
are often called "real" wholes. This difference is found
in Krikorian’s classification of additive organization as the
lowest form and one which is often the source of problems and
confusions when philosophers take it, mistakenly, as the
model of all wholeness. 40 Again, Spaulding classifies a sum
or aggregate as a whole but makes this caution:
40. See Krikorian, Art. (1935), 122.
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A whole may be a mere aggregate notwithstanding cer-
tain other relations, 3uch as those of similarity and
difference, among its parts. Such a whole, however,
does not seem to possess any distinctive properties
as a whole; it is simply its parts, with their proper-
ties, summed and numerically conjoined. 41
Amplifying the general Gestaltist thesis, Wilhelm Burkamp
believes that whole and sum are almost ouposites. He stresses
the "Eigendetercninierheit" or uniqueness and irreducibility
of certain properties of the whole. 42 What is the basis for
distinguishing whole and sum? In the above quotation Spaulding
has given valuable hints as to where to look.
When a complex object is treated as a sum, the investi-
gator pruposely considers only its plural part s-in-relation.
Its unique properties, properties over and above those of the
plural parts or elements brought together, are ignored or are
actually not present. The difference between the unique proper-
ties of a v/hole and the properties of its various parts is
well illustrated in a given human society. The unique proper-
ties of a society, as a whole, are various customs, folklore,
and, more specifically, institutions like private property or
a state religion. As to the properties of the parts, there
are men with particular and various racial characteristics,
a particular environment that conditions human activity, persons
with and without land, and individuals in whom religion may
be a matter of etiquette or an intense experience.
Viewed as one and whole, an automobile is capable of
travelling at the rate of eighty miles per hour. It has such
41. -Spaulding, Art. (1912), 164.
42. See above, 20.
. ft
•
*
'
*
-
• yir
t 'is , oa ' *» ,t •;
• !
.
r- 9
.»
*
as am
.
*
•
•
' r
K
-
>
!
" \
*
-
*
24
and such a horsepower. It is marked by a certain amount of
streamllng to take care of wind resistance. And under normal
usage It will probably last a calculable average number of
years. Yet the sparkplug has neither horsepower nor speed.
Nor do the bearings on the crankshaft have such properties.
The sparkplug’s most Important characteristic is its durable
points (of the right kind of metal) at a certain distance from
one another. This important distinction between the unique
and specific properties of the whole in contrast to the proper-
ties of the parts applies even to philosophical systems. In
describing the method of the historian of ideas, A. 0. Love joy
notes that
Most philosophical systems are original or distinctive
rather in their patterns than in their components....
Just as chemical compounds differ in their sensible
qualities from the elements composing them, so the ele-
ments of philosophical doctrines. In differing logical
combinations, are not always readily recognizable; and,
prior to analysis, even the same complex may appear to
be not the same In its differing expressions, because
of the diversity of the philosophers’ temperaments and
the consequent inequality in the distribution of
emphasis
.
In any whole the specific, unique, or “oversummative"
properties are the unitary aspects of the whole. They are
the properties that belong to it as one in contrast to the
plural parts and their properties which the object in question
has or may be found to have. The various parts with their
properties emphasize the plurality of the whole. In
the previous definition it was said that a whole is
a unitas multiplex
,
a oneness and diversity at the same
43. GCB, 3-4
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time. Such statements must have read strangely like contra-
dictions, like saying a thing is at once one and not-one. There
is no formal contradiction when it is seen that a thing is one
and many but not under the same aspect or from the same point
of view. When an object is a whole, it has certain properties
that belong to it as one thing, as a unity. It also has cer-
tain properties distributively, with reference to the plural
elements which are unified and organized.
In his article entitled "Synoptic Method" Beck has
dealt with this problem in an attempt to find the meaning of
"real or objective whole." He asks, how can one distinguish
between the whole that is formed cf one’s head and his body,
and the whole formed by Carroll’s cabbages and kings? The
II H
usual answer. Beck notes, is in terms of oversummative proper-
ties. 44 This answer does not satisfy him. Referring to a
discussion of the matter by Charles Peirce, Beck maintains
that any two objects when taken together have a property
which neither possessed alone and no other object has in com-
mon with them. A and B in a sum have the unique property of
un-A-B-lessness. This symbolic example might well be sup-
plemented by the more concrete conjunction of cabbage and
king or dog and apple. But the principle is the same. Beck
infers that the new property in a sum is logically on a par
45
with a Gestalt quality. ' There may be a certain formal or
44. Art. (1959), 340-541.
45. Ibid., 341. Cf. Burkamp, SG, 65.
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purely " logical” parallel with the more advanced forms of
organization, hut there is an important difference. In the
examples used by Beck there are no unique concrete properties
that mark the unity or "Eigendeterminierheit n of the whole.
To specify the nonlogical and concrete properties of an aggre-
gate the investigator must always indicate the elements — A
and B, cabbage and king. It must now be apparent that sums
and aggregates satisfy the previous definition of whole only
superficially. The distinctions brought out here underline
Moritz Schlick’s remark that the problem of wholeness is first
46
of all a problem of definition.
Because a whole which is more than an aggregate is thus
a unity with certain unique and irreducible properties, an
adequate method for dealing with wholes must take sufficient
account of those unique properties. An inadequate method will
try to explain them away or discount them. It will ignore their
importance in understanding a given whole. In this respect
a falsifying method may convert all wholes into sums or try
to minimize the special properties the whole may be found to
possess. Dewey suggests the canons of an adequate treatment of
wholes in his critique of elementarism: Elements depend on
the existence of immediate and qualitatively integral objects
(Compare with the unique or specific properties of a whole
mentioned above.). The search for elements starts with empiri-
cal objects possessed as integral and nEvery step of analysis
46. See Art. (1935), 54-55. The question of whether an organism,
a community, or an electrical field in a wire is a whole or
sum has no meaning until one has settled as to when and how
he wants to speak of wholeness.
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depends upon continual reference to these empirical objects."47
Only in such reference do cells, electrons, and the like have
their empirical and functional meaning. Thus Dewey has
hinted that an adequate treatment of wholes is one in which
the unique and specific properties are not explained away or
reduced to properties of parts. Rather, they are the primary
datum and subject-matter which parts, elements, and organiza-
tion are to explain.
2 ) Qualities or aspects in contrast to parts . What is
the relationship of the unique and irreducible properties of
a whole to those of parts? That depends, as was suggested
earlier, on what you mean by parts. In the previous paragraphs
parts and wholes were treated as being in distinctly different
universes of discourse, e.g. a society characterized by cer-
tain institutions in contrast to particular men doing specific
tasks. That meant, of course, that the unique features of the
whole and parts do not strictly or formally imply one another.
Rather, the movement in each direction is by hypothetical in-
ference. It is an act of discovery like the finding of causes.
"The discovery of parts from wholes and of wholes from parts,"
writes A. C. Benjamin, "is essentially imaginative in character,
48
guided, as in the case of causal inferences, by loose analogies."
Thus explanation of a whole is a search for the sufficient
conditions of its unique properties in terms of the organization
47. EN, 144.
48. IPS, 193-194. See ibid., 205
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of other objects or things with their own properties . The
automobile and all that is meant by "autoroobileness" is ex-
plained when one comes upon sparkplugs, cylinders, crankshaft,
body, paint, and so on — all organized in such a way that
mobility and a certain horsepower are the result. Again, a
society is explained by the diverse organization and activities
of the specific individuals and their conditions of life. Only
in reference to the unique features of the whole as a whole,
to its specific and unique properties, can you discover that
some other objects are parts, i.e. sufficient conditions of the
whole's specific properties. And only in reference to the
unique features of the whole as a whole can you test and verify
your discovery of parts. The parts, it has been frequently
said above, are other objects organized in a certain way. They
are thus the sufficient condition for the whole having the
specific properties that it does have.
A whole, however, may be "explained" by concentrating on
its own apparent properties, by a conceptual analysis of those
properties. But then the "parts" are not of the same sort as
those described above. For clarity they should rather be
called qualities or aspects. Plato was referring to qualities
or aspects when he wrote in the Theaetetus that "wholes" are
built up of simple elements with which you are directly
acquainted:
None of these primeval elements can be defined; they
can only be named for they have nothing but a name,
and the things which are compounded of them, as they
are complex, are expressed by a combination of names.
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for the combination of names is the essence of
a definition . 49
The qualities or aspects of a brick are its weight, solidity,
shape, and so on (these may or may not be primitive), but
its parts are sand, binder, cement, and coloring matter. The
explanation of an object in terms of its qualities or aspects ,
however, is quite different from explanation through the
finding of its parts . The first method of explanation deals
with the object as a complex of concrete qualities rather
than a whole containing parts. Accordingly, in Spaulding's
classification of wholes the parts of organic wholes — physi-
cal and chemical processes, cells, and electrons — are not
on a par with the "parts" of space and time which, rather, are
qualities or aspects. It is important to distinguish analysis
into qualities or aspects from analysis into parts. The former
is primarily a conceptual act requiring only a clear and distinct
grasp of features. The latter requires imagination, hypotheses,
and all that goes along with experimental reasoning. It re-
quires the "experienced union" of events, to use Hume's phrase.
The clear and distinct grasp of features, qualities, or
aspects provides a common sense description of the object under
consideration. Thus, a brick is described as a box- like,
heavy reddish, rough, solid physical object. Naturally this
description involves a discrimination of qualities or aspects
within the qualitatively integral object. Insofar as the
moments or aspects are taken as data for inferences to parts*
the description of the whole in question may be expanded as
discoveries are made. So other objects with specific rela-
tionships and qualities of their own, i.e. the sufficient ' -
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conditions of the properties of "the whole as a whole," may
sooner or later enter into its description. Only then will
the properties of a whole stricELy imply the parts 1 properties
and relationships.
It is clear that the specific and unique properties of
a whole may be terms in an off-hand, commonsense description
of the whole. Or they may be data for inference to their own
sufficient conditions, for inference to parts proper. The
latter would seem to be the only way whereby parts (and not
merely abstracted qualities or aspects) can be discovered with
their own properties in distinction from the specific proper-
ties of the whole. The method ofanalysis into qualities (con-
ceptual or mental discrimination) treats the object more as a
complex of concrete qualities than as a whole of parts, strict
ly speaking. It is analysis which arrives at elements that
Loewenberg has called "post-analytic data," i.e. terms in the
primitive description of a unitary object which is a complex
of different data (simple characters and nonsensible modes of
organization involving unity, identity, and so on.) 50
3) Unities of qualities or aspects and anal?/sis into
qualities . Of the three preceding classifications of wholes
Krikorian T s is most satisfactory because it provides more ex-
plicitly for the distinction between a whole as a complex of
qualities and a whole as a unity of objects, thus providing
for the fact of unique (Gestalt or "oversummative" ) properties
in a whole. It will be shown later how this is implicit in
Spaulding f s contrast between analysis in situ and experimental
50. See above, 28. Cf. Lo®rwenberg, Art. (1927), 7-8.
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analysis and in his statement that he is not attempting to
derive everything from one kind of brick. Before looking
to Krikorian’ s classification as a basis for a critical and
synthetic classification of wholes, one should note a feature
that belongs to all groupings regardless of specific distinc-
tions as to the nature of elements or parts that are unified.
Since a whole is a unity, organization, or togetherness of
parts, its form or mode may be considered in abstraction.
Krikorian suggests this possibility in contrasting abstract
BP
and concrete wholes. In any whole the mode of unity is a
pattern which may be treated abstractly. Whenever the pattern
among elements in a whole is found to be specifically exempli-
fied by concrete experienced events (constants), there is an
actual whole of the type under consideration. Boyle T s law
for the pressure of gasses, when it is considered exclusively
in symbolic form, is thus an abstract functional whole. The
same principle applies even to purposive wholes whose telic
(means-end, aiming at a type or norm) relationships may be
considered apart from concrete events. This distinction is made
in Blanshard’s theory of the idea:
When we speak of the relation between idea and object
as that of unrealized to realized purpose, we are
speaking of what may be called the essential or logi-
cal aspect of that relation, not of the temporal
lapse of process through which we come to know it. 55
51. See WC, 222.
52. See Krikorian, Art. (1935), 121.
53. NT, I, 517. Cf. ibid., 473. This is Kant’s distinction
between formal and material conformity to purpose which cuts
across the distinction between art -- subjective conformity
to purpose — and natural organizations. KTJ, 274-275, 32-34.
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Krikorian’s classification, as mentioned before, breaks
in the middle as he introduces things or substantial wholes
which are enduring patterns of qualities. 54 Before he intro-
duces "things” there are only ‘Wholes” to be dealt with by
analysis into qualities or aspects. The "parts” of such
"wholes" are not "objects," as defined earlier. Rather they
are abstracted and simplified qualities. In this category
fall space, time, and perhaps classes themselves. But these
are not wholes in the same sense in which a human body, an
automobile, a brick, or a society are wholes. If one believes
space and time to be complex, he might subject them to a
conceptual analysis or what Spaulding calls analysis in situ .
He would find them to be a pattern or complex of qualities.
By a mental analysis he would make his meaning more definite
and clear.- But he would not find "parts," i.e. other objects
with their own properties. Furthermore, it is doubtful
whether a class should be called a whole. Because a class em-
braces or denotes a number of objects one might think it is
a whole. But a class is formed by separating out common quali-
ties or properties in different things. It is a result of
mental analysis into qualities. Of itself a class is a proper-
ty or group of properties. Though objects may be instances of
a class, they are not "parts" according to the meaning used
here.
4) Functional wholes . Spaulding’s organic wholes,
Krikorian’s causal and purposive wholes, and Burkamp’s func-
tional wholes ( Wlrkungsganzheiten ) all presuppose parts that
54. See above, 17
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are more than qualities or aspects. They presuppose a unity
or organization ofobjects, what Krikorian called substantial
wholes, as the sufficient condition of the unique properties
of the "whole as a whole." They presuppose a whole whose in-
vestigation requires more than conceptual discrimination of
qualities or aspects. Hence the "terms" of a spatial whole
are not on a par with the "terms" of such a whole as a mole-
cule or a human body.
The wholes referred to in the paragraph above — wholes
which specifically differ from aggregates or sums — may be
grouped under the general notion of functional whole with
a lower subtype, the causal whole, and a higher subtype, the
55purposive or telic whole. This means that the dominating
mode of organization among the parts is the functional re-
lationship. The term "function" Is used here much in the same
way as Whitehead uses it. In a functional whole the parts or
elements change, influence, and determine each other. The
ma thematical physicist makes the causal relation a functional
one so as to facilitate measurement and computation. For him
a function is a magnitude so related to another that to values
of the former there correspond values of the latter. In any
55. The central problem of this dissertation does not re-
quire an exhaustive discussion of the hierarchy of wholes. That
is a significant and difficult metaphysical task deserving
treatment in itself. The present synthesis Is advanced especially
to show that wholes of different types require special modes
of comprehension and investigation.
56. See PR, 38.
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case, there is reciprocal determination. Examples of this
type of wholeness are a modern automobile, a molecule, or
a solar system. A causal whole subsists only so long as
there is a clustering or concentration of functions greater
in number than the functional relationships to an environ-
ment
The highest type of wholeness is the telic whole which
is at once a functional and causal whole but something more.
The functioning of some parts is dominated and determined by
the value of others. For example, the growth of the human
eye and the development of the double heart system in mammals
involve something more than causal and functional interde-
pendence: "Phylogenetic and causal references alone can
never give us a complete story of what happens in this, or in
any other embryonic development. The reference to ’purpose*
is unavoidable."^® There is, then, in a telic whole a hier-
archy of parts functionally related. They seem often to stand
in means-end relationship. A purposive whole, Krikorian ob-
serves, involves aspects of realization and achievement related
to "accomplishment of tendencies."®^ In this case the unifying
characteristic of the whole is the interplay of purposive pro-
cesses which presuppose functional and causal organization and
unitary objects as parts themselves amenable to conceptual
57. See Beck, Art. (1938), 372-373 on the criterion of inhomo-
geneity, i.e., the categories which apply to the insides of a
thing at a given stage of inquiry differ from those that ap-
ply to its outsides.
58. Werkmeister, APS, 333-334. See ibid., 349-351, 362.
59. See Art.(1935), 124.
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discrimination. Examples of this type of whole are an
amoeba, a dog, a man, and a personal consciousness. 60 A
telic whole, as defined above, is properly an organic whole
though "organic" is frequently used much more extensively.
Organic whole has its obvious prototype in the actual living
thing and its structure . Even here there are degrees of whole-
ness ranging from the not-so-complex amoeba to the human per-
sonality and mammalian body. Here, of all places, there is
the highest degree of self-maintenance, complexity, and tight
togetherness of parts.
60. See above, 21, the grounds for Burkamp’s view that any
Wirkungsganzheit is telic. Hegel has well suggested, in the
opening paragraph of his Naturphilosophie , that purely ex-
ternal teleology is a gratuitous anthropomorphism that rarely
helps science or religion. The above examples of purposive
wholeness require a further caution: In this dissertation
there is deliberate abstraction from the relevant metaphysi-
cal question of the human self’s organization and unity
through purpose, a question raised by Hume, among others,
when he sought a source of identity and persistence of per-
sonality in a more empirical basis than substance. (See THN,
I, 243ff.) Here there is also abstraction from issues sug-
gested by Kant’s contrast of an organization’s conformity to
purpose with and without purpose, issues such as conscious
and unconscious purpose and the regulative ("as if ") nature
of teleological judgments. These are important issues, but
they are not at the center of the dissertation.
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D. Summary and Conclusions.
"Organismie" or "holistic" philosophies have recently
gained prominence. They use scientific results such as the
physical field theory and Gestalt psychology to support philo-
sophical theories saying that the world’s ultimate elements
have a structure something like that of a living thing.
Views like those of Smuts, Whitehead, Lossky, and others in-
directly suggest that there is a "concrete" way of investigat-
ing a whole that does justice to its unique properties and
organization, and there is an "abstract" analytic way that
tends to miss those features and find a mere aggregate.
Such views raise the central problem of this dissertation:
Does the understanding of wholes require both analysis and
synopsis? The question implies that there is a difference
between the analytic and synoptic methods. To find this dif-
ference the dissertation examines views of men who say they
use analysis or synopsis in order to understand wholes of
various kinds. (The writings of Lewis W. Beck advance this
problem in important ways. He shows that synoptic method must
be something more than "acknowledgment of an oversummative
property and that knowledge of wholes must be empirical rather
than purely "ratiocinative. " ) But first there must be a tenta-
tive definition of basic terms, and the meanings of "whole,"
"sum," "part," and the like must be made clear.
Analysis ordinarily means resolution of an object into
parts and also recognition of the relationship of the parts to
the original whole. Etymologically synopsis means seeing things
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together. In this simole sense it is merely analysis-in-
reverse or synthesis. So, for the various reasons to be given
later, this dissertation presents the idea that synopsis is
the procedure wherein results of analysis-synthesis are
tested and interpreted by reference to the specific and unique
properties of the whole in distinction from those of the parts.
1. Conclusions about types and definition of whole.
A whole, to paraphrase Plato’s definition, is a unity of
elements or a togetherness of objects seen as one. Satisfying
this broad definition, wholes have been defined by various
writers as ranging from "additive organization” through spatio-
temporal wholes” to causal and purposive organizations (Krikorian,
Spaulding, Burkamp). When a complex object is treated as a
sum or aggregate, the investigator deliberately sees only its
plurality and speaks of the whole in terms of that plurality.
The object is then characterized exclusively with reference to
the properties of the parts conjoined with each other. Specific
and unique properties of the whole are ignored or are actually
not present. Because some complex objects are aggregates but
also something; more
,
they have specific and unique properties,
properties that are more than transcriptions of features of the
parts. The existence of such properties explain how a whole
can be called both a unity and a plurality. The unique pro-
perties of an automobile — its speed, horsepower, and social
use — mark it as one in contrast to the plurality and relations
of parts such as sparkplugs, pistons, fan, and wheels.
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"Parts" of a whole are such objects as are found to be
the condition of the whole’s unique and specific properties.
"Parts" should not be confused with qualities or aspects which,
taken together, constitute any given object. The qualities of
a brick are its brown color, box-like shape, and smooth sur-
faces. Its parts, however, are sand, fibrous binder, and
cement in a certain arrangement. Thus spatial, temporal, or
"substantial wholes" in themselves are to be seen as complexes
of various qualities or aspects. But in a "real" or func-
tional whole the parts are more than qualities or aspects.
Such wholes are an organization of objects or processes found
empirically to be sufficient conditions of the whole’s specific
and unique properties. There may be, among the changing parts
and internal processes, causal and pa rposive relationships
(in the latter case the functioning of some parts is dominated
by the value of others). A machine, a molecule, an amoeba,
and a human personality are obvious and familiar examples of
a "'real" or functional whole. Moritz Schlick has well sug-
gested that the problem of wholeness is first of all a problem
of definition.
The important and central question is whether both ana-
lysis and synopsis are required to deal with wholes which have
certain properties that are "qualitatively different" from the
properties of the parts and their arrangement.
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2. Prospectus.
The title of Chapter II, Questions About Wholes and
Methods Arising From the History of Thought, should be taken
quite literally. That chapter will consist of a brief review
or sketch whose purpose is to examine problems about wholes
and the way of comprehending them — problems growing out of
the ideas of a few salient personages in the history of philos-
ophy.
Chapter III will consist of a thorough examination of
the analytic method as it is defended by Spaulding and Perry.
In that chapter the different types of analysis will be con-
sidered, and there will be reference to the type of analysis
championed by logical positivists. Why will analysis be taken
up with close reference to the views of specific men? First
of all because the analytic realists such as Spaulding and
Perry have most ardently defended, championed, and written at
length about the analytic method. Secondly, because philosophi
cal discussion and polemic is often confused by an attack on
positions that no one does or would hold. There cannot be
a clarification of meanings that will enhance common discourse
unless one pays attention to what other people say.
Chapter IV will consist of an examination of synopsis
with an attempt to find wherein the uniqueness of its procedure
might lie. This chapter is the heart of the dissertation.
Historical as well as important theoretical considerations
make it necessary to link the method of synopsis with analysis-
synthesis in order to determine what should be contributed by
synopsis for adequate comprehension of wholes. Here again
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views of specific men will be introduced as a springboard
for critical discussion.
Chapter V will carry over conclusions from the previous
chanters to an examination of the results and methods of sci-
ence. Here esoecially will the question of scientific method
as analysis be related to synopsis. Similarly certain
methodological developments in connection with biology and
psychology will be related to the synoptic procedure.
This chapter opened with examples of the contemporary
interest in "holistic” philosophies and "synoptic" method.
Those examnles should have been evidence enough of the need
for critical analysis. A thoughtful reader must feel that
there is too much vague generalization and not enough patient
inquiry into the grounds and consequences of "holistic"
method and the intellectual atmosphere of this era. What
seems to be needed is an attempt to winnow wheat from chaff.
Fo£m the outline of the dissertation’s program it should
be apparent that the writer must rely frequently on the con-
clusions of natural scientists. Their methods of investigating
and conclusions will also play into the discussion. Here the
writer can pretend to speak only as an amateur. But even the
amateur can improve his standing by trying to rely, cautiously,
on the views of men who seem to be authorities in the fields
of physics, biology, and psychology. That will be done wherever
it is possible.
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CHAPTER II
QUESTIONS ABOUT WHOLES AND METHODS ARISING
FROM THE HISTORY OF THOUGHT
The old adage that there is nothing new under the
sun applies to most philosophical issues and ideas that
are of interest today. The problems raised in the previous
chapter — the nature and kinds of wholes and, especially,
the appropriate ways of investigating them — are no excep-
tions to this truism. Like most current intellectual ques-
tions these have a long history beginning with the Greeks. A
sketch of this history, referring to outstanding figures and
issues, will set problems for later chapters.
A. Pre-Socratics
.
If Aristotle had been entirely right about his pre-
decessors, one could expect from them the sort of information
about wholes that a materialist or physicist is able to give.
The weakness of Thales, Anaxagoras, Socrates, and even Plato
was, according to Aristotle, their neglect of all but material
and formal causes. With obvious exceptions taken for granted,
Aristotle’s judgment seems generally correct. In the eyes of
the pre-Socratics all wholes were ultimately material or physi-
cal complexes.
Thales found water to be the principle of all things.
And though he also believed that everything is full of gods, it
41
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is possible that he may have meant by "god" nothing more than
water. Dissatisfied with his associate's theory that the
material cause and first element of everything is water,
Anaximander of Miletos advanced a more radical thesis: physis ,
or eternal and "widest" substance, is the fundamental reality, ^
Anaximenes, an "associate" of Anaximander and a member of the
Milesian school, was not satisfied with an indeterminate,
boundless physis . The one infinite substance was seen to be
air. This thesis was supplemented by a theory of rarefaction
that brought all changes under a quantitative principle. ^ Hera-
clitus thought of fire as the first principle of the world.
Fire was chosen to reconcile flux and stability, the many and
the one, Heraclitus saw the world as a unity of multiple fac-
tors: "It is just the 'opposite tension' of the opposites that
constitutes the unity of the One."
Aristotle and Plato interpret Xenophanes' denial of
human attributes to a god who is one and the greatest as anti-
cipating the One or Plenum of Parmenides. By "one god" Xeno-
phanes probably meant that there is "No god but the world.
Writing his philosophy in meter, Parmenides maintained that the
universe is a plenum which does not change, for change is an
illusion of the senses. He showed that corporeality (which is
sensuously perceived) and monism are incompatible and thus made
1. Burnet, EGP, 54. See ibid., 47-48, 50-54; Aristotle, Met., 985.
2. Ibid., 73-79.
3. Ibid., 143.
4. Ibid., 127-128. See Aristotle, Met., 986b; Plato, Soph
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the atomism of Democritus and Leucippus inevitable because
the Greeks could not conceive of abandoning corporealism at
this historical stage.
^
Empedocles, another verse-writing philosopher, sought
to explain the possibility of motion by having Strife and
Love unite and separate the four basic elements of the world —
earth, air, fire, aid water. Now the lines are clearly drawn
between the pluralists on the one hand and Parmenides on the
0
other. Like Empedocles, Anaxagoras was a pluralist, but he
had a much different conception of the "elements. 1 ' Every
*7
"seed" was thought of as a unity of diversity; and the Nous
was understood as the source of separation and definiteness.
"All things together" does not change, but there is mixture and
separation. The substantial whole of being in Anaxagoras’
thought stands in contrast to the flat and relatively simple
monism of Parmenides.
In general, the interest of the early Greek philosophers
was in the nature of being. While they found all things to be
reflections of a certain type of cosmic wholeness, they were
relatively inarticulate about the instruments they were using.
To be sure, formal dialectic was used by Parmenides, but there
was no detailed interest in methoddogy such as is found in
Plato or Aristotle.
5. See Burnet, EGP
,
175-180. See ibid., 334-336 on the atomism
of Leucippus and Democritus.
6. See ibid., 231-232; 207 (fr. 17); 215 (fr. 71).
7. See ibid., 263-264; 259-260. Cf. Plato, Phaedo, 98 (Jowett.
DP, I, 482.
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B. Plato and Aristotle.
In the Parmenides Plato considers a question raised
in the previous chapter: How can a whole be both one and
many? At first Parmenides forces Aristoteles to admit that
the one cannot be a whole and have parts. If it remains one.
It is unlimited and formless and changeless. Since every
mode of being is thus denied to the one. It is really non-
existent. Then Parmenides shifts ground to show that the one
has parts — one and being — and this is a whole. On this
basis Parmenides seeks to show that the whole is, without
contradiction, an ultimate categroy and that everything parti-
g
cipates in the one.
Discussion of wholes In the Theaetetus is related more
directly to methodological matters. First Plato affirms that
"a whole, though formed out of parts, is a single notion dif-
ferent from the parts. Here is the suggestion that a whole
may have certain unique and specific properties that are
qualitatively different from the properties of the parts in
a certain arrangement. As the dialogue moves on, however,
this distinction is erased. A whole is identified with the
all or a sum in order to show that if syllables, for example,
are known, letters cannot be unknown.^"0 The main intent of
8. Parm . , 137, 143ff., 156. Here the term r,part n has a very
special meaning. It means something even more abstract than
the qualities or aspects which are found by conceptual ana-
lysis to be components of an object. Further, it is used in
a totally different sense than the way hydrogen and oxygen
are taken to be parts of water or the stomach is taken to be
a part of the human body. Here "parts” are concepts or logi-
cal terms of different extensions: i.e., "being” includes "one."
9. Theaet
. ,
204.
10. Ibid., 205E.
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Platens reference to syllables as wholes is to show that, in
addition to expression of meanings or citation of distinguish-
ing characteristics, explanation may be taken as "an enumera-
tion of the elements out of which anything is composed."
Plato uses the example of a wagon:
He who can describe its essence by an enumeration of
the hundred planks, adds rational explanation to true
opinion, and instead of opinion has art and knowledge
of the nature of a waggon, in that he attains to the
whole through the elements.
11
This concrete example — the wagon and its planks —
is somewhat misleading, for planks are not elements in the
same sense as the "primeval elements" referred to in previous
IP
remarks on Plato. In speaking of "primeval elements"
which "have nothing but a name" Plato means the qualities or
aspects of an object rather than parts of a whole. He is
concerned with the results of conceptual analysis of an ob-
ject into its component qualities. Though in practice the
letters of a syllable, Plato admits, are "more clearly known"
than the whole syllable, the knowledge is of a different kind
from a rational insight. Thus, a possible meaning of "ex-
planation" is what was previously referred to as conceptual
analysis in which the "parts" of an object are abstracted
qualities or "primeval elements" which have "nothing but a
Plato's "dialectical reason" is often linked with the
synoptic method}4 This is natural because Plato, in the
11. Theaet
. ,
207.
12. See above, 27ff.
13. See Theaet., 201-202.
14 • See Rep., 537C. Cf. Mera, HET, III, 103-105, 193, 350n;
IV, 430fT7^ Sorley, KVIG, 250; Brightman, ITP, &7-29.
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Republic Plato says that the dialectical thinker is synopti-
cal. On the level of "understanding,” says Plato, the mind
uses hypotheses in connection with images and "shadows . " This
is the province of geometry and the cognate arts. Then he
goes on to describe the function of reason:
When I speak of the other division of the intelligible
you will understand me to speak of that other sort of
knowledge which reason herself attains by the power of
dialectic, using hypotheses not as first principles,
but only as hypotheses--that is to say, as steps and
points of departure into a world which is above hypo-
theses, in order that she may soar beyond them to the
first principle of the whole. 15
There are two sides of Plato's "dialectical reason." First,
he suggests that all explanation involves reference to the
system of Ideas and ultimate rational principles. Secondly,
he suggests that inquiry should be guided by reference to the
whole, by reference to the first-seen "unity of things." Is
there here a sufficient differentia of synopsis? How is
explanation through simple elements, which was taken up in
the previous paragraph, related to analysis and synopsis?
These are leading questions for the next chapters.
Corresponding to Plato 1 s "dialectical reason,"
Aristotle's creative or active reason is that form of apore-
16
hension in which thought and object are one. Among the soul's
cognitive activities creative reason is highest. Like Plato's
"understanding," the passive reason may be connected with
sensuous and perishable images. Creative reason, on the
15. Rep . , 511. See ibid., 537C on dialectician as synoptist.
Cf. Statesman on relation of the first-seen "unity of things"
to enquiry in the arts, 285.
16. Aristotle, De Anlma, 430a.
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other hand, is really a divine form of cognition, for God’s
activity consists in pure contemplation admitting no distinc-
tion between subject and object, no images and desires. ’Afhereas
human intellect is discursive and human knowledge is piece-meal,
God’s thinking is intuitive in that he sees all things at once
17
and whole.
God's mode of cognition, says Aristotle in Nicomachean
Ethics, is the moral aim of all men especially realized by
the philosopher. The highest of the virtues are the intellectual
virtues, for even moral virtues depend on the practical intel-
18
lect. Of the intellectual virtues the most important is
philosophic wisdom which combines scientific knowledge (ration-
al demonstration) with intuitive reason (grasp of first prin-
ciples). The philosopher of all men tries to grasp the first
principles of all things and demonstrate what follows from
them -- the philosopher, then, is dearest to the gods.-*-® It
appears that there is little difference between Plato’s dia-
lectical reason and Aristotle’s intuitive and creative reason.
Especially do Aristotle’s views raise the question of the re-
lationship between the piece-meal understanding (emphasizing
analysis) and intuition (creative reason) in comprehending
wholes
•
For dealing with the "phenomena presented by animals
and their several parts," Aristotle’s methodological dicta
17. See Met., 1075aff.
18. See Nlc . Sth. , 1143b., 1145a.
19.
See ibid., 1179a
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anticipate Kant, Goethe, and even contemporary "holists" who
maintain that certain types of wholeness — especially func-
tional purposive wholes — require a method of investigation
that is somehow guided by a reference to the whole as "first-
seen." Aristotle put the issue squarely:
Ought the writer who deals with the works of nature
to follow the plan adopted by the mathematicians in
their astronomical demonstrations .. .or ought he to
follow some other method?^
In answering this question Aristotle everywhere aimed to "save
the appearances." Dealing with purposive functional wholes,
he would not condone the reduction of final causes to material
21
and efficient causes. It seems accurate to say that Aristotle
believed comprehension of wholes demands interpretation in terms
of the collective, unique, or "first seen" properties as de-
fining characteristics. Are the suggestions arising from
Aristotle’s remarks on creative reason or from his effort to
"save appearances" the sufficient differential of synopsis in
contrast to analysis? The answer must wait until the next
chapters.
20. De Part. Anim. , 639b. While metaphysics along with
physics and mathematics as theoretical sciences of Hwhat is"
start from eternal verities, in natural science and biology
the consideration is what is to be. (See Met., V, 26, 1023b)
"The artist, on the other hand," Aristotle explains, "or
nature, the chief of the artists starts from an ideal con-
ception, not yet existent in matter, but to be realized in
the future." (De Part. Anim.
,
640a).
21. See ibid., I, 1, 639b, 642a.
Aristotle.
Cf. Roretz, KPO, 35 on
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C. Modern Views.
In place of the medieval synthesis of Aristotelianism,
Patristic tradition, and Scripture the men of the Renaissance
put their faith more in natural reason or what Plato and
Aristotle might have called the understanding or discursive
intellect. The organon of natural science which was forged
by da Vinci, Galileo, and Francis Bacon became the intellectual
authority for the modern man, and philosophy adjusted itself to
the new spirit. Descartes and Spinoza emulated the hand-
maiden of physics and mechanics. Descartes’ system was domi-
nated by the spirit of logical analysis as he tried to trace
back coraclex and general assertions about the soul, God, and
the world to self-certain premises.
1. Spinoza.
Like Plato and Aristotle, Spinoza examined the kinds of
knowledge: The sense-bound imagination can at most yield opinion.
Rational knowledge sees things as abstract essences sub specie
aeternitatis
.
But scientia intuitiva grasps the unity of things
in a way that imagination, lost in detail and illusion, cannot
do. It complements the abstract picture delineated by scientific
reason with a reference — so characteristic of the artist —
to nafcticulars of concrete intuition. 22 Spinoza’s scientia
intuitiva seems to be an extension of Plato’s dialectical
22. See Ethics
,
V, 28-31. (Wild, SS, 387-390). Cf. SS, xlix-
lii •
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reason or Aristotle’s philosophic wisdom. It is an interpre-
tation of science’s abstract universals in terms of concrete
intuition. It is a grasp of common properties as living in
particulars of intuition. For the understanding of wholes,
for the nature of synoptic method Spinoza’s view raises several
important issues: What is the role of intuition in understand-
ing wholes? Does synopsis or analysis lead toward the "concrete"
whole, the actual complex individual?
2 . Hume
•
Behind Kant’s transcendental method there lies some-
what indirectly Leibniz’s distinction between verites de raison
23
and verites de fait . By pointing to necessary, a priori
truths Leibniz was able to challenge Locke's empiricism and
the attempt to derive all knowledge from experience. After
Locke, Hume exjSoited to the limit the method of analysis. He
dissipated all substances — material and spiritual — by what
was referred to in the previous chapter as conceptual discrimina-
tion. The world was turned into a collection of impressions
not entirely unlike the realists’ totality of neutral entities. 2^
23. See Monad., 33. For Leibniz as for Aristotle everything
that exists is a functional-purposive whole. That is to say,
each living thing and each substance has a dominant entelechy.
The living body, for example, is full of other living things —
plants and animals — each with its own entelechy. (Ibid., 70)
Obviously Leibniz’s biocentric view anticipated Whitehead's
philosophy of organism. (See Whitehead, SMW, 223; PR, 47.)
24. "All our distinct perceptions," said Hume, "are distinct
existences." Accordingly, "there is no absurdity in separating
any particular perception from the mind." (THN, II, App., 319;
ibid., I, Pt. IV, Sec., 2, 200.) Cf. Perry, PPT, 137-139,
78ff., 310-311 on "neutral entities."
.*
'
.
• 1 ' ' ' I; 'V a
:• ;•
.r-
,
i • : i •
-X , x>j
> 86 *1 Mto * Oif *J (
.
• t
,
• ’
. .
E
'
’ lltfCT
••
,
. «
51
Such an outcome threw into relief the epistemolq^Lcal problem
of bridging the chasm between a priori reasoning and know-
ledge of Individuals. Leibniz had tried to make a bridge
with the principle of sufficient reason. But Hume said that
no a priori reasoning or logical demonstration can establish
26
a matter of fact. The truths of fact are warranted by
experience or not at all. Hume’s scepticism consisted in
showing that causality is not a problem of logical demonstra-
tion, that the causal relation between events is not a logi-
cally necessary relation. With the method of analysis Hume’s
philosophy attains the generality involved in the neo-
realists’ neutral entities. He took every complex object or
concept apart to find the experiential elements from which it
is derived or constructed. Especially does his method raise
the question: What is the relationship between analysis which
leads to qualities or aspects and analysis which goes to real
parts.
3 • Kant
.
It is common knowledge that Kant took Hume’s so-called
scepticism — which had emerged with reconsideration of the
relation of verites de fait and verltes de raison — as a
point of departure. In the Kritik der reinen Vernunf
t
.
which
had divisions corresponding to Plato’s understanding and reason,
Kant anticipated a later critique by introducing the notion
of organic or organized whole. Discussing the cosmological
26. See THN, I, 91-96
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ideas, he notes that a whole given in intuition (e.g. space)
is infinitely divisible, but in an organic body the whole is
not similarly organized into infinity. His remarks imply that
an organism is not a whole in the same sense as space is a whole,
that there is something in organisms which cannot be analyzed
in the same way?7 Perhaps the faculty which makes %hings in
themselves" definite can deal more adequately with living wholes.
This is suggested in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft when Kant
discusses the organization of knojwedge into a whole, an
organized unity like an animal, which only reason can envisage . 28
Kant would agree with Plato or Spinoza that reason as opposed
to understanding is the key to ultimate principles. For example,
an organized product of nature such as a tree or an amoeba can-
not be adequately comprehended by the understanding which
treats nature as a complex of sense objects. Nature is full of
functional-purposive wholes which demand the insight of reason
over and above that of understanding.^^ Thus the question arises
as to whether and how synopsis saves appearances that are missed
if an object in nature is seen merely as a complex of sense
objects (parts).
27. See Kant, KrV, B551-555. See above, 27ff. Here Kant
hints at the difference between aspects and parts.
28. B860-861. Cf. Driesch, Art. (1924), 365-368.
29. See Kant, KU, par. 61, 75. For an exposition of these
issues see Henderson, ON, 54-61.
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4. Goethe.
Goethe found in Kant’s Kritik der Urteilskraft "ein
Bild seiner eigenen intuitiv synthetischen Geistesrichtung.
"
30
As was suggested in the previous chapter, Goethe would give
up neither the poet’s "anschauendes Bewusstsein" nor the exact
scientist’s patient analysis and tight logic. The latter is
illustrated in ^rfahrung und Wis sense haft and in the logic be-
hind his discovery of the intermaxillary bone. On the other
hand, Goethe was highly impatient with abstraction, overt ex-
perimentation, and quantification which the exact scientist
must employ. In Faust he wrote that Nature reveals herself to
the patient observer,
Und was sie deinem Geist nicht offenbaren mag.
Das zwingst du ihr nicht ab mit Hebeln und mit Schrauben.
With the Kantian notion that only a synthetic universal
is adequate to organized beings and real wholes Goethe was in
complete accord. He quotes from the Kritik der Urteilskraft
with approval and enthusiasm:
Wir kftnnen uns einen Verstand denken, der, weil
er nicht wie der unsrige diskursive, sondern intuitiv
ist von synthetisch Allgemeinen, der Anschauung eines
Ganzen als einers solchen, zum Besondern geht, das
ist, von dem Ganzen zu den Tellen.^l
For Goethe, as for Kant, adequate understanding of wholes
30. SW, XXXIX, 355. See ibid., 31. Cf. Merz, HET, III, 350n.
31. Kant, KU, par. 77; Goethe, SW, XXXIX, 34. In Goethe’s
treatise on morphology the discription of a living thing almost
repeats Kant’s definition of an ’’organized being." See Goethe,
ibid., 252-253; cf. Kant, ibid., par. 66. Lewes maintains
that the notion of Type or Idea was for Goethe, as for St.
Hilaire and other anatomists, a methodological device and
not a Platonic Idea. (LWG, 369) In some of Goethe’s own
statements, however, the Idea seems to be much more than an
"artifice." See Goethe, ibid., 102.
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demands something more than analysis and reference to the
manifold or aggregate. Trees, plants, animals, and man must
be seen as developed "aus einer produktiven Einheit." To
this end an intuitive insight of the whole — much like the
artists’ way of looking at things — seems to be necessary.
In a later chanter it will be shown how defenders of synopsis
take very seriously Goethe’s remark about interest in indi-
viduals: "Dies ist aber nicht denkbar ohne eine Method, die
das Interesse an der Gesamtheit offenbart
.
1,32
5. Hegel.
Even more than his immediate predecessors Hegel was
concerned with the full and adequate comprehension of wholes
and the way of "knowing by wholes" that is often referred to
as synoptic method. Like Spinoza and Kant he criticized
the operationsof understanding and sensuous perception as
being misleading and partial. The proper medium of philos-
ophy, Hegel maintained, is the notion, the progressive organi-
zation of experience. Reason aims to achieve the concrete uni-
versal which is a unification of data like the type of uni-
3'5
fication found in living things. On the one hand reason is
reflective and embraces operations of the discursive intellect.
One might say that it is analytical and divisive. The fault
of Kant and the empiricists of the British tradition, Hegel
believed, was that they did not see the proper relation of
32. Goethe, ibid., 100.
33. Hegel, PG, 73-75; Enc., 186-204.
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thought to experience. They were inclined to remain on
the perceptive, natural scientific level which was always
threatening to pass back into phenomenalism (subjective
'2A
reason and material idealism).^
On the other hand, reason is intuitive insofar as
there is a grasp cf unity and organization or an appreciation
of what were earlier called collective properties, the quali-
ties that mark an object as a unitary whole. Whereas Kant
and empiricists were inclined to remain on the discursive
level, the romantic and mystical philosophers went to the op-
posite extreme and suppressed precise formulation of experience-
35
connections in the interest of feeling and pure intuition.
Hegel’s criticism of Jacobi is characteristic of his criticism
of all extreme romanticism: Until brute experience, feeling,
and awareness are transcended, there is no philosophical know-
ledge. "Das unmittelbare Wissen 1st nicht Erkennen, Begreifen;
dem dazu geh8rt, dass der Inhalt bestimmt in sich, als konkret
gefasst werden." For Hegel, then, reason is an organization
and transformation of the "given" which contains much more
than the refined and reduced sense experiences that are primary
data for the scientist. The aim of reason is the formulation
of notions or concepts with progressively greater empirical
adequacy and approximation. That is the meaning of "concrete"
as opposed to "abstract." Is it possible with a synoptic
34. See Hegel, VGP, III, 182, 295-296; PG, 83-88.
35. See Hegel, PG, 12-18.
36. VGP, III, 421. Cf. Enc
.
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method to achieve the "concreteness " in which Hegel was
interested? Synopsis in contrast to analysis is often linked
with the "concrete" view. The important question is: How?
D. Epilogue and Summary.
The reader was forewarned about the purpose of this
historical sketch. Only outstanding figures in the history
of philosophy have been discussed and then only for the pur-
pose of raising problems and anticipating later chapters.
Many relevant and important views of scientists and philo-
sophers of science have been deliberately omitted so the
central issues may not be bogged down in historical detail. In
any case, some of the methodological problems related to wholes
should now appear in bolder relief.
For the pre-Socratic philosophers, as Aristotle sug-
gested, all wholes were ultimatiy material or physical com-
plexes: Thales 1 philosophizing ended in water as first prin-
ciple; Anaximander’s in physis ; Anaximenes’ in air. Though
Hei^clitus saw the cosmos as a whole, as a unity of opposites,
and though Anaxagoras introduced Nous to mix the "seeds"
(wholes as unities of diversity) forming the world-whole,
they were, like the other pre-Socratics, inarticulate about
the instruments they were using to reach such conclusions.
In the Theaetetus Plato deals with wholes and methodo-
logy. Wholes are built up of primeval elements which "have
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nothing but a name" and are the essence of a definition;
explanation is "an enumeration of the elements out of which
anything is composed." But when Plato "explains" a wagon by
enumeration of the planks (parts), these elements are not in
the same category as primitive qualities which "have nothing
but a name." Merz, Sorley, and others link Plato's dialecti-
cal reason with synopsis. This is justifiable because Plato
said that the dialectical thinker is synoptical. "Understand-
ing" moves upon hypotheses, images, and shadows, but reason
soars beyond hypotheses to "the first principle of the whole."
Plato's suggestions must be untangled in answering the
question: How, specifically, are "dialectical" or "synopti-
cal" reason and explanation through "primeval elements" re-
lated to the understanding of wholes? Similar problems
are raised by Aristotle's "intuitive reason" wherein all
things are seen at once and whole, and by his effort to
"save the appearances" of purpose in living wholes.
With Spinoza scientia intuitiva follows rational know-
ledge and sense-bound imagination as a higher stage. Here
the abstract picture delineated by scientific reason is
given color by particulars of concrete intuition. What is
the role of intuition in comprehending wholes? In dealing
with issues that had engaged Locke, Leibniz, and other pre-
decessors, Hume emphasized the analysis of an object or a
concept into its experiential elements. The effect wastodestroy
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substance. His world became a collection of impressions
akin to neo-realists’ "neutral entitles": "All our distinct
perceptions are distinct existences." (Hume) How is conceptu-
al discrimination, 'which separates aspects, related to finding
parts of a whole, parts which are more than aspects? Kant
believed that there is something in organisms which cannot
be analyzed in the same way as spatial wholes. His Kritik
der IJrtellskraft causes one to ask: How is analysis and how
is synopsis concerned with "saving the appearances" which are
lost if a living whole is "understood" as a complex of sense
objects? The same issue arises when Goethe oraises Kant’s
view as "ein Bild seiner eigenen intuitive Geistesrichtung.
"
Goethe would sacrifice neither the poet's "anschauendes Be-
wusstsein" or a whole nor the scientist's tight and patient
analyses. How are the two related? With Hegel Reason aims to
achieve the "concrete universal," i.e., the organization of
data following the structure of organisms. Steering between
romanticism and sensationalism Hegel found "concreteness"
in progressive empirical adequacy. Synopsis, in contrast to
analysis, is often linked with the "concrete" view. The real
question is: How?
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CHAPTER III
ANALYSIS
A. Statement of the Method of Analysis,
The conventional and dictionary definition of analysis
makes the term mean a resolution of anything into elements
and an examination of those elements themselves and in re-
lation to the original whole. Analysts have refined the
term by distinguishing kinds of analysis on the basis of in-
tellectual operations themselves or on the basis of materials
that undergo analysis. Th^s, it has become common to dif-
ferentiate conceptual and experimental analysis, to dis-
tinguish existential and linguistic analysis. How such dis-
tinctions are related to views of analysts who will be discussed
here — primarily E. G. Spaulding and R. B. Perry — will ap-
pear later.
Spaulding, Perry, and other neo-realists have defended
analysis against intuitionists theories such as those of Bergson
and Bradley who hold that analysis entails falsification. 1
Both defenders and oponents recognize that analysis is intended
as a method of inquiry and a way of understanding or explaining
1. See Holt and others, NR, 32: Analysts are opponents of "all
philosophies that rely on immediacy for a knowledge of complexes
of all philosophies that regard the many in one as a mystery
that can be resolved only by an ineffable insight." See
Costello, Art. (1913), 495 and his valuable caution that real-
ists might "perceive the strong as well as the weak points of
Bergson" and that Bergson does not deny the possibility of ana-
lysis or the validity of concepts but rather insists that
"neither words nor concepts are identical with the entities
symbolized.
"
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any complex object of attention. But what is meant by
understanding and explanation? Understanding means a grasp
of the intrinsic properties and features of the problematic
object and a grasp of the essential relations which that ob-
ject bears to other objects. As Y/hitehead has suggested,
understanding has internal and external movement:
If the thing understood be composite, the under-
standing of it can be in reference to its factors,
and to their ways of interweaving so as to form
that total thing. This mode of comprehension makes
evident why the thing is what it is.
The second mode of understanding i3 to treat the
thing as a unity, whether or no it be capable of
analysis, and to obtain evidence as to its capacity
for affecting its environment. The first mode may
be called the internal understanding, and the
second mode is the external understanding.
^
To illustrate what is meant by understanding and explana-
tion: After thorough observation and description of the ’’first
seen” properties, a gas in a container is understood in so far
as its volume is found to have a definite relation to tempera-
ture and pressure. Another level of understanding is achieved
as the relation of temperature to molecular motion is fixed.
And this in turn links the behavior of the gas to the behavior
of a bar of steel or a piece of glass. Again, one understands
"jazz” or "swing” music in so far as he knows the relation of
music to "immigration” and absorption of Negroes, attitudes
toward sophisticated symphony on the part of a semi-frontier
people, and the relation of nervous excitation to the tempo
of urban life. All this, of course, presupposes "jazz” has
been carefully related to musical form, musical ideas, and the
like so its genre might be precisely stated.
2. MOT, 63
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The problematic situation which understanding and
explanation aim to resolve consists of a vague and confused
relation-relata complex. If analysis and synopsis have any
specific differences as methods , those differences will he
found in the ways of operating on a problematic or "given”
whole so as to achieve order, definiteness, connection, and
thus understanding. In their character as methods neither
analysis nor synopsis would seem to require any further
theory of the "given" that what has been said here about the
preliminary situation or starting point of investigation and
its relation to explanation.
1. The realists’ analysis.
The common opinion of the neo-realists is that analysis
is "that method of procedure in which the problematic is dis-
covered to be a complex of simples." Such words immediately
recall the aim of Leucippus and the Greek atomists.^ The dis-
covery of fine identities in place of gross differences, the
realist explains, is really only the careful and exhaustive
examination of any topic of discourse. Analysis reduces a com-
plex and problematic object of attention to a totality of com-
ponents and a plurality of factors. The "totality" includes
the "combining relations" of the components. For example, a
vase is not identical with. the various pieces into which it
, - - „
3. Holt and others, HR, 24.
4. See above, 42-43.
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has been shattered unless these are arranged or related as
they were before the accident. Again, overlooking "combin-
ing relations" in dynamics leads to the conclusion that
analysis falsifies by reducing motion to occupancy of oosi-
tions. But the occupancy, as will be suggested more fully
later, has a special order that is revealed by analysis. 5
Such, then, is the view of analysis to which the neo-
realists agreed in their co-operative volume entitled The
New Realism . In their separate contributions to that volume
Perry and Spaulding elaborated the meaning of analysis. The
rest of this section will, for the most part, be an exposi-
tion of their views. This exposition will be followed by an-
other section devoted to critical examination and evaluation
of analysis before taking up the synoptic method.
2. The positivists 1 analysis.
To clear the main line of argument it is necessary
to distinguish between analysis espoused by neo-realists and
the linguistic analysis of logical positivism. The latter
is mainly irrelevant to the central dissertation problem.
Realistic analysis may operate on an amoeba, Newton’s falling
apple. Gauss's geometry, or any possible object of thought.
Whether the objects ofanalysis are merely subsistents (any
possible objects of thought) or existents (objects of thought
in the space and time system), those objects are independent
5. See Holt and others, NR, 24
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g
of the knower. Realistic analysis is thus examination of
the content of the world. In this sense it is metaphysical.
The neo-realists, in fact, speak of the "full ontological
validity" of "the method of logic and of exact science in
general" (analysis). 17 In so far as the neo-realist accords
"full ontological status" to logical and physical entities,
subsistents and existents, he is a "Platonic realist."®
Logical positivists and their sympathizers champion
an ametaphysical or linguistic analysis. A. J. Ayer has well
described such analysis:
The validity of the analytic method is not dependent
on any empirical, much less any metaphysical, pre-
supposition about the nature of things. For the philo-
sopher, as an analyst, is not directly concerned with
the physical properties of things. He is concerned
only with the way in which we speak about them.
9
The proper sphere of interest for the philosopher is logic,
i.e., the analysis of sentences to find their consequences
and relations. The critics of analysis, Ayer observes, usually
attack its metaphysical consequences or assumptions. They
assume that analysis breaks up objects until the whole uni-
verse is an aggregate of particulars united externally.
"Linguistic analysis" means, however, the probing into formal
consequences and implications of propositions. Like formal
logic or mathematics it is not directly concerned with things,
6. See Holt and others, NR, 35, 253.
7. Ibid., 26.
8. See ibid., 35. Logical principles, Spaulding explains, are
objective in the sense of Plato’s Ideas or Aristotle’s forms.
9. LTL, 61. (Ital. mine.)
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objects, or existent s. These references, the later-day posi-
tivists have sought to show in the study of semiotic, belong
to sign theory (syntax: language referring to language) or to
the content of some special science (language referring to
"the behaviour of physical, or even mental, objects," i.e.,
factual propositions).
The"realra of subsistence," according to Morris, is not
a metaphysical question so much as a semiotic issue. It
calls attention to the fact that the designatum of every
sign is a class of objects which may have many or no members.
If its members are at a place and time which can be measured
in relation to other objects, the designatum is a thing or
existent. Otherwise the reference is merely to symbols and
concepts. According to Morris and Carnap, a semiotic analysis
makes it unnecessary to introduce a realm of existents and a
realm of subsistents or essences.^
Neo-realists, of course, could agree to much of what
Ayer, Carnap, and Morris say about the value of logical ana-
lysis. As W. T. Marvin suggests, the proper"world of discourse"
for philosophy is logical analysis of formal and material pre-
mises rather than psychological facts.^ But for thinkers
like Perry and Soaulding logical analysis is not merely a
probing of the inter-relationships of words and signs. These
men are Platonic realists so it is a means of laying bare the
10. See Morris, Enc
. ,
I, 2; 5, 15. Cf. Carnap, Art. (1959),
221ff
.
11. See Holt and others, NR, 95n.
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structure of the world. The method of logic and the ana-
lytic methods of exact science have "full ontological validi-
ty." 12 Since realists claim both logic and science as in-
stances of the analytical method, they regard analysis as suf-
ficient for all understanding. Certainly understanding re-
quires the application of logic — tracing out implications
and clear statement of the relation of evidence to conclusions.
These operations, in turn, require analysis of any body of as-
sertions claimed to be knowledge. But further uses of analysis,
and the exact sense in which the methods of science are ana-
lytical, await more clarification from the realists.
3. Perry on analysis.
In his little book entitled Defense of Philosophy
Ralph Barton Perry characterizes philosophy as "that branch
of knowledge which attempts to get to the bottom of things,
and to embrace the whole of things. It seems to require
both the poetic insight in which every part reveals the mean-
ing of the whole and the more prosaic view whereby analysis
of the "flower in the crannied wall" carries one "abroad
12. Since neo-realists and positivists seem to agree in a
number of ways, why do they disagree about "ontological
validity" of analysis? Though it is here neither necessary
nor feasible to try settling such disagreement, it may be
instructive to consider its grounds. Positivists argue that
there is no way of testing the basic thesisof "Platonic real-
ism." "Objectivity" and "real" must have meaning in terms
of the actual or hypothetical occurence of experiences. So
logic is not concerned with the world’s structure but rather
with syntax, and science aims to predict experiences. (See
Ayer, LTL, 29-30, 35.)
13. 17.
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into the domain of all reality." 14 Thus, the philosopher
must employ both the method of abstraction and intuitive
insight
.
He may learn the area of the country in number of
square miles, its population, topographical measure-
ments, industrial and social statistics, and thus
come to grasp it all by "conceptual abstraction."
Or, he may by the breadth and intimacy of his ac-
quaintance and by the liveliness of his imagination
come to see and feel its individuality, as one
"little world," one "blessed plot," one "earth,"
one "realm," like Shakespeare’s England. This is
whatl have called intuitive insight. 15
Philosophy presses both attitudes and ways of comprehension
forward so as to grasp the "whole of things." 16 Perry seems
to be saying that ohilosophy and any truly adequate investi-
gation must rely on some other method than that of analysis,
must rely on the method of poetic insight whereby one "feels
individuality." Whether this is the case and -whether ade-
quacy demands a synoptic method such as will be described in
the next chapter calls for further examination of the realist’s
position.
In Present Philosophical Tendencies Perry notes the
ambiguous position of philosophy between the theoretical de-
mands of science and the religious concern with action, destiny,
man’s hopes. Since life is best served by a theoretical de-
tachment, philosophy should. Perry believes, examine ultimate
causes by "the method of critical analysis." Philosophy may
14. Perry, DP, 14-15
15. Ibid., 19-20.
16. Ibid., 26, 28.
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reach beyond the limits of science for answers to those
problems that underlie religious faith; "For the philosopher’s
is the prior task of seeking that knowledge itself from which
the passions may derive their light and guidance." Else-
where in Present Philosophical Tendencies Perry repeats the
thesis to which he had subscribed in the New Realism : analysis
is the method of exact knowledge in general. The analytical
version of scientific concepts makes them "ratios or relational
complexes of simple terms of experience." This method suf-
18fices for all other concepts. Failure to press analysis for-
ward leads the philosopher into the error of pseudo-simplicity
where the pre-analytic simplicity is given priority and is used
to discredit the post-analytic simplicity that accompanies know-
1 Qledge. Perry defends analysis on the grounds that knowledge,
in contrast to "immediate apprehension" requires such a pro
c edure
:
The method of analysis presupposes that the nature
and arrangement of the parts supplies the character
of the whole. If such were not the case the speci-
fication of the parts and their arrangement would not
afford a description of the whole, and one would have
to be content with an immediate or mystical apprehen-
sion of it.
17. Perry
,
PPT, 41. See ibid., 29-30.
18. Ibid., 61-62.
19. See ibid., 65-66. In such an error the investigator.
Perry explains, fails to recognize the difference between
the simplicty due to ignorance andthat due to knowledge. The
pre-analytic unity hovers in the background of the mind,
tends to discredit analysis, and seems to contradict the re-
sults of analysis.
20. Ibid., 319. Most criticisms against the analytic method.
Perry says, are based on misunderstandings. Referring to
James and Bergson’s attack on the analytic version of con-
tinuity, Perry reminds the reader that the symbols standing
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In his statement of "A Realistic Theory of Independ-
ence” Perry rightly insists that a precise definition of de-
pendence and independence is essential to such conceptions
as coherence, synthetic unity, and wholeness. A In formulat-
ing such a definition. Perry throws light on the relation of
analytical method to wholeness. For ulterior epistemological
reasons the realist distinguishes dependence and relation.
"Dependence is something over and above bare relation." 22
Were it not, the belief in the independence of objects from
the cognitive consciousness would entail complete agnosticism.
The realist maintains that various objects sustain the cogni-
tive relation only accidentally. Leaving aside mere relation
for the purpose of this discussion, one notes that Perry finds
four general modes of dependence: whole-part, causation, im-
23
plied and being implied. In the first mode, which is the
center of interest here, an object is dependent on what it
contains. It is dependent on what it "can be analyzed or
divided into." For Perry, it will be shown presently, this is
the primary direction of whole-part dependency.
for continuity or blue may themselves be discrete or black.
And the use of analysis does not mean that everything is re-
duced to logic: "The analytical method does imply that reality
consists of terms and relations. It does not
,
however, imply
that this bare term-and-relation character is all there is to
it." (PPT, 234) For example, "Bare logical order
_is static;
and can neverof itself express time. But it is an utterly dif-
ferent matter to regard time, like space and number, as a case
oforder, having the specific time quale over and above the pro-
perties of order." (Ibid., 235) Perry notes, as does Spaulding,
that in the time series the instants possess "a unique time
character of their own."
21. Holt and others, NR, 105.
22. Ibid., 114.
23. Ibid., 107-113.
'.I
.
.
.
• vreW
.
*
t
'
.
'
t
,
. -
:
‘
‘
.
. ,0
<
~ - f " • t ' •
-
. • •
‘
'T*<t
.
• *3
. £2
t .
' IcT ,
.
69
The whole-part dependency, according to Perry, has a
formal aspect (a relation between vafiables) and a material
aspect (a relation between particular values of the variables).
For example, the yellowish volume-knob is materially dependent
as part on the table-model We stinghouse radio set in brown
bakelite box operated by DC power. The formal and material
dependence of part on whole — the relation of hypotenuse to
right triangle orpancreas to mammal's body — is reducible to
other types of dependence. This is an important assertion
for Perry to make. He explains that when one says the hypote-
nuse is dependent formally on the right triangle, there is
only tautology. "The side-opposite-the-right-angle-of-a-tri-
angle cannot be such without the triangle." In other words the
conception of triangle depends on the Conception of triangle,
or a part cannot be a part or belong to a whole without that
whole. "This is equivalent to saying," Perry offers, "that
the complex relationship of part and whole depends on the whole
as one of its terms. And this is a case of dependence of whole
on part, and not of part on whole. In most cases of materi-
al dependence there is emphasis on the interdependence of
parts so that the whole-part relation is ignored for some other
mode of dependency. For example, the dependence of the pancreas
on the heart is more important as a causal dependency than as
whole-part dependency.
In Perry's use of analysis with "dependence" and the whole-
part relation there are some matters to be criticized in the
24. Holt and others, NR, 108.
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section following Spaulding's views. It follows from what
Perry has said about dependence that all simple entitles are
mutually independent. They cannot be dependent in the whole-
nart relation because they do not themselves consist of
parts. They cannot be dependent in the part-whole relation
because. Perry has argued, this reduces to the dependency of
whole on part or part on part. The legitimacy of such reduc-
tion will be questioned later. Again, simple entities cannot
be causally or implicative ly dependent because those modes
25
hold only between complexes. It follows, then, that a simple
entity cannot be dependent on the complex of which it is a mem-
ber without the comnlex being a part cf cne of its own compon-
ents or without the components being causes or impliers of
themselves. Further, complexes themselves may be destroyed
without affecting the components which are independent.
All these statements are implications of the defini-
tion of dependence which
reveals the important fact that dependence is not
always reciprocal. While a complex depends on the
terms into which it may be analyzed, these are none
the less independent of the complex.
The basic question, as Perry's own remarks suggest, is whether
the whole-part dependence Is non-reciprocal. If he is right,
here is an argument for the thesis that simple entities are in-
dependent of consciousness and knowledge because they are not
dependent on the whole of which they may be parts. Though
25. Holt and others, NR, 118
26. Ibid., 119.
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they must be experienced in some context or schematism, the
general conclusion is not imperilled:
The ultimate terms of experience are at any rate
independent, whatever may turn out to be the case
with certain complexes of these terms. If the knower
desires to eliminate the personal equation and seize
on things-in-themselves, his safest course is to sift
experience into its elements and thus obtain a sure
footing in the independent world. 27
4. Spaulding on analysis and wholes.
Spaulding’s discussion of wholeness and analysis, like
Perry’s, is made in and for the sake of the neo-realistic per-
spective :
My specific purpose becomes, then, not simply to de-
fend analysis qua analysis, but also by this means
to defend the general realistic interpretation of
both whole and part. I shall, then, defend analysis
as a method of knowing which discovers entities or
parts which are real quite in the same sense as are
the wholes which are analyzed. 28
Already there is apparent a difference between the views of
Spaulding and Perry. For the latter, the simple elements in
which analysis terminates are not on the same footing as the
whole out of which they were analyzed. Perry, in fact, ar-
gued that the further analysis is pressed toward ultimate
terms, qualities, or indefinable entities, the nearer the
knower approaches independent "things-in-themselves . "29
a. Analysis.
Spaulding’s distinction between formal and experimental
or material analysis is not a distinction between variables
27. Holt and others, NR, 128.
28. Spaulding, Art. (1912), 155.
29. See Holt and others, NR, 52, 54-55, 128.
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30
and constants. In formal analysis the parts of a complex
"are distinguished and discovered but nevertheless left in
situ . " Some objects may be physically taken apart in experi-
mental analysis, but at a certain stage this procedure must
be supplemented by other methods
which are identical with mathematical analysis,
methods which are based on rational principles,
methods which lead to analytical results that in
many cases are directly confirmed by further experi-
mentally directed observation. Such analysis may
be called formal. 3^
The difference between formal and material analysis might be
clearer if some examples of application were offered. The
former is the method of dealing with motion in terms of oc-
cupancy of points and instants, with the number continuum,
and the time series. The latter is the method of dealing with
complex or existing things such as chemical, physical, or bio-
logical entities. In contrast to the empirical observation
and experimental operations involved in material analysis,
formal analysis is conceptual.
These remarks on the kinds and functions of analysis
suggest its meaning for Spaulding:
Analysis is the discovery, or, possibly, the inven-
tion of parts parts of the whole analyzed. Which
of these analysis is — discovery or invention, —
revelation of fact or falsification —
,
is in reality
the central question at issue. On this point parties
divide. But all agree that that which is analyzed is
in some sense a whole, and that to which analysis
leads is in some sense a part. 33
30. See above 69 on Perry 1 s formal and material dependence.
31. Spaulding, Art. (1912), 156.
32. See Spaulding, TNR, 158.
33. Spaulding, Art. (1912), 155. Cf. Spaulding, TNR, 192-3.
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Analysis clearly involves the whole-part relation stressed
in the exposition of Perry’s views. The realists believe
that analysis means the discovery of parts that exist or
subsist independently of the analysis. In this they oppose
the position that to analyze means to construct or invent.
Spaulding remarks that this is the position of pragmatism —
analysis is justifiable because "its validity is identical
34
with its verification." The realist may admit many of the
theses of pragmatism. But there is a point at which he must
draw the line. It is only to the position that the validity
of analysis
is in any specific case identical with its verifica-
tion, that the realist is fundamentally opposed. For
such a position means, he holds, subjective idealism.
Of that he can and will have none . 33
There are other features of analysis than the discovery
of carts or the discovery that a certain object is complex
and composite. Analysis reveals also relations that organize
the parts as well as "those properties which, in some cases,
the whole, as a whole, may have different from those of the
parts." Spaulding urges that these diverse products of
analysis are quite as "real" as the whole which is analyzed
and are independent cf their discovery and specification. As
mentioned before. Perry seems to believe, somewhat differently
from Spaulding, that the products ofanalysis are more "real"
than the starting point. In any case, much criticism of
34. Spaulding, Art. (1912), 158.
35. Ibid., 159.
36. Ibid., 161.
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analysis as falsifying is emptied if one remembers Spaulding’s
aim to "save the appearances'1 , but at the same time to achieve
adequate understanding: "The whole..._is the parts and their
properties and the relations relating the parts and the pos-
sibly specific properties of the whole." 37
b. Types of wholes.
Applying the method of analysis, Spaulding finds
several types of wholes, one type being distinguished from
another primarily by the relations that hold among the sub-
ordinate parts. The present exposition of Spaulding’s grouping
of wholes amplifies the brief consideration which appeared in
Chapter I. And the previous criticism of his classification
will receive further confirmation in the "Critical Examination"
which follows. In a collection or aggregate the components
are related by "and," elements are related by numerical con-
junction. "Anything, taken with at least one other ’something,
and these two with another something, and so on, form a
3Q
whole." Certainly the universe is a whole in this sense.
It is at least an aggregate of all entities, but may be more
if other relations besides mere conjunctive relations are
present. As Spaulding remarks, an aggregate is often confused
37. Spaulding, Art. (1912), 161. The last clause in the above
statement — "the possibly specific properties of the whole"
—
was emphasized in Chanter I in connection with the definition
of sum and whole and the difference between part and moment.
See above, 16, 22ff.
38. See above, 22ff.
39. Ibid., 163. Cf. Spaulding, TNR, 193.
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with other types of wholeness:
A whole may be a mere aggregate notwithstanding
certain other relations, such as those of similarity
and difference, among its parts. Such a whole, how-
ever does not seem on the basis of genuinely empiri-
cal investigation to possess any distinctive proper-
ties as a whole; it j^s simply its parts, with their
properties summed and numerically conjoined. 40
In the second type of whole which Spaulding considers,
the oarts are similar in at least one respect and related by
one or more relation other than mere numerical conjunction.
Such wholes are classes or assemblages of similar individuals
that are not themselves classes — e.g., carbon, American,
space, time.^ 1 Here the nonconjunctive organizing relations
and theuiiqueness of the terms are all important. To over-
look them is to make a clearly false analysis. Accordingly,
space, motion, and time are not analytically reduced to non-
space, rest, and nonduration. Space has a continuity (asym-
metrical and transitive relations) like that of the real
number series, "But its continuity is a continuity of points,
not of numbers; that is, there is a quale in the spatial ele-
ment, which the numbers lack." Furthermore, Spaulding warns,
to ignore the organizing relations of points and instants which
define continuity, is to lead to the mistaken belief that the
results of analysis "contradict" the object analyzed -- in the
present case continuous extension or duration.^®
40. Spaulding, Art. (1912), 164.
41. Ibid., 169-170. See above, 32, on classes as "wholes."
42. Ibid., 184. In his criticism of realistic analysis
Costello overlooked this difference between mathematical
and spatial or temporal continua. See Art. (1913), 497-498.
43. See Spaulding, Art. (1912), 188-189, 192-194.
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Defense of wholes like space, time, and motion —
classes of "individuals" — involves, Spaulding believes,
defense of the atomic theory. Combination of certain sub-
stances in rational proportions, variation of temperature and
volume of gasses, and the general periodicity of chemicals are
analytical data which carry with themselves "the assertion
of the one hypothesis which in the present state of our know-
ledge, is the only one that will explain them all." Spaulding
concludes:
Then the entities, the atoms, which that hypothesis
denotes, are to be accepted as real in exactly the
same sense as are the data which they explain. 44
He remarks that here, as in other analyses, apparent falsity
and distortion can be avoided if one remembers the organizing
relations and the nonadditive results of organization -- the
specific properties of the whole. His emphasis in regard to
the atomic theory as illustrative of the whole-part relation
underlines the thesis that the products of analysis -- atoms,
molecules, and electrons — exist in the same sense as that
which they explain. The third type of whole is the class of
subordinate classes rather than individuals. The whole is an
organization of types wherein individuals are instances of
"states of affairs" that are as real as the wholes analyzed.
The fourth main type of whole with which Spaulding is
concerned is the organic whole. An organic whole is a complex
of elements "which, related, do modify or influence one an-
other, or which perhaps are constituted by virtue of their
44. Art. (1912), 228.
45. Ibid., 253-256.
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relation to one another."46 Not only do living things
exemplify such wholeness, but physical complexes also have
properties which are lacking in their parts and which are not
derived additively from the parts. Some physical properties
are clearly additive — volume, magnetism, and the heat of
combustion of organic compounds. In other cases of physical
complexes, there is a different situation. For example,
water has certain specific physical and chemical properties
in itself as a compound. The former are its specific gravi-
ty, boiling point, and the like. The latter are the ways
it combines with other compounds such as sodium chloride or
sulphuric acid. By experimental analysis water may be split
into hydrogen and oxygen which have certain similarities to
water in physical properties but definitely different chemi-
cal properties. Thus, there is in the whole and parts some-
thing new. Of these new properties Spaulding says:
These properties are put ’in relief’ by the analysis;
they are a residuum, characteristic of the whole as
a whole, and revealed by analysis which at the same
time reveals the parts or elements, and, through its
ramifications, organizing relations . 47
Thus analysis sets problems. It may be directed to a whole
which is not merely the sum of parts and whose properties can-
not be deduced from parts. Analysis also calls for "the
empirical ascertainment in many cases of the functional rela-
tion between the properties of the whole and those of parts. "48
46. Spaulding, Art. (1912), 240. See Spaulding, TNR, 500.
47. Ibid., 238.
48. Ibid., 240. The problem of explaining the so-called non-
additive results of organization is well described in WC, 227.
See ibid., 237; TNR, 446-449.
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In discussing organic wholes, Spaulding is especially
concerned with adjusting analysis to the "nonrational element
in nature.” As noted above, analysis puts certain specific
properties and qualities in relief. These are merely found
and not deducible from other facts though they may exemplify
types of logical order and types of ]aw. There are, Spaulding
believes, two ways in which the analyst may deal with the
"nonadditive results of organization,” contingencies, or the
"nonrational element in nature.” On the one hand, he may
hold that when parts are analyzed out or synthesized in,
they are changed in certain respects. Then "the parts when
in situ will actually be constituted by their relation to
49
other parts." On the other view, the analyst may hold that
the parts remain the same but gain new properties at different
levels. Either of these metaphysical theories is compatible
with the method of analysis. They are theories to account for
the "specific properties of the whole" or collective proper-
ties in distinction from distributive properties. In any case,
it is impossible to deduce the properties of the whole from
the part and vice-versa. This "nonrationality" ard contingency
is quite apparent in the analysis of living things:
All the evidence, now, shows that the organism con-
sists of cells, of colloidal particles in solution,
of molecules, of atoms, and electrons. At each
level as we go upward synthetically, new properties
appear. Going downward analytically, there is on the
whole a loss of properties. There is a tendency to-
ward simplification. 50
49. Spaulding, Art. (1912), 241.
50. Ibid., 241.
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From his earlier to later hooks Spaulding seems to
shift and revise his view of the nature of an organic whole.
In The New Realism he speaks of organic wholes or unities as
illustrated by any chemical compound or an organism. 51 There
is causal interaction and such an organization of elements
that the whole has new properties which the parts lack. The
New Rationalism cuts beneath the earlier position to state
very specifically the abstract logical pattern involved. An
organic whole is a causal whole or an infinitely complex web
of causal relations. By causal relation Spaulding means one
that is in form asymmetrical and transitive. As though to
anticipate objections that this does not jibe with the notion
of cause actually used in exact natural science, he observes
that an organic whole may have functional noncausal relations.
It will be remembered that the simplest functional whole is
one in which there is a one-Dne relation (and, of course, n-
valued functions are possible) correlating terms of one
series with those of another.
What is to be noted about the argument in The New
Rationalism is its provision for unique levels of organiza-
tion and its provision for purposive wholes that are causal
wholes but something more. 55 Spaulding will not grant that
a purposive process is only a causal process read backwards.
51 See Spaulding, Art. (1912), 157, 256-247. See above, 32,
on functional wholes. The present discussion gives Spaulding’s
view of how analysis deals with what were earlier called
functional wholes.
52. See ibid., 157; TNR, 156-157.
53. See ibid., 196, 509-514.
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This is a frequent argument designed to keep biology -- or
any science that apparently needs teleology — within the
realm of strictly physicalistic portrayal of nature. Evolu-
tion, Spaulding believes, is teleology as an existential
process. It implies at least change with direction, and
correlation with time gives direction. The logical basis of
direction is a series of instants related asymmetrically and
transitively. But if this is completely identified with
teleology, there is no growth in conrolexity, no purposive
advance or progress. Then means and ends only describe the
direction of change. They are merely numbers of a series in
which one finds the means "as earlier asymmetrically related
54
to the end as later ." But evolution brings to change the
idea of emergence, the production of new wholes. Spaulding
believes that
there is an existential creative synthesis that is
also a temporal process in which there arise new
wholes with new properties. These properties un-
deniably have the^r place in the evolutionary
• scheme of things. 5
For such reasons he rejects his belief of The New Realism
essay that the "end" is merely a later stage in a causal com-
plex whether it be an organism or a physic -chemical complex. 56
In A World of Chance (1936) there is a sharp cleavage
between the organic level and that of chemical, physical,
and mathematical organization. Spaulding no longer identifies
54. Spaulding, TNR, 511.
55. Ibid., 512.
56. See Spaulding, Art. (1912), 245-246. Cf. TNR, 513.
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causal and organic wholes. They belong to distinct levels,
though the levels certainly overlap at least in one direc-
tion. The specific and irreducible feature of an organic
whole — interpretable in terms of unique organizing relations
and pattern — is the presence of telic structure. There is
internal determination, the whole organism "controls" the
process of regeneration so the part serves it, and in human
behavior there is conscious selection of an end and the auto-
nomous determination of means by end. 57 To be sure, there are
physico-chemical processes in an organism, but they are com-
prehensible only in terms of their service to the "organism
as a whole." Teleology, Soaulding believes does not neces-
sarily entail effects of a conscious agent, but it clearly
marks off an organic whole from the level of physical causali-
ty. In his essay in The New Reali sm Spaulding vaguely anti-
cipated this conclusion. There he "resolved" the vitalistic
problem by noting that in biology causality operates with
specifically different constants. "Vitalism is but another
word," Spaulding wrote, "for not-pure mechanism. "58 The
specific properties of a living whole are no more deducible
from those of certain hydrocarbon compounds than the chemical
properties of water are deducible from those of hydrogen and
oxygen.
57. See Spaulding, WC, 239, 232.
58. See Spaulding, Art. (1912), 247.
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B. Critical Examination and Discussion of Analysis.
Though the analysts’ argument at first is compelling
and convincing because it seems so much like contemporary
common sense reflecting the spirit and method of exact
science, that argument is really a bundle of perplexing
problems and doubtful implications. The following paragraphs
will elaborate vulnerable and questionable points in the
analytical method as described by Perry and Spaulding.
1. The direction of whole-oart dependency.
In connection with Perry's discussion of dependence59
there are assertions about the formal-logical relation of
whole and nart that need examination. A basic question is
whether or not the whole-part dependency, logically, must be
nonreciprocal. The primary direction of "holistic" dependency,
according to Perry, is whole-part, i.e., an object is de-
oendent on what it contains or can "be analyzed into." What
is Perry's proof for this? It lies in an attempt to show that
the formal and material dependence of the part on the whole
(note the order) is reducible to that of whole on part. Sup-
pose one were to say that the hypotenuse is dependent on the
right triangle. This is equivalent to: "The side-opposite-the-
right-angle-of-a-triangle cannot be such without that triangle."
Thus, a part cannot be a part or belong to a whole without
that whole. "This is equivalent to saying," Perry asserts,
"that the complex relationship of part and whole depends on
59. See above, 69
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the whole as one of its terms. And this is a case of de-
pendence of whole on part and not of part on whole." 00 But
there is another equivalence: The complex relationship of
part and whole also depends on the part as one of its terms.
And this is a case of dependence of part on whole. The relation-
ship of whole-part is clearly reciprocal. The reciprocal de-
pendency follows from the definition of whole as an organiza-
tion of parts, from the way wholeness, by definition, implies
partness.
Demonstration of the reciprocal rather than nonrecipro-
cal dependency of whole and part has some noteworthy consequences
for Perry* s defense of the theses of neo-realism. If the
dependency of whole and part does not reduce in every case
to whole-part (note the order), the mutual independence of
all simnle entities is undermined. Their simplicity is then
no guarantee of their independence. And it also follows that
a complex may not be destroyed without affecting the rela-
tively simple entities. Then there are no purely dialectical
grounds for asserting that though simple entities must be
known in some context or schematism, "The ultimate terms
of experience are at any rate independent, whatever may turn
out to be the case with certain complexes of those terms.
At this point the difficulty comes from trying to have cake
60. Holt and others, NR, 108. In this quotation Perry subtly
shifts the meaning of whole. The first sentence means that
a part cannot belong to a whole without that whole. But in
the second sentence the whole^ which is dependent on part; is
the "complex relationship" where whole functions as a term.
61. See above, 69-72.
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and eat it too. With dependency of whole-part being re-
ciprocal, Perry cannot defend at the same time and for the
same purpose the ultimacy of a logical pluralism and an ex-
periential wholeness. If the simple entities must be known
in some context or schematism, the ultimate terms of experi-
ence in the sense of experienced-terms cannot be independent.
It is, of course, possible to justify the view that results
of analysis are not dependent on the knowing experience. And
one may agree with Perry that things are not dependent on
knowing but still argue with evidence that those things are
conscious things. (Idealism) The independence of entities
from the knowing experience would not seem to be proved by the
argument that the direction of whole-part dependency is non-
reciprocal.
2. Division, analysis, and analysis into qualities.
In Perry’s assertion that an object is dependent on
what it "can be analyzed or divided into" 62 there is hint of
an ambiguity that runs through the realists’ notion of ana-
lysis. It is a grave mistake to identify analysis which
separates out qualities and aspects of an object with analysis
which goes to parts with their own properties. Using this
mistake the analyst tries to show how a certain theory of
space and events is on a par with the physicist’s atomic
theory. He tries to show you that if analysis is sound in
62. Holt and others, NR, 108. See above, 25-26.
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one case it is also sound in the other. But "division," like
analysis into qualities or aspects is really a form of analysis
in situ . Analysis in situ is formal and conceptual in con-
trast to the physical, manual, and experimental operations of
material analysis. The former is the method for dealing
with such wholes as motion, space, and time. That method may
be apnlied to anything other than a simple abstracted quality.
It marks out the qualities or aspects by reference to which the
object is characterized.
The common sense meaning of division is preserved if you
say that the resulting "parts" are alike in quality, though
not In quantity, with the whole that was divided. For example,
when a pie is divided, the pieces or elements are still pie.
Similarly, volume may be divided and its elements are still
volume. In division the nature of the elements may be inferred
from that of the whole which is divided because the primary
consideration is quantity . In dividing any object you purposely
and deliberately forget everything but "how much." Your main
interest is "more or less than" of the same thing.
Division, then, is related to the notion of sum or aggre-
gate. Division alone is not adequate for understanding genuine
wholes, i.e. conplexes which have specific properties of their
own besides the properties of the parts-in-relation. 6^ The pur-
pose and results of division are clear when it is compared
with the analysis used on physical complexes, organisms, or
chemical compounds. A division of salt does not lead to
65. See above, 71-74. Cf. Spaulding, TNR, 158.
64. See above, 22-30.
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something qualitatively different from the original mass. But
analysis, in the realists’ argument, does. Analysis leads
to sodium and chlorine atoms and finally to electrons. It is
highly confusing to identify division and analysis as Perry
does
.
The classification of wholes in Chapter I suggested the
urgency of distinguishing between the analysis which separates
out qualities and aspects and the analysis which goes to parts
with their own properties. Krikorian’s classification of
wholes divides at the point of "substantial unities" or what
common sense refers to as "things." Unlike Spaulding’s classi-
fication Kirkorian’s points to the radical difference between
elements such as qualities that are marked out in conceptual
analysis and parts which are more than abstracted qualities,
which are themselves objects. From the preceding exposition
it is clear that Spaulding knows the difference between analysis
into qualities and analysis into parts. The difference lies
in the contrast between analysis in 3itu and material analysis.
This difference should prevent Spaulding from putting "wholes"
like space, time, and motion on a par with physical wholes
whose parts are atoms. But it does not. So he urges, quite
mistakenly, that defense of wholes like space and time also
involve a defense of the atomic theory.
In view of the above criticism itis necessary to re-
interpret the realist’s general thesis that analysis — the
method, he says, of exact science and logic — explains by
discovering that the problematic object is a complex of
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simoles and by reducing the complex object of attention to
a plurality of factors. Conceptual discrimination and ana-
lysis in situ may discover the problematic object to be a
comolex of simples. The "simples' 1 are abstracted qualities
or properties. In a brick, for example, the composing quali-
ties, which may be further reduced, are weight, reddish or
brown color, hardness, roughness, and rectangular shape. The
analysis in this instance is epistemological. In sense-data
or essences it finally comes to rest. Here the object is a
whole whose "parts" are qualities or aspects. Of this sort
of analysis Perry’s statement is adequate and appropriate:
The method of analysis presupposes that the nature
and the arrangement of the parts supplies the char-
acter of the whole. If such were not the case the
specification of the parts and their arrangement would
not afford a description of the whole and one would
have to be content with an immediate or mystical ap-
prehension of it. ^
Conceptual discrimination and analysis in situ do "afford a
description of the whole," and without these procedures "one
would have to be content with a mystical apprehension" of
the whole. Thus, analysis of space or time gives a more ex-
act description or definition in terms of order and points
or instants. When the realist says that the instant has "a
quale different from the quale of the point," he is recog-
nizing in a very impersonal way that the meaning of terms in
his description depend on the experienced wholes of space and
time. He does not emphasize the abstractive route that led
to his description. Whitehead has traced the "analytic"
65. PPT, 319
.*
.1
.
o q > I
. .
~
.
.
.
.1: ^ 5
•
: *
*ro
88
route that leads to description of space and time:
In the act of experience we perceive a whole formed
of related differentiated parts. The relations be-
tween these carts possess certain characteristics,
and time and space are the expressions of some of
the characteristics of these relations. Then the
generality and uniformity which are ascribed to
time and space express what may be termed the uni-
formity of the texture of experience. .. .This uni-
formity does not belong to the immediate relations
of the crude data of experience, but is the result
of substituting for them more refined logical enti-
ties, such as relations between relations, or
classes of relations, or classes of classes of rela-
tions. 66
But Perry gives no hint of recognizing that his re-
marks about analysis apply only to a special type or func-
tion — to analysis which ends in refined aspects rather
than parts with their own properties. In regard to the lat-
ter, that is, in regard to “parts” in the sense in which
that term has been used here. Perry's statement is inade-
quate. It is a call for reduction and, necessarily, distor-
tion. Spaulding, on the other hand, is aware that explana-
tion may require a different sort of analysis and a shift
of procedure in which parts are discovered which themselves are
objects rather than simple qualities. On this level the parts
of an automobile are sparkplugs, crankshaft, pistons, bearings,
universal joint, and so on. The parts of a book are cover,
paper, thread, paste, and cloth. This shift requires ana-
lysis on a different level and for a different purpose —
material analysis involving imagination, hypothesis, and in-
ference to explain the qualities of a book as a book or an
66. OT, 216-17
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automobile as an automobile (the specific and unique proper-
ties). Exact natural science, par excellence , uses a method
of analysis which finds parts that are more than abstracted
qualities or aspects. (Atoms, genes, protons are at least com-
plex hypothetical entities.) Science reveals, Dewey observes,
"the state or order upon which the occurence of immediate or
final qualities depends."^7
The realists’ general thesis that analysis reduces
the problematic object to a complex of simples especially
needs amplifying in the case of material analysis. Through
material analysis the scientist seeks causes and conditions.
In dealing with "organic wholes" such as water, an amoeba,
or salt, the investigator first of all relates the object to
others to find similarities. In the case of chemical com-
pounds this results in the periodic table. In the case of
organisms it may result in discovery of common processes of
growth, assimilation, reproduction, locomotion, adaptibility,
etc. Prom these relatively simple data, from the discrimi-
nated qualities of the original problematic object which was
a whole, the scientist moves to hypothetical ehtities and
statements about the underlying condition of order in the
data. By hypothesis and inference the scientist seeks enti-
ties that define the conditions of the specific and unique
properties of the whole under consideration; those entities
will be the parts with their own particular properties.
67. EN, 136. Seeibid., 2-3.
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If the realist intends that the scientific analyst moves
from comolex object to hypothetical entities that explain
the features of the object, it is true that the investigator
moves toward " simples" because a hypothesis about conditions
and causes presupposes that a certain amount of conceptual
discrimination has taken place on the problematic object as
"first seen." But the specific scientific objects — for
example, molecules, cells, genes, or the material tools of
a society — are not simple in the same way a point is
simple in relation to the space continuum. Nor is the sci-
entific object a "part" of the original problematic complex
in the same way as a point is a part of space, as reddish-
hue is a cart of the brick, or as a piece of pie is a "part"
of the whole pie.
5. Validity of analysis and its relation to metaphysics.
The realists’ remarks about the validity of analysis
and the reality of the results of analysis rest on two basic
theses. The first is that the validity of analysis is not
identical with its verification, i.e., the results of ana-
lysis, the discoveries, the entities referred to by hypotheses
that emerge in material analysis are objective "states of
affairs" distinct from and not dependent on (caused by) their
being known. Spaulding asserted in connection with material
analysis68 that the entities referred to by any hypothesis
are real in exactly the same sense as the data they explain.
68. See Art. (1912), 158-159.
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Is the law of falling bodies real in the same sense as my-
book-droooing--off-the-table is real? Is Heisenberg's
matrix real in the same sense as are the shifting spectral
lines? Is any refined conceptual abstraction real in the
same sense as the vivid, " enjoyed," and experienced data
from which it is abstracted? Perry suggests that analysis
terminates in neutral entities which do not exist at all.
MThe simple entities are nowhere . 1,69 So the results of ana-
lysis do not belong to the same category as the "real"
things analyzed. Since Spaulding gives no hint of rejecting
this thesis of neo-realism, he apparently means something
else by the "real" entities any hypothesis refers to. In
using the term real, Spaulding means objective, independent,
or universally valid. He means, apparently, that analysis
is not artificial construction, that its validity is not
identical with its verification, i.e., the law of falling
bodies is an objective "state of affairs" that is discovered
and not made in verification. But this is finally no more than
a distinction between the definition or meaning of truth and
its criteria or tests. To make truth dependent on or equi-
valent to its tests, says Spaulding, is the same sort of
error as identifying the results of analysis with verifica-
tion of those results. Analysis is advanced as a means of
discovery, and not invention, of a state of affairs that is
not caused by being known.
69. See Spaulding, Art. (1912), 158-159
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Truth, Spaulding believes, is the subsistence of a
specific relation — a functional relationship of correspon-
dence -- between the knowing process and the entity known.
But this definition
only indicates the difficulty of finding a test where-
by to ascertain whether knowledge in any specific in-
stance _is true or not. But the presence or absence
of this test is not identical with the presence or ab-
senceof knowledge, for the former concerns proof and
the grounds of conviction, the latter, the presence
or absence of truth. 70
The realist is certainly right that belief always has some
relation (true or false) to an object. But what that rela-
tion is can only be ascertained through verification and test-
71ing. To know whether the results of an analysis of water,
an automobile, or an amoeba are true one must verify hypotheses
that take one beyond the problematic object as a qualitative
whole. But the truth of those hypotheses is, of course, dis-
tinct from verification.
The second thesis on which the realists’ remarks about
the validity of analysis depends is their particular meta-
physical scheme. "Validity of analysis" is really a question-
begging phrase. For the realist it seems to mean that ana-
lysis is justified because the world does in fact consist
of terms and relations which, like truth, are found and not
invented. "The analytical method," writes Perry, "does imply
that reality consists of terms and relations."72 Analysis, then,
70. TNR, 423-424.
71. See Montague, Art. (1909), 546-548.
72. PPT, 234; see ibid., 78: analysis leads to "logical real-
ism." Cf, Spaulding, WC, 222-228.
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is simply a reflection of metaphysics. The attack on
Bergson and Bradley is really an attack on their metaphysics
because analysis means that the world is a complex of terms
and relations. "Validity of analysis," in spite of analysis
being called a "method of procedure" and a "method of know-
ing" is for the realist a thesis in metaphysics rather than a
methodological question. It is an implication of the ratio
essendi rather than something connected primarily with the
ratio cognoscendi . All this is to be expected in view of W. T.
Marvin's spirited defense of the "dogmatic" thesis that
epistemology presupposes a theory of reality and is really a
73
metaphysic In disguise.
4. Analysis and the "specific properties of wholes."
In spite of all these difficulties in the realists'
method of dealing with wholes, there is a noteworthy effort
especially on Spaulding's part to deal with "real" wholes,
i.e. with such comolexes as have certain unique or specific
74properties over and above those of the parts. There is an
effort to deal adequately with those complex objects whose
parts are other objects rather than abstracted qualities or
aspects. Such wholes, it was noted earlier in this chapter,
fall under the general class of "organic wholes" -- e.g. an
amoeba, a human body, a chemical compound, a machine, or a
physical mass such as a quantity of steel — and such wholes
have properties which are lacking in their parts. Also, the
73. See NR, 74ff.
74. See above, 27.
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parts have their specific characteristics. The function of
analysis, Spaulding says, is to put such properties "in re-
lief."75
Spaulding recommends two other steps to deal with the
unique properties of wholes which analysis "puts in relief."
In the first place, such unique properties always presuppose
nonadditive organization. That is to say, the sufficient
condition of specific or unique properties in a whole is organi
zation of parts in a way over and above the additive mode.
When a whole is deliberately seen as nothing but a form of
additive organization, its properties are only transcriptions
of the properties of the elements in conjunction. Then the
investigator takes account only of the features of the
various parts and ignores the "unique properties of wholes." 7^
Spaulding well describes this situation:
It is an established empirical fact, that parts as
non-additively organized form a whole which has char-
acteristics that are qualitatively different from the
characteristics of the parts. A simple and familiar
illustration of this is the formation of water out of
hydrogen and oxygen. The relation between hydrogen
and oxygen is not additive, but organizing, and the
characteristics of the water are not the same as are
those of its chemical components. Also, the appear-
ance of these new characteristics (of the whole) is
not nullified by the hypothesis that they are poten-
tial in the parts in any sense; for, even if it be
granted that this hypothesis does anything more than
conceal our ignorance, it but repeats the problem in
the form of the question as to how the existential
appears out of the qualitatively different potential.
On the other hand, if the hypothesis that there are
non-additive relations, is accepted as an empirically
established principle from which deductions concerning
75 . See NR, 238.
76. See above, 25
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specific instances can be made, then one can
understand in just this sense the specific de novo
apnearance of certain qualities. "Things" added
give merely a total of the same qualities as the
parts have.*?7
Boiled down to bare essentials, Spaulding's remarks mean that
if one grasps the properties of certain objects as parts
and their mode of organization, he will be able in subsequent
instances to predict the appearance of the specific and unique
properties of the whole. To account for or to explain the
whole's unique properties there is required empirical ascer-
tainment "of the functional relation between the properties
of the whole and those of the parts.
"
7^ It is not a matter
of deduction of one level from another but the relationship
is ascertainable "only by inductive and empirical investiga-
tion." 79 At least, this la the trend of Spaulding's view
on the analysis of such wholes as differ sharply from sums.
Since all wholes whose parts are more than abstracted quali-
ties or aspects that characterize the object, the relation
of carts and whole is at most functional, and "reduction
of these new properties to those of the parts in the sense of
identification" is impossible without falsificat Ion. 80
Secondly, Spaulding offers two possible metaphysical
theories to account for the nonadditive results of organiza-
tion, for the specific properties of wholes. Since these
77. TNR, 447. (Ital. omitted)
78. Spaulding, Art. (1912), 240; See WC, 227.
79. Spaulding, TNR, 449.
80. See Spaulding, WC, 237: analysis is not explanation of
the "higher In terms of the lower."
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theories were explained earlier, it is not necessary to dis-
cuss them here. 81 7/hat is notev/orthy is Spaulding* s reference
to the specific and unique properties of a whole as a "non-
rational element in nature." They are nondeducible "occur-
rences" in no sense identical with the properties of the
82parts.
5. Conclusions about analysis and wholes.
(1) Some versions of analysis take no account of the
unique and specific properties of wholes. "The nature and ar-
rangement of the parts," says Perry, "supplies the character
of the whole." With such a view there is no distinction made
between analysis and division. And any distinction between
wholes and collections somewhat loses its point.
(2) In Spaulding* s view, analysis puts the specific and
unique properties of wholes "in relief." Furthermore, the
analyst recognizes that the specific properties of wholes are
not strictly deducible from the properties of the parts in a
certain relation. (In this sense they are "nonrat ional. "
)
(3) In Spaulding's version of analysis the specific
properties of a whole have no special role in understanding it.
They are merely other factors to be "analyzed out" along with
the parts and relations. They have no more important in under-
standing the whole thanhave the parts and relationships.
Whether and how they might have, in a synoptic method, is
partly the subject matter of the next chapter.
81. See above, 78.
82. Spaulding, Art. (1912), 240; WC, 237. See below, 124ff .
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C . Summary.
By analysis "the problematic is discovered to be
a complex of simples," a totality including the "combining
relations." Unlike the positivists' linguistic analysis
which only traces the formal consequences of propositions,
neo-realists' analysis which is "the method of logic and
of exact science" has "full ontological validity." Philosophy's
main task is analysis of concepts as "complexes of simple
terms of experience. " (Perry) Analysis "presupposes that
the nature and arrangement of the parts supplies the character
of the whole." Perry analyzes "dependence" in wholes and finds
they depend on parts but not vice-versa. With Spaulding ana-
lysis may be experimental (for "organic wholes," chemical or
physical complexes) or in situ (for motion, time, space).
Analysis reveals parts, relations and properties "the whole
as a whole, may have different from those of the parts." (Omit-
ted in Perry's view.) In situ analysis of time, for example,
does not falsify because it leads to continuity and instants
with a "quale different from the quale of the [spatial]
point." Analysis of organic wholes does not falsify because
it shows "organizing relations" and puts unique properties
of the whole "in relief." Such properties, elso referred to
as a whole's snecific properties, are a "non-rational element
in nature.
Perry's assertion that dependence is nonreciprocal,
that the whole depends on the parts but not vice-versa, is
invalid. That a part cannot be a part without a whole is
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equivalent to saying. Perry believes, "that the complex
relationship of part and whole depends on the whole as one
of its terms. And this is a case of dependence of whole on
part and not of part on whole." He shifts the meaning of
"whole." In the second clause whole is "complex relation-
ship" where "whole" is a term or "part." But "part" is
also a term and the "complex relationship" equally depends
on the part. Since the relationship of whole and part is
reciprocal, a complex cannot be destroyed without affecting
the simple entities. If simple entities must be experienced
in a complex or schematism, they cannot by this argument be
proved independent of experience. To say an object "can be
analyzed or divided " invites ambiguity. With division the
object is treated as a sum. There is deliberate abstraction
from all but 'more or less than' of the same thing. A di-
vision of salt leads to lesser salts. But in the realists'
argument analysis leads to sodium chlorine, atoms, and
finally molecules. In distinguishing between experimental
and in situ analysis Spaulding seems to recognize that con-
ceptual discrimination differs from discovery of parts; so
he should not say that defense of the atomic theory involves
defense of wholes like space and time.
Perry's truncated version of analysis ( "Nature and ar-
rangement of parts supplies character of whole.") suffices
for analysis in situ finding simples as abstracted qualities.
It identifies the object by an empirical definition : a brick
is a reddish, rough, heavy, rectangular object. Such
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merely conceptual analysis cannot discover real parts, i.e.
objects with features of their own different from the specific
or unique properties of the whole. Scientific analysis finds
such complex entities (parts) as atoms, genes, protons, etc.
which are more than abstracted qualities or aspects. They
•
are simpler than the original whole but not parts in the same
way roughness is ‘'part" of a brick or a point is a "part" of
space. For the neo-realists the "validity of analysis" is
really a thesis of their metaphysic rather than a methodologi-
cal issue standing on its own feet. So their defense of the
"validity of analysis" is question-begging because they have
presupposed a special view of the real structure of things.
Further, their defense entails the obvious and truistic idea
that the truth of results of analysis is not identical with
the verification of analysis.
In Spaulding^ view, analysis puts the specific and
unique properties of wholes "in relief." According to him,
the analyst recognizes that the specific properties of
wholes are not strictly deducible from the properties of
the parts in a certain relation. (In this sense they are
"nonrat iona 1. " ) But even here the specific properties of a
whole have no special role in understanding it. They are mere-
ly other factors to be "analyzed out" along with the parts
and relationships. They have no importance or privilege in
understanding the whole. Whether and how they might have, in
a synoptic method, is partly the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
SYNOPSIS AND WHOLES
It is rather natural that synopsis should he defined
in contrast to analysis. Philosophers who have defended
synoptic method in one form or another have stressed the
way it supplements and corrects analysis. Perhaps Plato’s
dialectical reason, which is often mentioned as "synoptic"
reason, was intended to supplement and correct the method
of Leucippus or some other pre-Socratic . Spinoza seems to
have had such a relation to Descartes. And likewise Hume
and Kant, Kant and Hegel, scientific naturalists and Goethe
or Bergson go together in the history of philosophy.
A. Preliminary Definition.
W. R. Sorley's definition of synopsis, because it is
comparatively explicit, will be a good starting point:
Analysis sunders a thing into its elements; syn-
thesis puts these elements together; synopsis views
the thing as a whole. Synopsis is something more
as well as something less than synthesis. Synthesis
gives us a whole — or perhaps only a collection —
each part of which is distinguishable and has been
distinguished; synopsis contemplates a whole of
which the parts may not be distinct.
^
1. MVIG, 250. See Brightman, ITP, 27: Synopsis "means the
viewing of any object or complex of objects as a whole." In
synoptic reason the mind does more than review the separate
facts of deduction, analysis- synthesis
,
and intuition. "It
sees them together and sees also the qualities of the object
as a whole, which the other methods tend to omit, underesti-
mate, or merely take for granted." See ibid., 110-114.
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If one remembers Perry and Spaulding's view of analysis-
synthesis, it is plain that Sorley' s statement invites
further probing and discussion. No exponent of analysis
could accept Sorley' s definition of it as sufficient. The
question will presently be considered as to whether synopsis
or any other method could contemplate "a whole of which the
parts may not be distinct.’' Though parts at first may not
be distinct, unless they are discoverable and recognizable
as parts there can be no whole. It is thinkable that syn-
opsis could be more than analysis, i.e., could contain a
methodological feature to supplement and correct analysis.
But it is not thinkable that synopsis could entirely exclude
some method of finding parts, which is the primary purpose
of analysis, and still deal with wholes. If synopsis were
less in this sense, it would be just an "opsis." It would
be a grasp or apprehension. But such an "opsis” is also
included in analysis: Perry refers to the "immediate ap-
prehension" of pre-analytic simplicity, and the neo-realists
2
version of space requires reference to its quale .
1. Merz on synopsis.
Before trying to decide precisely what synopsis may
add to analysis or what it should contain over and above
2. See Perry, PPT, 41. See below, 106, on "preliminary syn-
opsis. Cf. Spaulding, WC, 237. In Brightman's remarks on
synopsis (See above, 100n) there is a more definite sug-
gestion as to how it is "something more" than analysis.
Whether that "something more" is the unique feature of synop-
sis will be discussed at length below.
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analysis- synthesis, one may profitably examine other defini-
tions and descriptions of it than those already given. Al-
most every discussion centering on synopsis refers to
Theodore Merz as its exponent. Merz, in turn, refers to
Plato, Goethe, Comte, Hegel, Schelling, Ruskin, Wordsworth,
and Sorley as synoptists. Many of these men were mentioned
earlier in Chapter II.
In comparison with the analytic, abstracting, and
isolating methods of the scientist, the characteristic pro-
cedure of the philosopher, Merz believes, is that of synopsis.
In the nineteenth century, nhilosophy tried to take over the
methods of science with the result that its vitality was sap-
ped and it became lost in details." If philosophy is to
deal adequately with the inner life, with nature as a whole,
and with novelty and individuality, it must cultivate the
vue d ! ensemble . But synopsis, Merz further cautions, is more
than generalization. It stands in contrast to synthesis which
is the obverse of analysis. As Goethe, Schelling, Hegel, and
others have suggested, synopsis contains an element of intui-
tive penetration. It relies on poetic and artistic representa^
tion -- a viewing of things together as a whole which presup-
poses that the intuitive grasp of the artist supplements the
analytic procedure of the scientist.^ These problematic phases
of synopsis were elucidated in previous remarks on Spinoza,
QGoethe, and Hegel.
3. See Merz, HET, III, 103-105, 192-193; IV, 430ff. See Sorley
MVIG, 250; Brightman, ITP, 27-29; Beck, Art. (1939), 339.
4. See Merz, HET, III, 103-104, 607-610.
5. Ibid., 610-612.
6. Above, 49, 53, 55.
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2. How synopsis entails analysis.
In the foregoing paragraphs it has been suggested that
synopsis entails analysis though it may bring to each problem
11 something more," some aspect of method that is more than
analysis. Wilhelm Burkamp, for example, insists that ‘'die
synoptische Erkenntnis" has priority "vor der isolierenden
Bestimmung der Einzelzusammenh£nge. " But the exact isolating
method which finds its completest exnression in "rationalism"
must always supplement and accompany synopsis. Otherwise
"Die Synopsis scheint nur das Verdienst zu haben dass sie
Massen von Einsichten auf Kosten ihrer zuverlUssigen Richtig-
keit und der Richtigkeitskontrolle gibt.”^
Again, Goldstein’s remarks stress the complementari-
ness of analysis and synopsis or rather seem, on the surface,
to stress that complementariness:
Scientific research is always founded upon ana-
lysis and, on the other hand, will never proceed
without a certain synthesis. If one understands
by synthesis the preliminary summary of the analy-
tically gathered facts
,
nothing can be said against
It.... Such a procedure can be very useful for fur-
ther research, particularly because it reveals the
mistakes of the prevailing views -- the breaches
in their theoretical bulwark. But i t furni she
s
us with as little insight into the true nature of
things as does the analytic procedure . Actually
we must hold against the synthetic approach the
fact that it does not confine itself to a prelimi-
nary synthesis, but claims itself as able to form
a coherent and adequate picture of reality.
8
9Prom Goldstein’s statements in Human Nature one may infer
7. Burkamp, SG, 283. Cf. Brightman, APR, 116-122.
8. ORG, 404. See ibid., 9; Goldstein, HN, 21, 23.
9. 3-6, 21-23.
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that by "synthetic" he intends the "synoptic or holistic"
method. But no synoptic thinker should be satisfied with
Goldstein’s version of the relation of synopsis and analysis.
In the above quotation the only legitimate role of synopsis
is that of synthesis, i.e., the survey of analytically
gathered facts. Obviously then synthesis cannot be prelimi-
nary to analysis, nor can it be anything more than analysis-
in-reverse. Apparently it is only preliminary to stating
or verifying a theory. If Goldstein ever speaks of a method
of investigating wholes that supplements analysis-synthesis,
it is in the last sentence where he condemns the use of the
"synthetic approach" alone. But no one should be seriously
disturbed by Goldstein’s last sentence. That synopsis can-
not be "less than analysis" or cannot exclude some method of
finding parts and still deal with wholes should be promptly
clear to anyone.
Adequate comprehension of wholes requires rigorous
conceptual discrimination of qualities or aspects and ana-
lysis into parts . For an object merely to be recognized
as a whole, one must at least be aware that it is complex,
that it is an organization in one sense or another, that it
is something more than a simple abstracted quality. If syn-
opsis is applied to this piece ofpaper as a whole
,
it must
also be seen as complex in one of two senses. On the one
hand, it may be seen as an organization of such properties
as whiteness, smoothness, rectangularity, weight, and so on.
These aspects or moments may be "analyzed out" by what has
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been referred to as conceptual discrimination. Like ana-
lysis in situ , conceptual discrimination comes to rest in
aspects, moments, or relatively primitive abstracted quali-
ties, 10 On the other hand, this paper may be seen as con-
sisting of parts discovered by a different mode of analysis:
wood-pulp, rag, bleach, chemical elements, molecules, and
finally electrons. All these parts have certain properties
of their own distinct from those of the paper as "first seen."
If the method of synopsis is applied to this paper as a whole ,
there must also be analysis of one kind or another to show
how it is complex, how it is an organization. When the
paper is delimited as a problem, one is vaguely aware that
it has aspects, that it is a relation- re lata complex. As a
problem it is given as a vague whole. This diffuse aware-
ness may be called "preliminary synopsis." 11
Though it is apparent that synoptic method, if it is
directed to comprehension of wholes, must entail analysis, it
is not yet clear what synopsis should add to analysis-syn-
thesis. Even the most rigid analyst thinks of his method
as implying synthesis, the obverse of analysis different only
in direction. Yet those who have concentrated most on
10. See above, 28.
11. See Brightman, APR, 117ff. on the stages in synoptic
method including "preliminary synopsis" and analysis. Like
Goldstein, logical positivists have seemed hypercritical of
synopsis because they fear it will try to move without ana-
lysis: "Die subjektive Empfindung," writes von Mises, "dass
ein ' ganzes’ sei...deckt nicht ein * letzte Wahrheit * auf,
sondern ist ein Ergebnis unkritischer Einstellung deren
Funktion sich darin erschdpft, eine gewisse erste Orientier-
ung auf einem bestimmt ungrenzten Gebiet zu liefern. " (KLP,
325) Cf. Frank, KsG, 25 on the value of the "organische
Naturauffas sung" as preliminary orientation.
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synopsis suggest that it is something more and something dif-
ferent from synthesis. Now it is necessary to find out what
there may be about synopsis to make it a better method of ex-
planation, especially a better method of comprehending wholes.
5. Synopsis and coherence.
For the sake of clarity and precision it is important
to distinguish between synopsis and coherence. Among philo-
sophers and logicians the term coherence has acquired two
soecial uses, that of referring to a definition of truth or
to a criterion of truth. To disrespect those uses is to in-
vite ambiguity.
Truth is a property of beliefs and judgments. What,
more precisely, is that property? It is the correspondence
or one-to-one relationship of the belief to an object or
state-of-affairs outside the belief. Bertrand Russell has
defended such a definition of truth:
If we take such a belief as "Othello believes that
Desdemona loves Cassio," we will call Desdemona and
Cassio the object -terms » and loving the object-rela-
tion . If there is a complex unity "Desdemona 1 s love
for Cassio," consisting of the object terms related
by the object -relation in the same order as they have
in the belief, then this complex unity is called the
fact corresponding to the belief . Thus a belief is
true when there is a corresponding fact, and is false
when there is no corresponding fact.^-2
On the other hand. Brand Blanshard defines truth in terms of
coherence: "The truth of a judgment does consist in the last
12. POP, 202. See Spaulding, TNR, 423
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resort in its relations to a completed system.
"
x But that
completed system is not a system of judgments but rather it
is reality, for thought "i_s its object imperfectly realized."
The coherence theory of truth, like the identity theory, final-
ly nasses over into metaphysics. Or, rather, it is itself a
metaphysical theory. It is not possible or feasible hereto
settle the question of the meaning of truth. That would re-
quire a final refereeing of the dispute between epistemologi-
cal monists and dualists. What is to be noted is that one
established meaning of "coherence" is truth as the absolute
and ideally complete system of thought which i_s reality.
Many philosophers who differ on the meaning of truth
agree as to its tests or criteria.^ A somewhat eclectic
statement of coherence as a criterion of truth would read as
follows: A belief or judgment is true when it is self-con-
sistent and is involved in an harmonious system of judgments
ranging from general hypotheses down to empirical and eviden-
tial judgments. The belief, for example, that this is a piece
of paper and not a thin sheet of white rubber is made true to
a high degree of probability by a number of empirical judg-
ments: This paper rips but doesn’t stretch. It burns before
it melts. It shows a water-mark. It submits to erasure. And
so on. The application of coherence as a criterion usually
13. NT, II, 270, 273. See Montague, Art. (1909) where there
is a similar monistic theory of truth develooed from the neo-
realist ic perspective: truth is "that particular form ofthe
relation of identity" which subsists between the object of
a belief and the content as existing. (546)
14. See Russell, POP, 217-218; Blanshard, NT, II, 259.
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consists of verifying hypotheses: If this is a piece of
paper, then it will rip, burn, have a water-mark, etc.
As Dewey says, the test of truth is not a mere formal
subsumption of abstract particulars. "It is the capacity
of the inferred idea to order and organize particulars into
a coherent whole that is the criterion." 15 In a true judg-
ment problematic facts — evidential and directly empirical
judgments — are integrated with general ideas to merge into
a coherent whole. When a proposition fulfills these qualifi-
cations, one can be sure to a probable degree that the ob-
ject being talked about is as it is asserted to be. 16 It is
possible, of course, to call such a criterion of truth syn-
optic because it stresses the togetherness or organization
of judgments in a system as the test of any one problematic
judgment. But synopsis is something more than a criterion
of truth. It is a method of investigating any object of at-
tention as a whole . Like analysis, synoptic method may re-
quire the coherence criterion for testing its results. For
if its results are to become knowledge, they must be put in
judgment form with palpably clear relation to other judgments
17
as evidence.
15. LOG, 157. See ibid., 383, 391-392, 418, 394.
16. See Schilpp, PJD, 559 where Dewey himself seems to sub-
scribe to the correspondence theory of truth.
17. To deny that data need formulation in judgments is to em-
phasize the fact that there can be meanings or referents with-
out judgments, but it is to ignore the fact that the question
of truth or falsity (and thus knowledge) cannot arise unless
there are beliefs, assertions, or judgments. For an experience
content that becomes a referent to occur no judgment is neces-
sary. When one asserts it is connected thus and so with other
referents, the question of truth, knowledge, and evidence arises
-«
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Standing in contrast to coherence, other tests of
truth have "been advanced which seem to he corollaries of
logical analysis . The logical analyst is often inclined to
shy away from system and coherence to find the truth or
falsity of a judgment in its correspondence with simple
facts, experiences, or sensatiors. More complex sentences
are reducible to simple test sentences by logical operations
in accord with the law of identity^ but taking account of
material assumptions and premises along the reduction route.
Blumberg and Feigl, as trail blazers of logical positivism
in America, advanced a criterion of truth that was purposely
at loggerheads with coherence: "Working back from complex
to simple we arrive at the immediate facts whose being-the-
case constitutes the meaning of the proposition." Since
meaning and truth-condition are identical, the single atomic
proposition, as against the coherence theory, is true or
false. This is determined by comparing the atomic proposi-
tion with "reality."^® The main drive of the analytical posi-
tion, then, is to the effect that individual and single
propositions are true or false because they directly corres-
pond with fact. Similarly, Bertrand Russell argues that most
human knowledge is derivative, built up from intuitive know-
ledge or self-evident judgments (truths of perception and
some universals) by strict deductive logic. In his view,
self-evidence — which allows isolate judgments to be true or
false -- must supplement the criterion of coherence.-*-^
18. Blumberg and Feigl, Art. (1931), 288.
19. See Russell, POP, 170-172.
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All philosophers who disavow coherence try to show
that certain propositions can be determined to be true in
themselves, apart from system. Hence, they rely ultimately
on such criteria as correspondence with fact (e.g. atomic
20
empirical propositions such as "This is red.") or on self-
evidence. But as Brand Blanshard has ably and validly ar-
gued, what is referred to as "solid fact" to which atomic
judgments correspond is "another judgment or set of judgments,
and what provides the verification is the coherence between
the initial judgment and these." The judgment that the
cover of this dissertation is blue involves the hypothesis
that if it is blue, it should match a certain area of the
spectrum, it should appear green under yellow cellophane,
etc. Unless one is merely naming or making a definition,
the judgment "This is blue" clearly requires other judgments
op
as evidence. Again, the axioms of mathematics and postula-
tional systems show that self-evidence is always a function
of system. It is "the voice in explicit consciousness of
systems that vary in magnitude and are achieved in varying
degree.
Paradoxically enough, the atomic verification that
seemed to be a corollary of analysis in logical positivism
has been "transcended" until contemporary thinkers of that school
20. See Werkmeister, APS, 87.
21. NT, II, 228. See ibid., 228-233.
22. Mill 1 s distinction between "belief" and "naming" is in-
structive: When we say that Negroes are woolly-haired we do
not ordinarily mean to make know that "woolly-haired" is a
name for every Negro "but that wherever the cluster of sensa-
tions signified by the word negro are experienced, the sensa-
tions signified by the word woolly-haired will be found. " (AHM, 164
)
23. Blanshard, NT, II, 249. See ibid., 240-256.
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make truth a syntactical concept, a function of a logical
system: "A proposition is ’true’ within a given system if
it is consistent with the rest of the system." 2^ Again,
moving away from the position that judgments can he true or
false in themselves in virtue of self -evidence or cor-
respondence with fact, A. J. Ayer indicates how empirical
verification at its very roots entails coherence:
Empirical propositions are one and all hypotheses,
which may be confirmed or discredited in actual
sense-experience. And the propositions in which
we record the observations that verify these hypo-
theses are themselves hypotheses which are subject
to the test of further sense-experience. Thus there
are no final propositions .... When one speaks of
hypotheses being verified in experience, it is im-
portant to bear in mind that it is never just a
single hypothesis which an observation confirms or
discredits, but always a system of hypotheses
.
2^
To sum up this section: Synopsis, like analysis,
is primarily a way of investigating objects to find out
whether and how they are wholes. Coherence is either a de-
finition or criterion of truth. Insofar as synopsis yields
judgments about the nature of wholes, about the specific
properties of wholes, about parts and organization in gsneral,
those judgments must be tested by the criterion of coherence.
24. Russell, IMT, 174-175 on the relation of positivists’
views to coherence.
25. LTL, 132-133
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B. The Uniqueness of Synoptic Method
1. Synopsis and generality: "seeing things together."
Merz’s view and remarks made by other thinkers of
like persuasion often suggest that synopsis as "seeing
things together" might mean something quite apart from em-
phasis on wholes and the whole-part relation. Vue d' en-
semble might be interpreted as a grasp of things in their
most fundamental relationships or modes of togetherness.
This is what Plato seemed to have in mind when he spoke of
reason soaring beyond hypotheses to the "first principles . "^
But in this case, seeing things in their togetherness is
seeing them as exemplifying certain laws or principles, as
possessing certain common features. This is the method of
logical abstraction par excellence . Vi/hat more radical
means is there for "seeing things in their togetherness"
than logic or mathematics which are concerned with the mini-
mum structure of any event? Scientific method, often cited
as the epitome of analysis, also aims, within various fields
delimited for practical purposes, at generality and seeing
QO
things in their togetherness.
26. See above, 101-102.
27. See above, 45-46.
28. See Brightman, APR, 118: "A scientific hypothesis is re-
stricted to the ordering of the limited subject matter under
investigation -- let us say the radiation of light or the re-
ligion of the Algonkins. A philosophical hypothesis, on the
other hand, has a far wider scope and is synoptic in a very
special sense, for it aims to relate the subject matter
under investigation to a view of experience as a whole."
Here "view of experience as a whole" may have two meanings;
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John Stuart Kill has admirably and accurately described
the way in which scientific method is analytic:
In one case it is the order of the phenomena that
is analysed and simplified; in the other it is
the phenomena themselves. When the observed facts
relating to the weight of terrestrial objects and
those related to the motion of the heavenly bodies
were found to conform to one and the same law, that
of gravitation of every particle of matter to every
other particle with a force varying as the inverse
of the square of the distance, this was an example
of the first kind. .. .Water was found to be an
actual compound of two other bodies, hydrogen and
oxygen; substances very unlike itself, but both
actually present in every one of its particles....
This last process is known by the name of chemical
analysis; but the first mentioned, of which the
Newtonian generalization is the most perfect type,
is no less analytical. The difference is, that the
one analyses substances into simpler substances;
the other, laws into sirnoler laws. The one is
partly a physical operation; the other is wholly
intellectual. 29
The generality of logic or mathematics, of course,
is achieved at the price of the greatest possible abstraction
from the empirical data, from the appearances of various
things. As Whitehead says.
The first noti<feble fact about arithmetic is that
it apnlies to everything, to tastes And to sounds,
to apples and to angels, to the ideas of the mind
and to the bones of the body. The nature of things
is perfectly indifferent, of all things it is true
that two and two make four. 9
It may mean "rational interpretation" of all possible experi-
ences and all possible types of experience. If this were
taken as the unique contribution of synopsis, the only thing
it would add to scientific analysis would be generality and
comprehensiveness. The phrase is also heuristic, intended
"to incite search for any possible property! ies ) of the uni-
verse as a whole... to discover whether it is one whole or
many wholes or a mere aggregation of atoms." (Letter to the
writer. May, 1941)
29. Preface to James Mill, AHM, iv-vi.
30. ITM, 9.
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If synopsis were merely the seeing of things in their to-
getherness as exemplifying universal principles, it would
be hardly distinguishable from the aim of the analytical
realists to "discover fine identities in place of gross dif-
ferences," or to discover that the problematic is a complex
of simples. In fact, what are intended to show the to-
getherness of things any more than the realist’s neutral
entities and his scheme of basic relations? Perhaos for
such reasons as these, defenders of synopsis have sought
its unique contribution in something more than seeing things
together in the sense of finding abstract principles and
laws of maximum generality, which is pre-eminently the aim
of analysis. 32
2. Synopsis and the unique properties of wholes.
Rejecting the notion that the unique feature of
synopsis is to be found in generality, Theodore Merz saw in
synoptic method a procedure wherein "every object of con-
temnlation. . .is a whole, a totality. 1,33 It was Merz’s
31. See above, 61.
32. See above, 101-102# 12.
33. Such a statement is, of course, a problem- raiser. (See
HET, III, 612) First of all, not every "object of contempla-
tion" need be a whole or totality. One can contemplate an
abstracted quality such as whiteness or roundness -- or non-
oerceotible characters of a thing such as identity and
unity — without contemplating a totality. Certainly one
can entertain in his attention the results of conceptual
discrimination. But if the object is complex — the pre-
requisite of its being a whole in any sense -- then the
question arises as to what kind of wholeness is under con-
sideration, as to whether the object is being seen from the
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contention that analysis cannot deal adequately with wholes
because it misses something: in the whole. But synopsis en-
tails an element of intuitive penetration like the artist’s
acquaintance with an object? Such an element makes synopsis
esoecially adequate for comprehending wholes. Criticizing
Merz's view. Beck says: "In making synopsis a knowledge of
wholes, he erroneously supposed that its distinctive contri-
bution was an acknowledgment of an oversuramative property. ”34
Such a property is taken account of because synopsis does not
exclude acquaintance. Furthermore, as was pointed out in
connection with Sorley’s definition of synopsis, acquaintance
or a mere grasp of a quality-mass could not alone constitute
synopsis if synopsis is to be adequate to an object as a whole .
Beck makes the same point: "In cases [of acquaintance with
an bversummative property’] which we do call synoptic experi-
ences, we do not find the presence of an intuition to be es-
sential to its being a knowledge of structural relationships
of parts and wholes." Thus, synoptic method must include
analysis or some method of finding parts if it is to deal
adequately with objects as wholes.
perspective of conceptual discrimination as an organization
of asoects, whether it is a sum, or whether it is a function-
al or "organic" whole. Even the most rigid analysts see
every thing or existent as a "whole," i.e., as an organiza-
tion of neutral entities in some relational scheme. And it
is not incompatible with the analytic method to regard the
entire cosmos as being a whole which is more than additive.
See Beck, Art. (1939), 339: with synopsis not all things are
seen as wholes.
34. Art. (1939), 340.
35. Ibid., 340.
* See above, 49-50, 53-54.
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If one takes cognizance of the established meaning
and usage of terms, he cannot find the differentia of syn-
optic method in the mere recognition of anergent qualities or
the specific properties of wholes. If a person wants to
define synopsis exclusively in terms of such a recognition,
there can be no quarrel with him. But analysts show how
their method can do the same thing. Several times in the
previous chapter it was noted that analysis reveals "those
properties which, in some cases, the whole as a whole, may
have different from those of the parts. "Specific proper-
ties of the whole" is merely another way of saying "oversum-
mative," emergent, or Gestalt qualities. The method of deal-
ing with and interpreting such properties may distinguish
synopsis from analysis. But one cannot in honesty follow
Merz and say that analysis, especially as advanced by Spaulding
and agreed to by other analytic realists, misses or ignores
<*0
such properties.
36. See Brightman, APR, 118.
37. See above, 93.
38. Merz's criticism of analysis seems to apply especially
to Perry's view. Though Perry speaks of the philosopher's
Intuitive insight and grasp of the "whole of things" (DP,
14-15), when he comes to analysis he says that "the nature
and the arrangement of the parts supplies the character of
the whole." See above, 65-71, 93-95.
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3. Synopsis as "knowledge of an object as a part in its
relation to some objective whole."
Taking the "togetherness" in synoptic method as a
point of departure. Beck asks whether a given togetherness
of elements, or any given whole, is objective or subjective.
This can be determined by supoosing that an object is a part:
If it is a part of an object which is a real whole,
it can be exhaustively explained only if in addition
to its own intrinsic nature we study also its
histrionic nature as playing a role in a determinable
whole.
What is this role played by the object as a part? Beck be-
lieves that if the object is "cast" in a real whole, there
will be an empirically determinable difference to some of
its characteristics. By referring to the next higher and
lower level of complexity one may discover whether an ob-
ject’s "properties are intrinsic to it as oversummat ive to
its parts, and whether or not there is some more inclusive
whole which has an effect on it."^ The criterion of real
wholeness is the fact that an object is changed by being
a part of such a whole.^ In spite of first appearances
this is really a theory to account for the specific proper-
ties of wholes, the collective properties which they may have
distinct from the features of the parts. In the end Beck’s
argument is the same as Spaulding's: "nonadditive results of
39. Beck, Art .( 1939 ) , 343. If "determinable whole" in the
above quotation means, with 7/ebster, "limitable," Beck’s
view does not seem to presuppose or imply absolutism. Ob-
jects must be examined in relation only to such wholes as
are amenable to empirical operations.
40. Ibid., 345.
41. Ibid.
,
344 lines 17-22. It would have been illuminating
if Beck had given some concrete examples.
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organization” means that when parts are analyzed out or syn-
thesized in, they are changed in certain respects. 42 There
is another theory to account for the same fact: the carts
remain the same but gain new properties at different levels.
In any case, Spaulding believes that in ’’organic wholes”
there are properties not deducible from or implied by those
of the parts. This fact calls for ’’the empirical ascertain-
ment in many cases of the functional relation between the
properties of the whole and those of the parts."43 In effect.
Beck says the same thing:
Philosophy will have to learn the same lesson with
regard to it [the concept of whole] as it learned
with reference to causality: whatis a real whole and
what is a cause are matters for empirical investi-
gation, and no amount of ratiocination alone will
answer these questions. 44
Beck agrees with one hypothesis advanced by Spaulding:
when carts are analyzed out or synthesized in they are changed
45
in certain respects. That hypothesis is intended to account
for the specific properties of the whole. When Spaulding and
Beck sceak of parts changing or gaining new properties, they
are saying what was said in Chapter I: there are certain organi-
zations of "things" (which from another perspective are organi-
zations of aspects) with unique or specific properties
42. See above, 96.
43. Spaulding, Art. (1912), 240. See above, 96-97.
44. Art. (1939), 345.
45. Yet Beck says that analysis, especially Spaulding’s view,
cannot determine "that an object may show properties when it
is in a whole which it does not have when it is not a part."
Thus Beck misinterprets the realistic thesis that analysis is
not invention, that it discovers parts indecendeftly existing
and does not affect what it discovers. See above, 91-92.
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46
that mark the unity and "Eigendeterminierheit" of the whole.
In a "real,” functional, or organic whole the presence oi unique
properties besides those of the perts is of distinct im-
portance. In a functional whole such as an automobile one
can separate the horsepower of the whole machine from the
specific functions of the sparkplug; one can distinguish be-
tween the lassitude of a diabetic’s gross bodily movements
and the functioning of a single part of his body, nis pan-
creas .
There is, as both Spaulding and Beck suggest, a func-
tional relation between the collective and distributive pro-
perties that can be discovered only by empirical hypotheses:
If sparkplugs in a certain number and with a certain adjust-
ment of points are connected in a specific way with a motor
head, pistons, crankshaft, battery, and carburetor — then
a certain average horsepower and speed will result. As
many investigators have observed, explanation of wholes is
much like causal explanation. It requires imagination, hypo-
theses, inference, and empirical observation -- all these
frequently entail experimentation. No amount of mere con-
ceptual discrimination could show, for example, that wood is
a part of this paper or that ink from a typewriter ribbon
is a part of these words as a specific sign-functioning.
Such a discovery requires, as in the case of the causal re-
lationship, direct or vicarious experience of certain factual
connections
•
46. See above, 25-26, on Beck’s view of sums and wholes’ specific
properties
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Everything Beck claims for synopsis is also included
in analysis as defended by Spaulding and agreed to by his
fellow analysts. Especially is material analysis able to
show how being a part of an organic whole makes a difference
to an object in the sense that it gains new properties or at
least is the condition of specific properties of the whole.
4. Synopsis: The unique properties of a whole
are nuclear to its nature and central
to our understanding of it.
Up to now the differences between the analytic method
and the so-called synoptic method of understanding wholes
have turned out to be verbal differences. Everything that
has been claimed for synopsis has also been included in ana-
lysis in one or another of its formulations. The analyst,
it has been shown, is as interested in "seeing things to-
gether" as is the synoptist. 7/hat better way is there for
"seeing things together" than the method of scientific ana-
lysis that aims to make the particular and individual event
an instance of the general law? Furthermore, even the most
rigid analysis thinks of his method as implying synthesis,
i.e. seeing the togetherness of the parts. For synthesis is
only analysis in reverse. Certainly one who has taken Humpty-
Dumpty apart will know best how the parts must go together
again.
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Furthermore, the difference between the synoptic and
analytic method is only verbal if that difference be located
in the fact that synopsis, in contrast to analysis, takes
account of the unique, specific, or "oversummative" proper-
ties of wholes. Spaulding’s version of analysis, for example,
is especially careful not to leave out the properties a
whole may have which are "qualitatively different" from those
of the parts.
Again, the difference between synopsis and analysis is
only one of names when the former is taken to be "knowledge
of an object as a part in its relation to some objective
whole." This is Lewis W. Beck’s version of synopsis. The
criterion of "real wholeness," he says, is the fact that an
object is changed by being part of such a whole. But
Spaulding also says, defending analysis, that the unique and
specific properties in a whole may be seen as a case of parts
changing as they are analyzed out or synthesized into a given
whole. And Spaulding agrees with Beck that to determine
whether there is such a change, which is signalized by the
appearance of unique and specific properties in the whole, re-
quires ’bmpirical ascertainment ... of the functional relation
between the properties of the whole and those of the parts."
Is there, then, any real difference between analysis and
synopsis? Is the alleged difference between these methods of
understanding wholes only one of labels? Earlier in this
chanter it was observed that any adequate understanding of
wholes must include some method of finding parts. On all sides
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analysis has been accepted as the method especially devoted
to showing how a given whole is composite, to revealing its
parts and their nature. But defenders of synopsis have said
that their method contains " something more" than analysis
which makes it a better method for understanding wholes. In
showing what that "something more" amounts to, the defenders
of synopsis have not spoken clearly and unambiguously. In
fact, all that has been claimed for synopsis over and above
analysis has turned out to be included in analysis in one or
another of its formulations.
If the difference between analysis and synopsis is any
more than a verbal difference, one must be able to state pre-
cisely how the synoptic method differs from that procedure
for understanding wholes which has gone under the name of
analysis. Naturally we are not here interested in the multi-
olication of methods beyond necessity. If the method which
has gone under the name of analysis is sufficient for under-
standing wholes, well and good. Then " synopsis " can hence-
forth be a synonym for analysis, as it has proved to be in
most cases. Or it can well be dropped from the discussion of
methods of investigation.
At the end of the previous chapter there were three main
conclusions about analysis and wholes.^7 Those conclusions
referred to a point made so often by synoptists, namely,
that in a whole there are certain specific, unique, or "over-
summative" properties which are either lost or ignored in
47. See above, 96.
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analysis. Now some versions of analysis take no account
whatsoever of the unique and specific properties of wholes.
"The nature and arrangement of the parts," says Perry, "sup-
plies the character of the whole." With such a view of
analysis there is no basis for distinguishing between division
and analysis. And any distinction between wholes and aggre-
48
gates somewhat loses its point. This version of analysis
is plainly inadequate. It blinks and shuts out something
that belongs to the nature of a whole. It leads to distor-
tion and a false view. Such a method may be sufficient for
separating out the concrete qualities and aspects that to-
gether make up an "object" or "thing. "49 Perry’s version of
analysis may be all right for finding that concepts are
"ratios or relational complexes of simple terms of experi-
ence." It leads to what Plato called "primeval elements "
that have nothing but a name, i.e. to the abstracted quali-
ties of a thing. But in regard to a whole this type of ana-
lysis must miss its essential features. It misses those
specific, unique, or "oversummative" properties that mark
the whole as a qualitatively unity. It misses those proper-
ties which make the whole one specific kind of thing even
though its parts and their type of arrangement may be found
in other kinds of wholes. When such analysis is focussed on
water, for example, it overlooks water’s transparency or
special refraction, its psrticular weight, its solvent power,
48. See above, 22ff., 84ff.
49. See above, 16.
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and other specific gross properties. The character of water,
according to Perry's version of analysis, is exhausted in
the properties of hydrogen and oxygen united in a certain
way. Again, the salient organic traits of a living thing
—
its mobility, irritability, reproductivity, etc. -- are re-
garded merely as expressions of the nature and arrangement
of parts. The properties of the whole organism are thus ex-
hausted in such parts as appendages, stomach, intestines,
cells, and finally hydrocarbon compounds. The nature and ar-
rangement of the parts, says this version of analysis, strictly
implies the character of the whole. After all that has been
said in previous chapters about the nature of wholes, it should
now be clear that this method is not an adequate one. It
overlooks properties that are central to the nature of any
given whole.
Spaulding's version of analysis puts the specific
properties of wholes "in relief." He recognizes that a
whole, of itself, may have certain properties that are "quali-
tatively different" from those of the parts and their arrange-
ment. This version of analysis, like synopsis as defended
by Merz and others, does take account of a whole's unique,
specific, or nDversummative" properties. Nevertheless in
Spaulding's more liberal and adequate version of analysis
the specific properties of a whole have no special role in
understanding that whole. They are merely other factors to
50. See above, 113-115
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be "analyzed out." They stand alongside and on a par with
parts, their properties and arrangement. The "qualitatively
different characteristics of a whole have no more privilege
and importance in understanding it than do the parts and re-
51lationships.
Is Spaulding* s way of dealing with the specific proper-
ties of wholes enough? Is it enough merely to take for
granted that such properties belong to a whole? If it is not,
if the specific properties of a whole do have some special
privilege and importance in understanding it, there is good
historical reason for calling that emphasis "synopsis." Of
all people who have been concerned with the way to under-
stand wholes the "synoptists" have most often called atten-
tion to the specific, "Gestalt," or "oversummative" properties
of wholes. They have persistently called attention to those
"qualities of the object as a whole, which other methods
tend to omit, underest imate, or merely take for granted. "52
51. See above, 77-78, 96. Spaulding also refers to the
unique and specific properties of wholes as a "non-rational
element in nature." By "non-rational" he means non-dediicible
.
He means that the specific properties of wholes are empirical
facts whose functional relationship to parts in a certain ar-
rangement can be learned only from experience and experi-
ment. Here, as with causality, pure deduction or "ratio-
cination" is not enough. It may be objected that there is
something wrong with Spaulding *s definition of reason if it
so flagrantly excludes facts. (Cf. Brightman, IPKI, 19) To be
sure Spaulding does not follow the Hegelian notion that ex-
perience is a function of reason. Spaulding* s use of "reason"
is the usual and historical meaning of the word, i.e. reason
is insight into logical necessity. Spaulding would agree with
Hume that no matter of fact is demonstrable; and the specific
properties of wholes are simply matters of fact.
52. See above, lOOn.
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But in this respect the synoptist f s ardor has often been
equalled by the vagueness of his ideas as to how, exactly,
the specific properties of a whole might have a place of
special importance in a whole and for our understanding of
the whole.
The best way to see the place of privilege which a
whole 1 s specific or unique properties have is to see how we
go about understanding a whole. At the beginning of investi
gat ion the whole is a problematic complex. We guess that it
is a whole. We have "a hunch" that it is a whole. But our
information is no more precise than that because we do not
yet know whether and how the object in question has parts. 53
At the beginning of investigation the object before
us is a problematic complex. How do we find its parts? We
carefully note its appearances, its various qualities and
properties. Then on the basis of experience or experiment
we infer that the object must have such and such parts as
sufficient ground for its appearances being as they are.
We may have to compare its appearances with those of other
objects, but this is only to help us make the inference to
parts
.
Some examples will make all this clearer. We start
out with water as a relatively transparent, solvent, liquid
53. The object in question need not, in fact, be a whole.
That is, it may be a complex of qualities and properties
which are as far as we can go. As was shown above (113n),
not every object need be a whole in the sense of having
parts which are themselves other objects. The ultimate enti
ties of physical science, for example, have no parts. They
are only complexes of such physical qualities as position
and mass. Yet they may themselves be parts of real wholes.
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mss. By noting how it turns to steam and how it reacts in
the presence of other things we guess that it has certain
parts. We perform the electrolysis experiment and determine
those parts exactly. We determine that the parts of water
are hydrogen and oxygen molecules in a certain proportion.
But notice: Every stage of the analysis into parts was
guided by the specific and "first seen" properties of water.
Only by reference to those properties can we find out how
hydrogen and oxygen are parts of water though they may also
be parts of hydrogen peroxide. And only by reference to
those properties can we test ouranalysis into parts. Though
the narts may have their own properties and arrangement, the
"qualitatively different" properties of water are nuclear
to the understanding of it.
Similarly, on the basis of experience and experiment
we infer that the parts of a brick are sand, cement, and
fibrous binder; that the parts of an automobile are spark-
plugs, crankshaft, pistons, and carburetor; that the parts
of a living thing are its various appendages, muscles, nerves,
and the like. But in all these cases the specific and "first
seen" properties of the whole, or what we guessed to be a
whole, guide our inference to the parts and finally verify
those inferences. Toward those properties flies "the arrow
of intelligibility." 54
54. For this apt phrase the writer is indebted to E. S.
Brightman, but the present thesis was arrived at independently.
With a method which ignores or minimizes the specific proper-
ties of a whole, "the arrow" flies in the direction of the
parts in a certain arrangement. Thus most analysts achieve
abstract generality at the expense of the whole's specific
and individual nature.
•
1 n
.
.a
]
:r1
}
.
,
' A
J
,
*
i
.
,
^
> r. -* 1 i • ;<!
.
.
.
.3 »td‘ i. 9
•
, .
•
. tn :r
:
• : --
127
7/e know that an object is a part only if we know that
it, along with other objects in a certain arrangement, is a
sufficient condition of certain properties by which we
identify a given whole. The analysis of the whole into its
parts is an attempt to infer correctly those grounds and
conditions. This inference or analysis is guided and tested
by reference to those properties which are seen, in the end,
to be "qualitatively different" from the properties of the
carts. In this sence the specific, unique, or "oversummative"
properties of a whole are nuclear to its nature. Those pro-
perties make the whole one snecific kind of thing even
though its parts and their type of arrangement may be found
in other kinds of wholes. They have a place of special privi-
lege in understanding the whole. Toward them flies "the arrow
of intelligibility."
We can now see in what respects Plato, Goethe,
Spinoza, and Hegel anticipated a distinctive synoptic method.
Those men said that there are features of a whole which
must not be lost but must be preserved in a "concrete" view
or scientla intuitiva . They opposed any view in which the
highly abstract results of analysis are used to discredit
or "explain away" the unique properties of wholes. The great
value of their work, however, is in suggesting what not to
do if you would adequately understand wholes. They provide
a point of departure. They have laid out the problems. In
these pages we have gone on to find the exact nature of ana-
lytic and synoptic methods in relation to wholes.
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The title of this dissertation is a question: Does
the understanding of wholes require both analysis and synop-
sis? To this question we must answer "Yes." The understand-
ing of wholes does require something more than analysis as
that method has usually been conceived. Besides analysis
there is required synopsis in which the whole’s specific
properties are taken as nuclear in its nature and central to
our understanding of it. Without analysis we could never
know whether and how an object is a whole. Only by analysis
can we learn of its parts and structure. But without synopsis,
without taking into account the whole’s unique and specific
properties, we would overlook an essential feature of every
whole and have no way of testing our analysis of the whole.
..
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Synoptists agree that their method of dealing with
wholes differs from or supplements analysis. Certainly
synopsis cannot entirely exclude some method of finding
parts (the primary purpose of analysis) and still deal ade-
quately with wholes. To understand specifically how £• sheet of
paper is a whole one must apply analysis, of one kind or an-
other, to find that it is a complex of such aspects as white-
ness and smoothness or to find it is a whole of parts such
as wood-pulp, bleach, and finally electrons. Before deter-
mining what synopsis may add to analysis for truly adequate
comprehension of wholes, one must distinguish between synopsis
and coherence. To disrespect special meanings "coherence"
has acquired — definition of truth and criterion of truth —
is to invite confusion. The first meaning: "The truth of a
judgment does consist... in its relations to a completed system,
and thought "ijs its object imperfectly realized. " (Blanshard
)
This view, like the neo- realist 1 s
,
is a metaphysical theory.
As a criterion of truth coherence means: A belief is true
when it is self-consistent and involved in an harmonious sys-
tem of beliefs ranging from general hypotheses to evidential
empirical judgments. Against this criterion stands analytic
reduction of complex beliefs to emoirical "atomic" proposi-
tions which are indubitable and true-in-themselves . But
"solid fact" or indubitable atoms are themselves beliefs and
hypotheses whose confirmation requires "a system of hypotheses.
(Ayer) Unless one is making a definition, "This is white"
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involves, along with other beliefs, "That is red." When synopsis
results in beliefs about wholes — about their organization and
properties — those beliefs must be tested by coherence.
If the uniqueness of synopsis be sought in "seeing things
together," then logicians, mathematicians, scientists (in
fields pragmatically delimited), and neo-realists are synop-
tists par excellence . All "see things together" as exemplifying
abstract principles. If the uniqueness of synopsis be located
in recognition of specific, unique, or "oversummative" proper-
ties of wholes (Merz), then Spaulding must be called a synop-
tist. Again, to define synopsis as discovery of objective
wholes by determining whether an object is changed when it be-
comes a part (Beck) adds nothing to Spaulding’s analysis of
"organic wholes" which also requires empirical operations.
Thus far the difference between analysis and synopsis is only
one of label. Historically synopsis has emphasized the specific
properties of wholes but has been vague about them. Synopsis ,
as now interpreted, sees the specific and "qualitatively dif-
ferent" properties of a whole as nuclear to its nature and
central to our understanding of it . By reference to such proper-
ties, our inference to parts (analysis) is guided and tested.
Toward them flies "the arrow of intelligibility." Only by
reference, for example, to water’s specific properties such
as transparency, particular weight, solvency, etc. can we
justify our belief that its parts are hydrogen and oxygen
with their own properties and particular arrangement.
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CHAPTER V
SYNOPSIS AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD
In the first chapter it was noted that there is today
in the philosophy of science a tendency toward "holism.
"
The findings in various scientific fields are seen as evi-
dence that "whole" is a primary category. ^ Such a metaphysi-
cal tendency "becomes especially relevant to the purposes of
this dissertation when it is seen as entailing a general
shift in scientific methodology toward "synopsis" and "holistic"
procedure. It may he well now to see how some of the conclu-
sions of the previous chapter about the unique features of
synopsis apply to practices in the various sciences. The
following discussion is intended to give suggestions and ex-
amples of amplication . Attention will he given especially
to those interpretations of scientific method that have some-
thing to do with synopsis as it has here heen defined. In the
previous chapter it was suggested that the special sciences
may he synoptic hut that it remains for philosophy to exploit
the method fully.
^
1. See above, 1-10.
2. See above, 111-112, 125 and below, 138-39. Philosophy
can more fully exploit synopsis because it is not limited to
certain data as are the various sciences. Metaphysics is
the attempt to formulate and verify hypotheses of the widest
possible generality comprehending every type of experience.
(See Whitehead
,
PR, 5-14) The various sciences, especially
those patterned after physics, are incipient ly metaphysical
because they deal with "half the evidence provoded by human
experience." "Science embodies," says Whitehead, "a rigorous
scrutiny of one part of the whole evidence from which meta-
physicians deduce their conclusions ."( OT, 190. See 113, 134.
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A Physical Science.
Natural science, Galileo believed, must start with
"sensible experiments" and elaborate them through "neces-
sary demonstrations." He believed that there is a harmony
between mathematical truths and the occurrences of nature.
The book of nature is written in mathematical language.
Naturally, then, certain selected, refined, and measurable
sense-data were alone "real." What could not be measured
was excluded from scientific inquiry. It was the firm con-
viction of the fathers of modern physical science that only
in so fat as knowledge entailed mathematical statement could
investigators be free "des perpetuelles et steriles disputes." 5
They took da Vinci’s advice to ignore the inner essences of
things. They attended to exact formulation of relations
and changes among certain selected aspects of experience.
Galileo took a firmly phenomenal! stic attitude:
It does not appear to me at present to be worth
while to investigate the causes of natural motion....
All that is needful is to investigate the properties
of accelerated motion and define it in such a way
that the momentum of the body increases uniformily
in simple proportionality to time.
And the intention or force of Galileo’s thesis was later in-
corporated in Newton’s "Hypotheses non fingo," in which fingo
rather than non or hypotheses is the emphatic word.
See MoT, 211, 231-232. Thus, the appearances of purpose or
"aim at value" in nature are, in the main, deliberately avoided
by the scientist. The metaphysician can inquite into the con-
nection of such appearances with the calculable structure of
the world revealed by physicists. Metaphysical concepts are
meaningful insofar as they have a determinable though perhaps
devious relation to ordinary experiences and appearances.
3. See Duhem, Tp, 158, 163-164. Werkmeister, APS, 15-28.
4. Qpere
,
VIII, 256 quoted by Cohen, RAN, 218.
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1. The methods and aims of physical science.
What was characteristic of the method of Galileo an(l
Newton is characteristic of exact natural science today, ex-
act natural science patterned on the model of physics. As
Lenzen writes in 1938, "The goal of exact empirical science
is the exoression of natural laws as functional relations
between numerical values."
5 The space-time order, deter-
mined by "clocks" measuring rods, yield the data of exact
empirical science# Causality means determination in accord-
ance with natural laws that hold for the space-time order.
Von Nises well describes what the causal principle has come
to mean:
In dem speziellen Fall, in dem es sich urn Ver-
ftnderungen messbarer Grbssen handelt, kann man, wie
wir oben sahen, die Kausalbeziehung auf die exakte
Form von Differentialgleichungen bringen, wobei
nattirlich die Auffassung von den aufeinanderfolgenden
"Ereignissen" schon aufgegeben ist. 6
Modem science has steadily moved forward as investi-
gators have remembered the "phenomenalism" of Galileo and
Newton, as they have ignored inner causes and natures. It
is not hard to show that every major blockage in scientific
inquiry has been caused by illicit metaphysics in one guise
or another. The history of modern physics, for example, is
the story of a persistent effort to get away from models,
pictures, and thing-notions implied in so-called scientific
materialism. Or, again, the ether-concent illustrates the
5. Enc., I, 5, 13. See ibid., 3, 37.
6. KLP
,
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"ohenomenalistic" dialectic at work in science. It was
manifestly a result of picture thinking or mechanical
construction, to use Einstein's phrase. The theory of
relativity resolved the difficulties as it left the realm
of thing-concepts for that of relation-concepts in the ab-
stract arithmetical sense. In Cassirer’s words: "Die Welt
stellt selbst sich nicht mehr als ein Beisammen von Ding-
heiten, sondem als eine Ordnung von ' Ereignissen' dar."^
All this took place through the organon of Galileo and New-
ton which had absorbed the notion of substantiality in that
of function. The conclusions of Einstein or Schroedinger fol-
Q
low the path laid down by Newton and Galileo.
Modern physicists have been as self-conscious about
assumptions and method as Galileo was. They do not claim
that their statements reveal things absolutely. Rather their
assertions have a "rein anzeigenden Charakter." They are in-
dices. The man whose discoveries made possible the electro-
dynamic picture of the world first stressed the need of inter-
preting exact natural science in terms of a symbolical rather
than a copy theory. The views of Hertz — to which Helmholtz,
Mach, Duhem, and others have assented — may be crystallized
in the thesis that
Die Grundbegriff der Nsturwissenschaft erscheint
jetzt nicht mehr als Kopien und Nachbilder eines
7. See Einstein and Infeld, EP, 125. See ibid., 152 on the
history of the "field" which follows Maxwell's equations but
there are no material actors.
8. PSF, III, 552. See ibid., 545-546.
9. See Prank, EmP, 22; Werkmeister, APS, 203.
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unmittelbar dinglich Gegebenen; sondern sie
werden als konstruktive Entwttrfe des physikalischen
Denkens eingeftihrt — als Entwfirfe, deren theoretische
Geltung und Bedeutsamkeit an kdne andere Bedingung ge-
kniipft 1st, als daran, dass ihre denknotwendigen
Folgen stets wieder mit dem in der Erfahrung Beo-
bachtbaren iibereinstimmen.
The exact scientist seeks to represent the necessary connec-
tion of certain selected and experimentally refined phases
of appearances. Such representation requires a vast mediat-
ing scheme of assertions (usually symbolic) standing between
conclusions and experiences. The indirection of physical
theories -- their remoteness from ordinary appearances --
is suggested by Einstein’s explanation of relativity "in a
few simple words”:
I was once walking in the country on a hot day
with a blind friend and said I could do with a
drink of milk
’’Milk?" said my friend. "Drink I know; but what is
milk?"
'A white liquid,' I replied.
"Liquid I know," said the blind man, "but what is
white?"
'Oh, the' color of a swan's feathers.’
"Feathers I know. What is a Swan?"
'Swan? A bird with a crooked neck.’
"Neck I know -- but what is this crooked?"
Thereupon I lost patience. I seized his arm and
straightened it. ’That's straight,’ I said. Then I
bent it at the elbow. 'And that’s crooked.'
"Ah," cried the blind man, "now I know what you
mean by mi lk I"
H
The scientist’s concepts — mass, force, emergy, or elec-
trons — are "freie Scheinbilder" which copy nothing in im-
mediate sense data but which are advanced so as to see the
10. Cassirer, PSF, III, 25. See ibid., I, 24-26.
11. "Illustrative Anecdote," Reader's Digest
, 38(1941),
Number 230, June; 96.
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world as lawful and orderly, and thus to be able to control
it. "Une Loi de Physique," Pierre Duhem observes, "est une
relation symbolique dont 1 1 application a la realite concrete
exige que 1 ’ on connaisse et que l’on accepte tout un ensemble
de theories.
"
2. Physics, functional wholes, and synoptic method.
In the first chapter it was seen that scientists and
philosophers think modern physical theories demand or imply
an "organ! smic" perspective and something like a synoptic
method. There is a tendency in physical science which gives
credibility to such a thesis. Recent developments have shown,
as Philipp Frank says, the impossibility of deducing the
movements of minute bodies out of those of large ones, the
substitution of statistical laws for individual ones, and the
influence of a much wider circumstance than was formerly pre-
13
sumed. In modern physical science the notion of "field"
and Gestalt have thus come into the foreground. "The hopeless
endeavour," says Whitehead, "to derive complexity from sim-
plicity has been tacitly abandoned.
The- stable and persistent features of "matter" are now
sought in the "field," which is the thought-object of modem
physical science. Thus, interest has shifted to physical
systems , Gestalten , or what were referred to in Chapter I as
12. Tp, 254 (Ital. omitted). Cf. Einstein and Infeld, EP,
310-313.
13. See EmP, 24.
14. OT, 183. See MOT, 188, 192.
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functional wholes. The criterion of a Gestalt , it was re-
marked earlier, is its specific and "oversummative ” char-
acter. This is the core of Ehrenfels' criterion whereby
a melody is clearly more than the sum of tone impressions,
the meaning of a sentence is more than the sum of individual
words’ meanings, and so on. It was natural for Kdhler to
find that ” ’Ganze’ unter den Gegenst&nden naturwissenschaft-
licher Forshcung vorkommen, die in solcher Weise ’mehr sind
als die Summe ihrer Teile.’” Any causal process in physi-
cal science may exemplify Kflhler’s thesis without transcending
the actual mode of physical investigation to employ a special
viewooint. As von Mses notes, even mechanics can be seen
as a Gestalt theory. Yftiatj[sane physical investigator, for ex-
ample, would say that the image reflected by a mirror is
merely thrown together from independent and separate reflec-
tions of single points and not determined by the object and it
17totality of optical properties? For these reasons, then.
15. See above, 20.
16. Ktthler, PG, ix; see ibid., xix.
17. Von Mises, KLP
,
317-319. In a logical analysis of Gestalt
as a functional whole or Wirkungssystem Grelling and Oppen-
heim have found its distinctive feature to be interdependence
as ODoosed to an aggregative whole. "Nonsummative" is not
enough to characterize a functional whole, for some elements of
a class of functions in a dependence system may or may not de-
pend on their complementary classes. When they do, there is
a causal dependence system, which is really the primary inter-
est of Gestaltist s
.
(See Art. [1939], 71-72, 75-76.) When they
do not, there is still a nonsummative whole as was noted in con
nection with Spaulding’s duscission of organic wholes. All
this should suggest how the notion of Gestalt may play a role
in physical science. Geometrical configurations — certainly
basic for fields and also basic for certain organic phenomena-
may be represented by giving the analytical equation of the
corresponding distribution curve of distances. See Rashevsky,
Art. (1934)2, 419 on Gestalten and functional analysis.
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Werkmeister has suggested that "physical Gestalt" must be
distinguished sharply from the type of wholeness found in
living things. 18
This tendency toward developing theories and concepts
that involve fields and Gestalten suggests that physical
science even within a very delimited scope and range of em-
pirical data is synoptic: the physicists have not been con-
tent with earlier abstractions and have moved to higher
levels of aooroximation and empirical adequacy. For example,
Keeler's three famous laws were formulated on the basis of an
assumption never satisfied in Everyman's world. Where can one
.
find a system consisting of only two bodies? But higher levels
of approximation in mechanics took care of complications; in
the more complete modern theory of planetary motion Newton's
laws can be derived from Einstein's ten algebraic equations of
several thousand terms each when certain factors are reduced
to zero. 5
The notion of functional purposive whole^ certainly
may be connected with the physicists' conclusions. But the
connection is established from outside physical science
18. See APS, 358. Kurt Goldstein and Werkmeister are not
altogether satisfied with Gestaltism. (See also McDougall,
MM, 174-175; Meunziger, Art. [1935], 518-519.) At first the
Gestalt theory, Goldstein observes, seemed to create an un
bridgeable gap between the atomistic theory of physical
events and mental processes. Though Gestalt interpretations
seemed to close the gap, Gestaltists have not adequately under-
stood the living thing's "constants" through the "conception
of the crganismic whole." (See Goldstein, ORG, 377-78, 381-
388. But cf. Kbhler, PG, xiii in answer.)
19. See Rashevsky, Art. (1934), 179-180; Werkmeister, APS, 224.
20. See above, 19-22.
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through a metaphysical interpretation that considers basic
cognitive needs -- what constitutes "sufficient reason" or
adequate explanation — and the relation of other types of
experience to those in which the physicist is exclusively
21interested . The previous discussion of the method of
physical science and the continuity of modem and classical
theories should suggest that no purposive organization could
possibly be implied in physical theory. You cannot get in
the conclusion what was deliberately excluded in the premises.
Following this line, Frank defines "philosophical consequences
of modern physics" as those which do not follow from the
theory’s physical content. And, in general, one must agree
with him that physical science is itself neither materialistic,
"organismic nor idealistic but is logico-empirical. ^2
Hartshorne sponsors a "societal psychism" which is
most intimately bound up with developments in contemporary
science. He takes the "hints" given out by the scientists
which lead toward organic! sm. The degrees of integration or
"individuality" found in quantum theory is just what the
organicist wants. With such statements there can be little
quarrel, for it is true that theories of today have a certain
Gestalt or "holistic" reference. But when Hartshorne goes
on to say that the universality of final causes is illustrated
23in physics
,
that the electrons’ organic adaptation is "the
21. See above, 131.
22. Frank, Art. (1939), 171-176, and the "empiricism," as has
been shown, is a greatly abstracted one.
23. See BH, 190-191. Hartshorne explains further that the
electron avoids boredom and achieves "vivid contrast" by
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means to enjoyment of the ultimate values of feeling, har-
mony, and sympathetic participation," he is making assertions
that cannot he justified hy physical knowledge. They are
"philosophical consequences" in the sense used above. From
a strictly physical point of view they are nonsequiturs
.
The notion of organism gets its teleological, aesthetic,
or metaphysical filling from outside physics. To be sure,
classical physics no longer has universal applicability.
Other laws are needed for high velocities and sub-atomic
phenomena. But the general schema for exact natural science
is the same today as it was in the days of Newton or Galileo.
B. Synoptic Kethod and the Life Sciences.
Kurt Goldstein makes a very strong case to show that
biology, and particularly psychopathology and physiology,
need an "holistic" methodology. In discussing an individual’s
"coming to terms with the world," Goldstein, like Gordon
Allport, is esnecially critical of efforts to see personality
as "nothing more than a collection of hundreds or thousands
of independent specific habits which may be determined
pulsating in waves and being able to shift from one orbit to
another! In Art. (1935), 290-295 Hartshome expresses his
views more exactly and circumspectly. Exact natural science,
he says, cannot establish metaphysical ideas but can help to
discredit some false ones.
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statistically. " The knee jerk or the light reflex in
the pupil of the eye, usually considered the prototype of
reflexes, rarely show uniformity under natural conditions:
A constant reaction — corresponding quantitatively
to the amount of light -- is to be achieved only
under fixed conditions. Usually the reaction varies
throughout, depending upon the differences in the
mental and bodily condition of the entire organism. 25
A change in any part of the organism affects reflex action,
and at the same time the reflex changes the organism in a
definite way. Along the same lines Goldstein, like Allport,
criticizes Freudians for their hypostatizations (neo-faculty
psychology) that often impede psychotherapy, for their be-
laboring of the genetic approach that ignores the contem-
poraneity of motivation and conflict, and for their over-
valuation of the sex drive which is really an "auxiliary hypo
thesis" required by the partitive approach. 25 But Allport
only hints at the philosophical issues: "There has set in
a reaction against the search for mental atoms. The doctrine
of the whole has won popularity." In contrast, Goldstein
24. Goldstein, HN, 120-121. See ibid., criticism of "drives,"
146ff. Cf. Allport’s condemnation (PER, 248-258) of speci-
ficists’ attempt to "pulverize personality into minute con-
stituent elements." Though such an effort makes easier ex-
periment and explanation of cultural causation, it must miss
the higher organizing units (e.g. moral qualities), and it
has no basis in neurology.
25. Goldstein, HN, 122. Cf. ibid., 131 on Tolman’s discovery
of "catalyzing behavior" of rats.
26. Ibid., 161-167.
27. Allport, PER, 181-189. See 136-140, on the notion of Ge -
stalt in physical science. "Doctrine of the whole " is, of
course, a reference to Gestalt psychology. Closely allied
with Gestalt psychology is the Leipzig school of Ganzhelts -
psychologie
.
"Die Kernlehre der Ganzheitspsychologie , " says
Hans Volkelt, "ist das Prinzip der unbedingten Unzusammen-
gesetztheit des jeweiligen Erlebensbestandes und alien
u n
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always undertakes an epistemological critique: The Freudian
mode of thought- reflects the partitive and atomistic approach
that in turn reveals prejudices of scientific methodology. 28
Goldstein’s view of the structure of personality is
very similar to Allport’s. In the former, "preferred per-
formances" are the clues to capacities and constants of an
individual's functioning. In the latter, traits are psycho-
physical systems which are telic in character. There is a
difference ,however
,
in their conclusions about the symbols
and method adequate to investigation of personality. Allport
believes that "mathematical symbols and neologisms" are really
useless and dangerous. In the main Goldstein agrees as he
speaks of the "qualitative nature" of a personality's inter-
actional organization. The cnly thing that takes the edge off
his "hope to discover by objective and mathematical methods
[factor analysis] some consistent traits of personality" is
the reminder that the individual proper or the whole personality
pq
should always be the point of departure.
seelischen Lebens iiberhaupt . ” Art. (1934), 1. This apolies
to "given" events as well as hypostatized ones. "Unzusammenffe-
setztheit" is most clearly found in the description of immedi-
ate experience. Ho conscious content is a sum of elements or
oarts. Analysis reveals "Ganze" which are qualitative finali-
ties. Hans Volkelt's history of this school shows its close al-
liance with the Gestalt point of view: Wundt anticipated Ganz -
heitspsychologie
,
Shrenfels dedgnated distinct types of Ganz -
qualit&ten and in this resoect was somewhat indebted to Mach's
work of 1886, and William James's writings are full of notions
intimatel:/ related to Krttger's holistic theory of "des wirk-
lich Erlebten." (See ibid., 9-12, 42)
28. See Goldstein, HN, 167-168; Allport, PER, 235.
29. See Goldstein, HN, 188-189, Chanter VII; Cf. Allport, PER,
310-311, Chapter XII.
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1. Synopsis and "biology.
Goldstein's clinical and experimental work has helped
him to formulate an appropriate method for "biology whid> he
feels, must depart considerably from that of physical sci-
ence. On the whole, exact natural science, if it follows
the dicta prescribed by da Vinci and Galileo, is, Goldstein
believes, a procedure that moves "atomistically, " by dissec-
tion, isolation, and analysis.'"" He believes that all this
is necessary but not enough. Physical science results in a
symbolism which is essentially alien to the phenomena of
observation. Its methods are still too much concerned with
abstractions to be of real help to the biologist.
a. Kurt Goldstein on method.
In biology, Goldstein urges, the notion of "the organ-
ism in its qualitative organization and holistic functioning"
is the basis of biological knowledge and the criterion of
factual relevance. The true constituents of the organism are
discovered by the observation of "preferred performances."
As Goldstein says, relating his view to that of the Gestalt-
ists
:
In the light of our general view, the tendency to-
ward the good Gestalt finds its explanation as an
organismic phenomenon. The explanation lies in the
tendency Coward preferred behavior, which is the es-
sential prerequisite for the existence of a definite
organi sm. ^1
30. HN, 28, 21. But see above, 156ff .
31. ORG, 378. (Ital. omitted.)
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Such views imply that biology needs a partly sui generis
method. Goldstein believes it must be a form of creative
activity whereby the investigator builds a picture of the
individual phenomenon through ”a form of ideation similar
to the procedure of an artist.” Goethe called such a pro-
cedure Schau . The "picture” was called the Urbild . 5S
In physical science the copy-theory of knowledge
has been given up for the symbolic. Goldstein refers to
Cassirer and Duhem as emphasizing the role of creative imagi-
nation informing conceptual structures far removed from im-
mediate day-to-day exoerience. Biology also needs creative
imagination in a somewhat different direction:
In bMogy symbols, theoretical representations,
must in principle include quality and individuality
in all their determinations. Biological descrip-
tions must exhibit a definite qualitative organi-
zation.
The parts of an organic whole can never be understood merely
quantitatively. Every fact has a qualitative significance.
The tools of mathematical natural science must be supplemented
by approximation to a prototype, the Urbild of the organism.^4
This point of view was anticipated in the controversy between
Cuvier and S&int-Hilaire. One clung to the dissective way,
and the other made the Idea or "organismic principle” his
guide. Goldstein would do as Goethe did:
32. See Goldstein, HN, 23-25; ORG, 401-402.
33. HN, 29; ORG, 413.
34. See Goldstein ORG, 409. But cf. Goldstein’s remarks
above on mathematical analysis of personality factors, 142.
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A biologist must possess the faculty of combin-
ing both points of view, although he may not ad-
mit it. In other words, he must at one time use
the dissective approach, at another, the holistic. 33
Does the holistic approach require substantial vitalism:
Goldstein believes not. In fact, substantial vitalism is
usually an ad hoc or auxiliary hypothesis required by ex-
clusive use of the analytic method. Driesch’ s notion of
entelechy is too vague and irrelevant to scientific results
to be admissable. Furthermore, if teleology is anything
more than heuristic, it is, Goldstein believes, scientifical-
ly irrelevant. Goldstein agrees partly with Unger and von
Baer that "end" should be thought of as a direction of acti-
vity and not a consciously intended task. The idea of a
definite end (the actualization of an organism’s "essence")
may be highly fruitful for scientific comprehension. 37
35. ORG, 414. See Chapter II, 53, on Goethe and synopsis.
36. Substantial vitalism has valuably called attention to
the highly integrated complexity of organic life and its
creative development. Nevertheless, vitalism offers no pre-
cise explanation of these appearances except to postulate
entelechies or vital forces which have little or no ostensible
connection with them. Driesch explains that entelechy is non-
physic o-chemical but positively an elementary agent found in
nature. It has nothing in common with suatiality, quantity,
mass or energy. Still, in material systems the entelechy is
claimed to have effects through its suspensory power which
is "absolutely nonergetic" and sui generis
.
(See Driesch,
POI, 33-39, 32) The entelechy, says Needham somewhat
harshly, belongs to pre-Boylian biology. (OL, 77-78, 71)
Cf. Cohen, RAN, 273; Werkmeister, APS, 360-362; von Mises,
KLP, 268-269: Even if biology requires unique theoretical
"Hi Ifsbegriffe, " there is no need to step out of the realm
of empirical investigation.
37. See ORG, 424-425; see above, 126, describing Werk-
meister’s view of the use of concepts such as "purpose" in
biological investigation.
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Like synopsis Goldstein’s method makes the organism’s
specific qualitative organization, its constants , the guide
of analysis and the means of understanding parts. In both
psychology and biology the individual's "constants" make the
function of its parts intelligible. Goldstein defines con-
stant primarily in reference to psychology:
We may call the nreferred way of execution a con-
stant of the individual. Ultimately these con-
stants are basic traits of the constitutional and
character make-up of the individual. 38
The term "constant" is equally necessary for biology. it
is only in reference to the individual’s constants that the
functioning of parts under natural conditions can be under-
stood. Those investigators who try to understand the indi-
vidual in terms of the functioning of isolated parts, find
it continually necessary to bring in ad hoc hypotheses and
auxiliary factors. The sexual organs and digestive appara-
tus, for examnle, are parts of such a living thing as a per-
son, a dog, or a rat. To understand these parts, their
snecific relations and activities, it is necessary to refer
to the individual's constants :
A normal organism. .. is able to repress the hunger
feeling or the sex urge if it has something very
important to do, the neglect of which would bring
the whole organism into danger.^0
Goldstein’s method is thus application of synopsis in bio-
logy and ns yc ho logy.
38. HN, 184. See ibid., 193. See above, 138n.
39. ORG, 377-378; 381-388.
40. Goldstein, HN, 143.
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b. Rashevsky on method.
N. A. Rashevsky notes that the common excuse for the
lack of a consistent system of mathematical biology is the
comolexity of organic phenomena. Yet on the face of things
physical events appear so complex that exact mathematical
treatment seems impossible and out of the question. Rather,
the complexity of organic events, Rashevsky contends, is an
argument for the use of the mathematical method. An epitome
of the mathematical biologist's habits is found in Rashevsky'
s
statement
:
The important thing in mathematical method is to
abstract from a very complex group of phenomena its
essential features and thereby simplify the problem.
The more complex features are then taken care of
gradually, according to the degree of their importance
and complexity as second, third, and higher approxi-
mations. True, by abstracting, we lose, so to say,
contact with reality.: but no harm is done as long as
we keep it in mind . 1
And as long as "we keep it in mind" inquiry moves to ever
higher levels of approximation and empirical adequacy just
as the more complete modem theory of planetary motion re-
presents a higher level of empirical approximation from
which Newton's laws can be derived when certain factors are
4P
reduced to zero.
/That happens when the operations described above are
actually applied to living things? On the first level of ap-
proximation the nucleus-cytoplasm as well as the cells' func-
tioning and mode of multiplication are eliminated as too
complex. The investigator concentrates on what is common to
41. Rashevsky, Art. (1934), 178.
42. See ibid., 179-180. Werkmeister, APS, 224-225, 364, 365.
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all cells. A cell is viewed as a small liquid system in
which certain chemical reactions occur that result in
growth. After this the investigator occupies himself
with the precise physical conditions for absorption and secre-
tion of substances in relation to the permeability of the
cell surface and chemical reactions. "The conditions of
growth of a cell," Rashevsky says, "can readily be stated
mathematically by requiring that the total amount of food
substances consumed per unit time should exceed that of
44
secretion substances produced.
"
Further inquiry leads to other levels of approxima-
tion where the concern is surface tensions and conditions
of cell division (calculation of the critical size for di-
vision in terms ofpermeability, temperature, rate of meta-
bolism, etc.). Subsequently the scientist must attend, us-
ing the same basic schema, to types of cells, to irritability,
and so. Rashevsky even goes so far as to make suggestions
about the mathematical relation between character and bodily
constitution.
In spite of his rigorous application of the mathemati-
cal method and functional analysis, Rashevsky recognizes that
43. Note always the levels of approximation and conditions
of reduction. Compare this with the subsequent discussion
of the basis of "creativity." Woodger’s remarks in BP (235-
236) are not in contradiction to Rashevsky’ s views as to the
modus operandi of strictly scientific biology. But Woodger
is anxious lest the use of mathematics lead to content-ohysi-
calization. (BP, 235)
44. Art. (1934), 184.
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the aim is to explain rather than ’’explain away" specific and
unique properties of the living whole. The specific pro-
perties of the organism as a whole are the primary frame of
reference. Various parts are to he understood as parts only
by reference to the total features of the organism as "first
seen." RashevsBy’s method is the antithesis of reduction. ^5
Like synopsis it aims, 7/ithin a delimited subject matter, to
"save appearances" in explanation — inquiry must ever move
to higher levels of approximation.
In reference to synoptic method, Rashevsky’s views
are similar to those of Needham who seeks causal generaliza-
tions as valid as those of physics and chemistry but with a
different content .^ Thus, McDougall misrepresents when he
says v/ithout further statement that Needham relies primarily
and exclusively on "mechanistic explanation." Needham’s views
45. Werkmeister claims that the positivists’ reduction to
the thing-language (the everyday language: "This is hot."
’This is brown." "The lump of lead is heavy.") and their
physicalism thesis inevitably entails a content- reduction.
(See jVerkmeister, APS, 363-364; Art. [1940], 384-385.) But
Carnap and von Kises have argued explicitly that their
thesis entails no such reduction. In the Encyclopedia
Carnap notes that "Biology presupposes physics but not vice-
versa." The language of biology contains the physical
language as a sublanguage, but has its own unique elements.
(Enc., I, 1, 46, 45-55.) Again, von Mises speaks for the
positivists: "Warm sollten wir also verlangen, dass alles,
was in anderen Wissenschaft behandelt wird, sich auf Physi-
kalisches zurttckftihren lasse? Sowiet der Physikalisraus in
diesem Sinne gemeint ist, milssen wir ihn ablehnen." (KLP,
146. See ibid., 365-372.) For the logical positivists,
then, physicalism means linguistic reduction and "meaning"
becomes an intralinguist ic matter: Keaninsfulness is Ver -
bindbarkeit — a proposition is meaningless only if it con-
tradicts the rules of a given language. (See KLP, 63-74;
Morris, Enc., I, 2, 15-16, 41.)
46. See 0L, 164-165.
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follow very closely the fundamental consequences of dialecti-
cal materialism for biology. 4^ That is to say, biological
order is a "new dialectical level," a form different from
those found in physics, chemistry, and crystallography.
Mechanistic materialism -- Prenant, Zanadovsky, and other
Marxists or "left Hegelians" have insisted48-- is as much il-
licit metaphysics as is vitalism. The question is one of
levels of scientific laws, and this has an important meaning
for the whole-part relation as was suggested in the previous
chanter. For example, the specific properties of living things
are their self-direction, integration, regulation, and at the
same time diversity of processes. Whitehead has summarized
these features under "creativity." Now the specific or col-
lective properties of the organism may be found by material
analysis to have a functional correlation with the internal
structure of the germ and finally in the intra-atomic struc-
ture. 49
47. See Needham, OL, 44-47. Needham makes the interesting
observation that the dialectical position was anticipated
by Coleridge in his "Essay Toward Formation of a More Com-
prehensive Theory of Life" ( Miscellanies . London: Bohn, 1885)
Coleridge believed that life involves the same powers we re-
cognize under other names — electricity, chemical affinity,
etc. -- but so organized as to be the conditions or organic
appearances.
48. Cf. Emery, Art. (1935), 11-12: "Mechanists do not recog-
nize the hierarchy of the sciences and believe in the pos-
sibility of a reduction of the complex laws governing the
behavior of a society and living matter to the simpler physi-
cal chemical laws and these in turn to the most simple laws
of mechanical motion. . . .The dialecticians on the otter hand
consider the world process as a creative and synthetic one."
Both EnceLs and Lenin noted that there is a contact between
the biological and physical level but that "the higher is in-
evitably a new thing, which cannot be explained by the simple
sum of the ’elements.’" Cf. Somerville, Art. (1938), 232-33.
49. See Lillie, Art. (1934), 302, 309.
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The ontogenetic process owes its stable features to
intranuclear genes which are "directive." In contrast to
the homogeneity and symmetry in nonliving systems (for example,
the mixture of compounds in simple solution) organic trans-
formation is asymmetrical. This asymmetry has a basis in
in atomic and molecular behavior as shown in the predominating
influence of asummetrical compounds in synthetic metabolism
(for example, in the production of amino acids which are
"building stones" of proteins). Pasteur, in fact, regarded
the tendency toward asymmetric synthesis as the outstanding
distinction between the chemistry of living and nonliving
systems. It is responsible for the increasing complexity and
diversity of development that express themselves on a large
50
scale as "creativity." The hypothetical entities and parts,
which are discovered to explain certain "large scale features"
of the organism, get their specific meaning as parts from
their relation to the gross specific properties of the whole
organism. The atoms and their asymmetrical behavior are the
underlying and sufficient condition for the organisxrfs having
all those properties summarized in the word "creativity."
Their discovery marks a "qualitative difference" between the
properties of the whole and those of the parts in a certain
arrangement. There is no question of reducing the former to
the latter. In fact, Rashevsky follows the synoptic viewpoint
and suggests that inquiry and the "arrow of intelligibility"
should move in the opposite direction.
50. See Lillie, Art. (1934), 304. See ibid., 309.
..J$jj
,
’
.
'
.
e >
•
.
,
.
- 1 . •
152
2. Historical sciences.
A ’’holistic" and synoptic approach such as that dis-
cussed above may be necessary for all life-sciences and
Geisteswissenschaften . Morris Cohen, for example, seems
to believe that it is. After criticizing the attempted con-
tent-reduction of social-historical facts to simply physi-
cal or biological data, he concludes that the social in con-
trast to natural sciences demand a "teleologic point of view
which describes movements in terms of their goals.’ 1 They
demand a holism implied by the means-ends relationship
which ”is a special form of that between parts and wholes. "^1
On this point John Dewey seems undecided. In his
chapter on ’’Social Inquiry" in the Logic he vacillates be-
tween a teleologic holism and physicalism. Though social
sciences should generally follow the physical in instituting
a "conjugate correspondence of factual and conceptual sub-
ject-matter," their data, qua social, cannot be attacked
directly. They depend upon "extensive prior knowledge of
physical phenomena and their laws." No one does anything
except in physical circumstances so social sciences are not
exclusively or dominantly psychological. Dewey tends to
deny any autonomy for the temporal-psychological dimension
of purposes and desires -- emotions and purposes are existent
s
in the same sense as stones, stars, and oysters. 53 Everything
51. RAN, 543, 346.
52. See Dewey, LOG, 491-4S2.
53. See ibid., 492, 492n. "A pers on is an object, not a
'mind’ or consciousness.” (525T~*
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that exists is in physical space and time. Yet social
phenomena do have a novum
,
something "historical, or of the
nature of individual temporal sequences." The emphasis on
"individual temporal sequences" in social phenomena is a
significant emphasis, but for Dewey it often seems to be
little more than a challenge to physicalize the social
phenomena in distorting reduction and a killing shave with
Occam's razor.
Nevertheless, Cohen's remarks, and sometimes Dewey's,
suggest that adequate and honest comprehension of social
organizations as functional-purposive wholes entaiDs synopsis.
Otherwise there is a tendency to assimilate those wholes to
forms of biological and even physical organization. Certain-
ly a social whdbs has parts -- persons, material objects such
as tools and signs, industries, and the like -- with proper-
ties of their own. But to understand them fully as function-
ing oartSj they must ever be related to the specific proper-
ties and features of the whole which are really the defin-
ing properties that show the oneness of the society in con-
trast to the multitude of the parts. As Emery, the dialecti-
cal materialist has written, "Men are subject to certain
biological laws, but society as a unit has its specific laws
which are neither the sum, nor the continuation, nor the
combination or modification of the old elements." 5^ It is
the new elements, "specific laws" or collective properties,
which provide the primary and distinguishing referent of
the term "society." They are not, of course, the exclusive
«.
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referent, for a society is a complex thing with parts of
many kinds and functions.
54. See Art. (1935), 27.
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C. Summary.
Scientific methodology is shifting toward synopsis.
Though physics does and should follow the phenomenalism of
Galileo and Newton, the notion of "field" or functional
whole has become central. Physicists abandon earlier sim-
plicities and abstractions for the sake of greater empirical
adequacy. (Frank; Whitehead) Thus, there may be greater con-
cern for "individuality," but the reality of purposive and
"realizing" organisms is not implied (Hartshorne) in physics.
In psychology "The doctrine of the whole has won popularity."
(Allport) The view that personality is a collection of inde-
pendent specific habits and the Freudian mode of thought are
being abandoned in may quarters for understanding in terms
of an individual’s "preferred performances" or traits (telic
systems). The notion of "the organism in its qualitative
and holistic functioning" should be taken as the basis of
biological knowledge and the criterion of factual relevance,
so the biologist needs symbols that "include quality and in-
dividuality. " (Goldstein, echoing Goethe) But biology also
needs exact analysis. Though by abstracting mathematical
biology may seem to lose contact with reality "no harm is
done as long as we keep it [the abstracting] in mind " and
move to higher levels of empirical adequacy and approxima-
tion. (Rashevsky) Even this method aims within a delimited
subject matter to "save appearances." Along these lines
dialectical materialism and logical positivists’ "physicalism"
are quite compatible with synoptic evaluation of an organismte
.1
' n
•
-
'
*
156
specific properties: "Creativity," direction, and regula-
tion. Again, social-historical facts are seen to require
a "teleologic point of view" (Cohen) since they contain
something over and above the physical or biological level,
something "of the nature of individual temporal sequences."
(Dewey)
.
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ABSTRACT
The "holistic 1 ' and "organismic" philosophies of Smuts,
Whitehead, Lossky, and others raise the central problem of
this dissertation: Does the understanding of wholes require
both analysis and synopsis? (The writings of Lewis W. Beck
advance this problem in important ways. He shows that
synoptic method must be something more than "acknowledgment
of an oversummative property" in wholes and that understanding
a whole requires experience more than mere "ratiocination.")
Analysis ordinarily means resolving an object into parts and
seeing the relationship of parts originally in the whole.
Etymologically synopsis means seeing things together, which
might be merely synthesis or analysis-in-reverse. This dis-
sertation presents a different idea. It maintains that with
synopsis the finding of parts in a whole is guided and tested
by reference to the unique (Gestalt or "oversummative") proper-
ties of the whole in distinction from the properties of its
parts.
Some writers have defined "wholes" as ranging from
sums or aggregates through spatio-temporal %holes" and "sub-
stantial wholes" to causal and purposive organizations. Any
whole, i.e. any plurality-seen-as-a-unity, may indeed be re-
garded as a sum or aggregate if you take account only of its
elements and their properties, numerically conjoined. But a
whole differs from a sum or aggregate in that it has as a fact
certain unique (Gestalt or "oversummative") properties distinct
from the various properties of the parts. For example, the
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specific properties of an automobile -- its speed, horse-
power, and social usage -- mark its unity in contrast to the
plurality of parts such as sparkplugs, pistons, fan, and
wheels. The part
3
of a whole are such objects as are found
to be the condition of the whole’s unique and specific proper-
ties. "Parts" should not be confused with qualities or
aspects which, taken together, constitute a given object. The
qualities of a brick are its brown color, box-like shape, and
smooth surfaces. Its parts, however, are sand, fibrous
binder, and cement in a certain arrangement. Thus spatial,
temporal, or "substantial wholes" in themselves are to be
seen as complexes of various qualities or aspects. But a
whole, properly speaking, is a causal or purposive complex
of parts
,
of objects or processes found in experience to have
their own properties and found to be conditions of the whole’s
having such and such specific properties.
Questions Arising from Historic Views . Explanation,
Plato says, is "enumeration of the elements out of which any-
thing is composed." But when he "explains" a wagon by enumera-
tion of the planks (parts), these elements are not in the
same category as primitive qualities or "primeval elements"
which "have nothing but a name." Plato says that the dialecti-
cal thinker is synoptical. "Understanding," he believes,
moves upon hypotheses and images but "reason" soars beyond
to "the first principle of the whole." How, specifically, are
Plato’s dialectical or "synoptical" reason and his explanation
through "primeval elements" related to the understanding of
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wholes? Spinoza's scientia intuitive raises the question:
’What is the place of intuition in comprehending wholes? In
more recent times Hume used analysis to show that substances
are nothing but a complex of experienced qualities. His
method raises the question: Is the type of analysis which
separates out qualities and aspects of a thing adequate for
dealing with wholes? After Hume, Kant believed that there
is something in organisms which cannot be analyzed in the
same way as abstract spatial wholes. Goethe endorsed his
view as nein Bild seiner eigenen intuitiven Geistesrichtung.
"
Goethe wanted the poet’s "anschauendes Bewusstsein" of a
whole as well as the scientist's tight analysis. We must ask:
How are the two related? With Hegel "Reason" aims to achieve
the "concrete universal," the progressive organization of ex-
periences. Synopsis, in contrast to analysis, is often
linked with the "concrete" view that takes all facts Into
account. But how, specifically, is synopsis "concrete"
?
Analysis . By analysis "the problematic is discovered
to be a complex of simples" plus "combining relations." Unlike
positivists' "linguistic analysis" this neo-realistic version
of analysis is concerned with the nature of things rather
than language. Analysis, Perry says, "presupposes that the
nature and arrangement of the parts supplies the character
of the whole." But with Spaulding analysis reveals parts,
relations, and unique properties which "the whole, as a whole,
may have different from those of the parts." Material ana-
lysis, he believes, is adequate to deal with organic wholes
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because It shows "organizing relations" and puts "in relief"
a wholes unique properties.
It is confusing when a champion of analysis says that
an object "can be analyzed or divided ." With division an
object is treated as a sum. There is deliberate abstraction
from all but ’more or less than.' Dividing salt gives less
salt. But analysis leads to sodium and chlorine atoms and
finally to electrons. By " in situ " as against "material"
analysis Spaulding recognizes that analysis into qualities
differs from analysis into parts. So defense of the atomic
theory does not, as he believes, involve defense of "wholes"
like space and time. Perry’s narrower version of analysis,
like "analysis in situ ," may suffice for separating out an
object’s various qualities. But it mistakenly presupposes
that the character of a whole is exhausted in its parts and
arrangement. Spaulding's more adequate view puts "in relief"
those properties -in a whole that are "qualitatively different"
from the parts. (Those properties are "non-rat ional" because
they do not follow from the properties of the parts with logi-
cal necessity.) But even in this version the unique and
specific properties of a whole have no special privilege or
importance in understanding it. They are just other factors
to be "analyzed out."
Synopsis and Wholes . Synopsis must include some kind
of analysis if it is to deal adequately with wholes. One kind
of analysis will show that a sheet of paper is a complex of
such qualities as whiteness and smoothness. Another kind will
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show it to he a whole of parts such as wood-pulp, bleach,
and finally electrons. Synopsis should be distinguished from
"coherence. " To disrespect special meanings "coherence" has
acquired is only to invite confusion. "Coherence" may be
a definition of truth: A judgments truth is "its relations
to a complete system," says Blanshard. And thought " is its
object imperfectly realised." This view, like the neo-realist’s,
is indirectly a theory of the nature of things, a metaphysic.
"Coherence" may also be a criterion of truth: A belief is
true when self-consistent and involved in an harmonious and
inclusive system of beliefs ranging from hypotheses to eviden-
tial judgments. Against this criterion stands analysis of
complex beliefs into empirical "atomic" propositions which are
supposedly true-in-themselves . But these latter propositions,
unless they are cases of naming, are themselves beliefs whose
confirmation further requires a system of beliefs. Unless one
is merely naming, the proposition "This is white" involves,
along with other beliefs, "That is red." When synopsis re-
sults in beliefs about wholes, those beliefs must be tested
by coherence.
If synopsis be distinguished from analysis solely in
that it "sees things together," then mathematicians and neo-
realists are synoptists par excellence . They "see things to-
gether" as exemplifying abstract principles. If synopsis be
distinguished as mere recognition of the unique or "oversum-
mative" properties of wholes (Merz’s view), then Spaulding
must be called a synoptist. Again, to define synopsis as
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discovery of "objective" wholes by determining wither an
object is changed when it becomes a part (Beck’s view) adds
nothing to Spaulding's version of analysis which also allows
an object to change on becoming a part and also requires empiri-
cal operations. On all these points the difference between
analysis and synopsis is only one of label. There may be,
however, a real difference between those methods in the way
they treat the unique and specific properties of wholes. Ana-
lysis in some of its versions ignores those properties. At
best it puts them "in relief" and on a par with parts and order
in the whole. Historically synopsis has emphasized the specific
properties of wholes but has been vague about them. Synopsis
,
as now interpreted, sees the specific and "qualitatively dif-
ferent" properties of a whole as nuclear to its nature and
central to our understanding of it . By reference to such
properties our inference to parts (analysis) is guided and
tested. Toward them flies "the arrow of intelligibility."
Only by reference, for example, to water's specific properties
such as transparency, particular weight, solvency, etc. can
we justify our belief that its parts are hydrogen and oxygen
with their own properties and particular arrangement.
Synopsis and Scientific Method . Scientific methodology
is synoptic at several points. As physicists abandon earlier
simplicities, the notion of "field" or functional whole be-
comes central. In psychology, says Gordon Allport, "The doc-
trine of the whole has won popularity." Since "the organism
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in its qualitative and holistic functioning,” says Goldstein,
should he the basis of biological knowledge, symbols must
include ’’quality and individuality.” Though, by analysis and
abstraction, mathematical biology may seem to lose contact
with reality, Rashevsky believes that ”no harm is done as long
as we keep it [the abstraction] in mind ” and "save appearances”
by moving to higher levels of taking in the facts. With the
synoptic use of the organism’s unique properties and constants
’’dialectical materialism and logical positivists’ ’’physical-
ism" are quite compatible. Again, there is a synoptic empha-
sis in Cohen’s idea that social-historical facts require a
"teleologic point of view." They contain something over and
above the physical and biological leve], Dewey agrees, some-
thing of 'the nature of individual temporal sequences.”
Conclusions :
1. The contemporary "holistic” philosophies of Smuts,
Lossky, and Whitehead as well as the historic views of Plato,
Goethe, Kant, and Hegel raise the problem of whether wholes
require a special mode of comprehension over and above some
kind of analysis
•
2. Analysis, in some of its versions, ignores the
unique and "qualitatively different” properties of wholes that
enable us to differentiate between a whole and an aggregate,
between analysis and division and the separating out of quali-
ties.
5. At best analysis puts those properties ”in relief”
but gives them no special importance or privilege in relation
I V:''! . : :
’ " i 1 rf
.
’
, ?
r 1
' 1
i
-
• V ' ' £. g '
. /
’ *
J ' '
•
•
<
• • •
•
•
;
. r \
.
.
'
.
172
to parts and order in a whole.
4. In many writings on synopsis and analysis those
methods have been distinguished vaguely or verbally.
5. Synopsis, it should be said with historical right,
sees the specific and "qualitatively different" properties
of a whole as nuclear to its nature and central to understand-
ing it.
6. Scientific methodology is synoptic in the physicist ! s
emphasis on "fields," the psychologists stress upon wholes,
the biologist’s interest in the "holistic functioning" of
the organism, and in the recognition of the unique character
of social ohenomena.
7. The understanding of wholes requires both analysis
and synopsis because without analysis we cannot tell whether
and how an object is a whole and without synopsis we miss
or minimize the "qualitatively different" properties of a
whole which are nuclear to its nature and are the means of
testing our analysis.
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